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FIRST AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION:
ON DISCRETION, INEQUALITY, AND
PARTICIPATION
Daniel P. Tokaji*
[A]n ordinance which ...makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms
which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of
an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or
denied in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censor
ship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.
- Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham1

In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process,
the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the
benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants ... the Baldus
study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias
affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.
-McCleskey

v.

Kemp

2

The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirements for non
arbitrary treatment of voters .... The formulation ofuniform rules to de
termine [voter] intent ... is practicable and, we conclude, necessary.
·

-Bush

v.

Gore3

INTRODUCTION

The tension between equality and discretion lies at the heart of
some of the most vexing questions of constitutional law. The consider
able discretion that many official decisionmakers wield raises the
spectre that violations of equality norms will sometimes escape detec* Assistant Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University. A.B. 1989,
Harvard; J.D. 1994, Yale. - Ed. I wish to thank David Barron, Susie Blumenthal, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Amina El-Sayad, Rick Hasen, Ken Karst, Heather Gerken, Mark Rosen
baum, Bill Rubenstein, and David Schwartz for their comments and encouragement. Special
thanks to Erin Bernstein for her exceptional research assistance. This Article also benefited
from comments made during law school faculty workshops at Santa Clara, Loyola-Chicago,
Seton Hall, Villanova, University of Houston, Washington & Lee, and Ohio State Univer
sity. Any errors are of course mine alone.

1. 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958)).
2. 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (footnote omitted).
3. 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000).

2409

2410

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 01:2409

tion. This is true in a variety of settings, whether discretion lies over
speakers' access to public fora, implementation of the death penalty,
or the recounting of votes. Is the First Amendment4 violated, for
example, when a city ordinance gives local officials broad discretion to
determine the conditions under which political demonstrations may
take place?5 Is equal protection denied where the absence of uniform
standards for vote recounts gives low-level bureaucrats wide latitude
in determining which votes to count?6
The subject of this Article is the role of the courts in policing the
distorting effects of discretion upon constitutional equality, particu
larly where rights of political participation are at stake. It uses the
term "First Amendment Equal Protection" to refer to those cases
applying an especially searching mode of analysis where the govern
ment threatens to undermine equality in the realm of expression.7
At the core of First Amendment Equal Protection, I argue, is the
democratic ideal that all citizens should have an equal opportunity to
participate in public discourse. The cases that I include under this
rubric exhibit a heightened sensitivity to the threat to equality posed
by excessive official discretion,.8 This sensitivity has led to stringent

4. Although using the term "First Amendment" throughout, this Article does not ad
dress the religion clauses of the First Amendment but instead focuses on cases involving the
speech, press, assembly, and petition clauses. This should not be taken as denying that the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses have an egalitarian component. See Newdow v.
United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the words "un
der God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violate the Establishment Clause's requirement of
neutrality), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Elk Grove Uni
fied Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (Oct. 14, 2003). The egalitarian aspects of the First
Amendment's religion clauses, however, present a subject for another day.
5. See, e.g. , Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 9 1 -92 (1940); Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 501 (1939).
6. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 102-03.
7. The use of this term is meant to recall Professor Monaghan's use of the term "First
Amendment 'Due Process' " in his article of the same title. Henry P. Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process, " 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1 970). While Professor Monaghan
focused on the special procedural rules that were at the time developing to safeguard liberty
of expression, this Article focuses upon the egalitarian component of the First Amendment.
lt takes up Kenneth Karst's insight that "the principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the
first amendment's protections against government regulation of the content of speech."
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
20, 21 (1975) [hereinafter Karst, Equality in the First Amendment].
8. While libertarian rhetoric often surrounds First Amendment discourse, see, e.g. ,
Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 225 (1992); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, A utonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991), implicit in my argument is that the egalitarian component of the
freedom of speech has always been prominent. It thus takes issue with those who argue that
equality "should be banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm," see,
e.g. , Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982), as well as
those who contend that "the constitutional doctrine of free speech has developed without
taking equality seriously," see, e.g. , CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71 (1993).
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tests designed to "smoke out" illicit motivations.9 Among the
doctrines developed to cabin discretion in the realm of speech are
rules requiring exceptionally clear standards where government re
quires permission to speak in public places, and liberal rules regarding
facial challenges, justiciability, and appellate factfinding.10 These safe
guards against inequality in the realm of speech have for the most part
endured, despite the changing makeup of the Court and judicial
philosophies of its members.
This searching mode of analysis contrasts sharply with the standard
applied where nonspeech forms of equality are at issue. Outside the
area of free speech, the Court generally exhibits a much greater toler
ance for schemes that vest broad discretion in government officials.
That is true even where the existence of such discretion may allow
intentional group-based discrimination, including race discrimination,
to persist undetected and thereby defy judicial remedy.11 Cases such as
Washington v. Davis12 and McCleskey v. Kemp,13 for example, rest on a
presumption that decisionmakers will generally exercise their discre
tion free from racial bias. Even in the face of evidence showing a
statistically significant disparate impact on those of a particular racial
or ethnic group,14 the Court is loathe to find an equal protection viola
tion without "smoking gun" evidence of illicit motive.15 Put simply, the
Court exhibits a much greater willingness to trust government
decisionmakers - to assume that they will exercise their discretion in
a fair and unbiased manner - where race is concerned, than where
speech is concerned.

9. Cf David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV.
1, 26 (describing strict scrutiny as a means by which to "smoke out" illicit motivations).
10. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term - Foreword: Implement
ing the Constitution, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 54, 96-97 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Implementing
the Constitution) (identifying strict First Amendment rules for licensing schemes as a means
by which to prevent discrimination on forbidden bases); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960) ("[T]he
doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost in
variably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries
of several Bill of Rights freedoms.").
1 1 . Throughout this Article, I use the term "race" to include both race and ethnicity.
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
14. See, e.g. , McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13 (holding that Georgia's capital sentencing
system did not deny equal protection, despite disparities that "appear[] to correlate with
race").
15. This Article does not quarrel with the general requirement that discriminatory
intent must be shown in order to establish an equal protection violation. Indeed, it argues
that a concern with intentional discrimination lies not only at the heart of equal protection
cases in the area of race, but also at the root of First Amendment cases involving discretion
ary schemes of speech regulation.
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The critical distinction between First Amendment Equal Protec
tion and Conventional Equal Protection lies not so much in how they
answer the theoretical question of what constitutes a violation. The
difference lies instead in their answer to the question of how to
prevent and remedy such violations.16 Thus, it is important to consider
why these mechanisms for dealing with discretion differ so dramati
cally.
In considering this question, it is instructive to examine three lines
of equal protection jurisprudence that depart from the norm: specifi
cally, those involving jury exclusion,17 political restructuring,18 and the
"one person, one vote" standard.19 These areas exhibit modes of
analysis similar though not identical to First Amendment Equal Pro
tection, reflecting the importance of safeguarding equality in realms of
democratic participation. Even without clear evidence of discrimina
tory intent, the Court has been willing to find an equal protection
violation in these areas.20
This Article argues that the decision whether to cabin official
discretion, or, alternatively, to adopt a more deferential test in a given
context reflects a judgment, usually a silent one, about the relative
value of discretion and equality. The First Amendment Equal
Protection cases suggest a new gloss on inequalities that have not
traditionally been viewed as serious equal protection problems. These
include not only the electoral inequalities that have received consider
able attention in the wake of Bush v. Gore,21 but also practices such as
incumbent-preferential gerrymandering schemes and viewpoint-based
peremptory challenges. Considering such practices in the light cast by
First Amendment Equal Protection cases should, I argue, cause courts

16. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 243 (1998) ("[C]onstitutional text
does not specify precisely which institutional, procedural, and doctrinal rules best implement
the First Amendment's substantive values."); Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990
Term - Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional A ccountability (What the Bork
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 84 (1991) ("[T]he definition of fundamen
tal rights and the judicial enforcement of those rights are two very different inquiries.");
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 57, 60 (stating that the role of courts
is not simply to articulate constitutional norms but also to define how those norms should be
implemented).
17. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
18. See, e.g. , Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
19. See, e.g. , Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. As explained in Part III.B, I view these three sets of cases as "soft purpose" cases,
designed to smoke out intentional discrimination in cases where the existence of government
discretion makes it hard to detect. Cf. Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protec
tion, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1035 (1996)
(arguing that equal protection cases involving unequal restructuring of political process are
not best understood as "soft intent" cases).
21. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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to view the exercise of official discretion in these contexts more skep
tically than Conventional Equal Protection doctrine would demand.
* * * *

Part I of this Article assesses various areas in which official and
quasi-official22 decisionmakers are called upon to exercise discretion,
and describes two equality norms that may be threatened by such
discretion: racial equality and expressive equality. Part II traces the
development of First Amendment Equal Protection and shows how its
special doctrinal rules are rooted in concerns that public officials will
misuse their discretion to suppress dissenting viewpoints.
Part III contrasts First Amendment Equal Protection with
"Conventional Equal Protection," a term I use to refer to the less
searching mode of analysis generally applied to official discretion
outside the realm of speech. Part IV discusses three areas, collectively
referred to as "Unconventional Equal Protection,"23 which represent
exceptions to this general rule. In these cases, the Court has adopted
different modes of analysis, which place a higher premium on elimi
nating inequality even where it requires some diminution of official
discretion.
Part V attempts to explain these divergent approaches to the
problem of equality and discretion, noting that the equal protection
cases that most closely resemble the First Amendment model are
those concerning inequalities in the realm of political participation. I
argue that this heightened sensitivity suggests a First Amendment-like
dimension to questions of political equality that have traditionally
been examined under the lens of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Article closes by suggesting a new analytic framework within which to
examine such problems as inequalities in voting systems, incumbent
gerrymandering, and peremptory challenges, drawing from the
approach to official discretion developed in First Amendment Equal
Protection cases.

22. I use the term "quasi-official" or "quasi-governmental" to include jurors, public
defenders, civil litigants, and others who, though not generally thought of as government
officials, are in some contexts deemed state actors and therefore subject to the constraints of
the Constitution. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991)
(holding that private litigants exercising peremptory challenges are state actors).
23. Joel Swift uses the term "unconventional equal protection" to describe the mode of
analysis applied by the Supreme Court in assessing discrimination in the exercise of peremp
tory challenges. Joel H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury
Selection, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1996). This Article agrees that this area presents
a prime example in which the Supreme Court has departed from its ordinary equal protec
tion analysis, and attempts to explain its relationship to other areas in which the Court has
looked with skepticism on discretionary schemes that threaten either racial or expressive
equality.
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DISCRETION AND INEQUALITY

Discretion pervades our systems of government, from the actions
of police officers on the beat, to verdicts handed down by juries, to
decisions made by innumerable administrative agencies, to the manner
in which states and localities choose to structure their political
processes. Any system aspiring to individualized justice depends upon
placing some degree of discretionary decisionmaking authority in
public or quasi-public officials.24 Discretion to determine how the law
should be applied - and to decide when not to apply the law - is
therefore an integral component of our systems of justice.25
This Part begins by examining the literature regarding official
discretion in various spheres. It then provides an overview of two
types of equality that the misuse of official discretion jeopardizes:
expressive equality and racial equality. As I shall attempt to show,
First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is
centrally occupied with how best to curb intentional discrimination
without unduly infringing on official discretion.
A. Defining Discretion
Roscoe Pound defined discretion as "an authority conferred by law
to act in certain conditions or situations in accordance with an offi
cial's or an official agency's own considered judgment and
conscience. "26 In a similar vein, Kenneth Culp Davis stated that " [a]
public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power
leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or
inaction. "27

24. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation, and Mitigation: The Problem of
the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1960) ("[T)he life of today is too
complex and its circumstances are too varied and too variable to make possible, in practice,
reduction to rules of everything with which the regime of justice according to law must
deal.").
25. See, e.g. , Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir.
1973):

In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory or
statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecuto
rial decisions do not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary. The reviewing courts
would be placed in the undesirable and injudicious posture of becoming "superprosecutors. "
In the normal case of review of executive acts of discretion, the administrative record is
open, public and reviewable on the basis of what it contains. The decision not to prosecute,
on the other hand, may be based upon the insufficiency of the available evidence, in which
event the secrecy of the grand jury and of the prosecutor's file may serve to protect the ac
cused's reputation . . . .
26. Pound, supra note 24, at 926.
27. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 4 (1969). Davis's thesis was that
" [w]here law ends, discretion begins." Id. at 3.
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The common thread running through these two definitions is the
idea that discretion exists where the law leaves public officials free to
exercise their judgment. So defined, discretion permeates virtually
every aspect of governmental functioning.28 Police officers, for
example, enjoy considerable discretion in deciding which of the many
drivers speeding through an intersection to stop. But discretion does
not only come into play where the law ends. It also exists where it is
unclear what the law prescribes and where there are no effective
means to ensure that the law's prescription is followed. One such
example is a j ury's discretion to acquit a criminal defendant, even in
the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. If jurors refuse to follow
the law and acquit despite an instruction that would in the face of the
evidence require a guilty verdict, there is no check upon the jury's
decision. The jury therefore enjoys discretion to acquit, even though
the law mandates the opposite outcome. And of course, the modern
administrative state - with its countless agencies at the local, state,
and national level - is critically dependent upon the exercise of offi
cial discretion to engage in both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions.29
Vesting discretion in public and quasi-public officials allows those
officials to base their decisions on circumstances that by their very
nature are impossible to codify.3° For this reason, official discretion is
vital to ensuring "individualized justice," the ability of decisionmakers
to take particular circumstances into account in order to achieve a fair

28. See HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 349 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of
Cal. Press 1970) (1934) ("Even the most detailed command must leave to the individual exe
cuting the command some discretion."); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A
Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 581 (1983) ("Discretion is inevitable in
enforcing any law."). A substantial body of literature examines both the benefits and dan
gers of official discretion. See, e.g. , DA VIS, supra note 27; Burton Atkins & Mark Pogrebin,
Introduction: Discretionary Decision-Making in the Administration of Justice, in THE
INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAW (Burton Adkins & Mark Pogrebin
eds., 2nd ed. 1982); Pound, supra note 24, at 926.
29. Jerry Mashaw describes the tension between the enforcement of legal rights and the
administration of policy as follows:
In a legal culture largely oriented toward court enforcement of individual legal rights, "ad
ministration" has always seemed as antithetical to "law" as "bureaucracy" is to "justice."
Law focuses on rights, administration on policy. Rights, if enforced, must limit policy,
thereby stifling administration. When policy is wanted, the law's typical response is to create
no-right, no-law policy enclaves where discretion can flourish. But permitting uncontrolled
discretion generates a demand for law, and the competitive cycle of law and policy begins
anew.
JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983).
30. See, e.g. , Atkins & Pogrebin, supra note 28, at 3 ("[D]iscretion is important because
it maintains a flexible, individualized system of justice. Nevertheless it is a system vulnerable
to abuse.").

2416

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2409

result.31 Nevertheless, the existence of discretion creates a substantial
risk that government actors will contravene equality norms. Left to
their own devices, the various entities that exercise discretionary
decisionmaking authority - including police officers, bureaucrats,
judges, juries, and even the electorate - may base their decisions on
improper considerations.
From a constitutional standpoint, two such considerations warrant
special attention. The first is that public officials may misuse their
discretion either to target speech based on the messages or ideas
sought to be conveyed. The second is that official decisionmakers may
misuse their discretion to discriminate based on race or ethnicity. In
both contexts, requiring greater precision in the criteria that guide
decisionmakers' judgment decreases the likelihood that they will base
their decisions on constitutionally impermissible considerations.32 Yet,
in some circumstances, it may be impossible or imprudent to demand
such precise standards because of the need to preserve official discre
tion. In those cases, the pertinent question becomes how discretion
can be managed or cabined so as to minimize the threat of inequality.
The governmental and quasi-governmental players vested with
discretion that is subject to misuse include:
•
Prosecutors deciding whether to bring charges and whether to en
ter into a plea bargain:33 May prosecutors exercise their charging
discretion to target only those draft dodgers who are vocal in
their opposition, in an effort to suppress dissent?34 May they ex31. Id.; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term - Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992) (noting that the
rules/standards debate turns on how much discretion is afforded to decisionmakers).
32. See Spencer Overton, Rule�� Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 65 (2002) ("More flexible standards give deci
sionmakers the discretion to protect political participation in particular contexts, but this
discretion may also allow a decisionmaker's biases to enter the political process.").
33. There is an abundance of scholarship regarding the benefits and dangers of prosecu
torial discretion. See, e.g. , Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968) (discussing hazards posed by prosecutorial discretion in plea bar
gaining process); Richard Bloom, Prosecutorial Discretion, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267 ( 1999) (sum
marizing case authority on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Peter J. Hennig, Prose
cutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 722-27 ( 1999)
(analyzing tests for determining whether prosecutors have exercised their broad authority in
an unconstitutional manner, and arguing that subjective intent should be irrelevant to this
inquiry); Wayne Lafave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in The United States, 18 AM. J. COMP.
L. 532 (1970) (examining prosecutorial discretion and dangers of misuse); Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 121-30 (1994) (criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines'
grant of discretionary power to prosecutors); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in
an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 704 (asserting that while prosecutorial discre
tion is both "unavoidable and desirable," prosecutors must impose upon themselves a re
sponsibility to exercise that discretion only where they are assured of guilt beyond a reason'
able doubt).
34. In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected a
selective-prosecution challenge to "a passive enforcement policy under which the
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ercise their discretion to investigate and prosecute only African
Americans for cocaine trafficking offenses because they believe
that African Americans are more likely to be convicted?35
Police officers determining whom among the many violating the
traffic laws should be stopped and arrested:36 May police officers
stop speeding drivers based upon a racial profile showing that
Latinos on that interstate are more likely to be trafficking in
drugs?37 May they choose, out of a sense of patriotism, to refrain
from stopping those with American flags flying from their
antennas?
Judges determining what sentences should be given to people
convicted of crimes: May judges give enhanced sentences to those
who harbor political views hostile to the United States
Government? May a j udge give a particularly harsh sentence to a
white teenager from an affluent suburb, viewing his conduct to be
inexcusable in light of the advantages he has enjoyed?38
Civil attorneys deciding how to exercise peremptory challenges to
prospective jurors: May a civil defendant strike black jurors on
the belief that they tend to favor more generous judgments
against large corporations? May a plaintiff strike all libertarian

Government prosecutes only those who report themselves as having violated the law, or who
are reported by others." Id. at 600. Relying on the "broad discretion" of the government to
decide whom to prosecute, the Court held that the policy violated neither the Equal Protec
tion Clause nor the First Amendment. Id. at 607-14.
35. In United States v. A rmstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the Supreme Court reversed an
order requiring discovery in a selective prosecution claim. The district court had permitted
discovery, where the Federal Public Defenders office provided evidence that all of the
twenty-four crack cocaine cases tried by the U.S. Attorney's Office in 1991 involved African
Americans. The Supreme Court held that, in order to obtain discovery on a selective
prosecution claim, the defendant must show that the government did not prosecute similarly
situated persons of a different race. Id. at 470.
36. The subject of police discretion to enforce and to choose not to enforce the laws is
one that has received considerable scholarly attention. See, e.g. , Joseph Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration
ofJustice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) (explaining how police wield discretionary power through
their decisions whether to enforce the criminal law). Other scholars have emphasized the
values served by police officers' exercise of "common sense" discretion. See, e.g. , KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 62 (1975). For more recent studies of how the exercise of
necessary police discretion may be subjected to more effective public scrutiny, see Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities,
and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997), and Erik Luna, Transparent Policing,
85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000).
37. See, e.g. , Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2001).
38. For a discussion of the discretion allowed to judges sentencing criminal defendants
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of
Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Un
der the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1999).
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j urors out of belief that they tend to favor corporate interests
over those of consumers?39
Juries deciding guilt and meting out punishment:40 May jurors
consider the race of the victim in determining whether to impose
the death penalty? May they choose not to impose the death
penalty where the defendant and the victim are both white,
because they do not view that crime to be as egregious as a cross
race murder?41
The president of the United States deciding whether to grant
pardons: May the potential pardonees' race or their support for
the president's political party play a role in his decision?42
Municipalities determining whether to close streets for marches
and parades, and what fees to impose for those events: May they
choose to target for protection racial minorities marching in the
streets without a required permit? May they charge greater fees
for a white supremacist group preaching a message of racial in
tolerance, likely to generate a hostile response?43
Administrative agencies charged with setting policy and with
applying policies to individual cases:44 May an administrative law

39. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) ("[A) 'legitimate reason'
[to strike a juror) is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal
protection.").
40. For a discussion of the dangers of placing unguided capital-sentencing discretion in
juries, see Scott E. Erlich, Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and Death, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1403 (1996). Much of the contemporary scholarly debate regarding the dis
cretion vested in juries relates to jury nullification (i.e., the power of juries to disregard laws
they believe to be unjust and to make decisions in accordance with their collective con
science). See, e.g. , Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 257-58 (1996); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nulli
fication: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51;
Ran Zev Schijanovich, Note, The Second Circuit's Attack on Jury Nullification in United
States v. Thomas: In Disregard of the Law and the Evidence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1275
(1999).
41. See Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty: The Tension Between Indi
vidualized Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 TEX. WESLEY AN L. REV. 45, 80-94
(1995).
42. See, e.g., Greg B. Smith, Clinton Library Fundraiser Helped Perjurer Get Pardon,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2001, at A2 (" 'I was aware of the . . . rule(s), but I was also aware that
the president has discretion,' said (former White House counsel Bernard) Nussbaum, who
handled the case for free.").
43. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
44. There is a voluminous body of scholarship addressing the forms of discretion exer
cised by administrative agencies and the ways in which that discretion may be managed. See,
e.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES 6 (1987) (defining "two basic kinds of discretionary authority
given to administrative agencies: (1) authority to make legislative-like policy decisions, and.
(2) authority to decide how general policies apply to specific cases"); DAVIS, supra note 27,
at 23-24 (describing problems of discretionary j ustice that arise in both administrative adju-
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judge's racial biases be allowed to affect the determination
whether social security benefits should be awarded?45 May agen
cies exercise their rulemaking discretion to craft policies designed
to benefit politically well-connected interest groups?46
•
The electorate or legislature determining how to structure the
government: May the people enact a referendum imposing spe
cial barriers on those who seek to enact race-remedial programs,
such as school desegregation?47 May the legislature impose spe
cial barriers on those who wish to engage in certain forms of
speech, such as "raves" known to be associated with drug activ
ity?4s
These examples suggest the range of areas in which discretion may
lead to inequality, and elucidate the difficulties in policing the exercise
of official discretion. For even if one believes that the answer to some
of the above questions is no - and even if one believes that a no
answer is constitutionally mandated - the question of how to enforce
such a prohibition must still be answered.
In perhaps no other area has there been greater scholarly attention
to the relationship between discretion and inequality than in the litera
ture examining the operation of the criminal justice system. More than
forty years ago, Joseph Goldstein described the enormous discretion
ary power that street-level law enforcement officers wield through
their decisions whether to enforce the criminal law.49 While there is
now consensus that vesting some degree of discretion in police agen-

dication and rulemaking); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION 1 1-12
(1986) (arguing that achieving just administration depends not only on the existence of dis
cretion, but on using it to promote "shared decision making between autonomous, responsi
ble participants"); ADMINISTRATIVE D ISCRETION AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
(Douglas H. Shumavon & H. Kenneth Hibbeln eds., 1986) (collection of articles studying
administrative discretion and attempts to control its misuse).
45. See LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE: UNRA YEUNG BIAS IN
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 4-5 (1999) (finding bias based on race and poverty in adminis
trative law j udge decisions regarding social security disability benefits). See generally
MASHAW, supra note 29 (assessing the quality of justice in social security disability adjudica
tions).
46. See BRYNER, supra note 44, at 10 ("Administrative rule making . . . represents the
kind of administrative action that is most in need of external checks and constraints, because
of its legislative nature. It has become a focal point for criticisms for government regulation
and the broad discretionary powers enjoyed by administrative bodies.").
47. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) (striking down a
Washington initiative prohibiting local school districts from maintaining voluntary desegre
gation programs); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1448 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding a California initiative prohibiting local governmental entities from maintaining
voluntary affirmative action programs), amended by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
·

48. See Assembly Bill 1941, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (imposing special permit
requirements on promoters of any "rave party").
49. . Goldstein, supra note 36.
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cies is both desirable and unavoidable,50 more recent scholarship has
argued that mechanisms should exist to hold police agencies account
able for the exercise of their discretion. Erik Luna, for example,
emphasizes that the legitimacy of democratic government depends on
police discretion being exercised in a manner that is "open to the elec
torate."51 For police departments to operate behind a veil of secrecy
contravenes fundamental principles of self-governance and threatens
the rights of minorities.52 The debate over racial profiling - and the ,
means by which to stop it - reflects increasing concern with the
discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws by police officers vested
with broad discretion over whom to stop, detain, and arrest.53
Because the power to be lenient encompasses the power to
discriminate,54 one might ask why discretion in each of these areas
should not be eliminated entirely. If specific enough rules were
prescribed to dictate how discretion should be exercised, one might
argue, the potentially discriminatory exercise of discretion could be
curtailed if not eliminated. The problem with this argument is the
impossibility of crafting rules specific enough to deal with the many
50. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 209 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that
while Goldstein concluded that police discretion should be eliminated, "[v]irtually all other
experts have rejected the idea of abolishing discretion").
51. Luna, supra note 36, at 1 108.
52. Id. at 1132. Professor Luna's two c;oncerns regarding the consequences of police de
partments operating under the radar screen recall those upon which Madison focuses in ,
Federalist 51 : first, that government cannot be held accountable to the electorate it is sup
posed to serve; and, second, that the rights of numerical minorities will be placed in jeop
ardy. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2d ed. 1999);
see also AMAR, supra note 16, at 21, 237 (describing the twin concerns of Federalist 51 as
"protecting the people against unrepresentative government" and "protecting minorities
from 'factional' majority tyranny").
53. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 16-62 (1999) (surveying evidence of ra
cial discrimination by police and arguing that courts have failed to exercise adequate over
sight); SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE 100 (1996) (finding evidence of
discrimination against African Americans in making arrests); John R. Hepburn, Race and
the Decision to Arrest: An Analysis of Warrants Issued, 15 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 6669 (1978) (finding racial disparity in arrests between whites and nonwhites); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Tracy Maclin,
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 344-54 (1998) (analyzing evidence
that police officers disproportionately target African-American and Latino motorists);
Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police
A rrest Decisions, 75 J, CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 246-49 (1984) (finding police are
generally more likely to take action when the victim is white than black, but finding no dif
ference based on the race of the suspect); Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging Selective En
forcement of Traffic Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United
States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 TEXAS L.
REV. 1083, 1116-23 (1998) (proposing an application of exclusionary rule to police practices
that have a discriminatory effect); Carl J. Schifferle, Note, After Whren v. United States:
Applying the Equal Protection Clause to Racially Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law, 2
MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 161-62 (1997) (explaining how broad police discretion gives rise
to a specter of discriminatory enforcement against racial minorities).
54. DAVIS, supra note 27, at 231-32.

'
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different factual scenarios that official decisionmakers confront. Even
if one believes that the answer to most, if not all, of the above ques
tions should be no - i.e., that the government entities in question
should not exercise their discretion in the ways indicated - the ques
tion of how to ensure that such discretion is not exercised remains.
Many discretionary decisions seem, by their very nature, to defy
judicial review. And too closely circumscribing the exercise of discre
tion, even if possible, would risk missing aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that call for special treatment in the individual case.ss
Preserving some discretion therefore is essential not only to the
efficient operation of government, but also to the promotion of indi
vidualized justice.s6 Entrusting public officials with the power to make
individualized judgments comes at a great price, however, where risks
of racial bias or the suppression of disfavored ideas are at play.s7 Thus,
there must be some limitation placed upon the exercise of official
discretion.s8 But in what circumstances should courts restrict official
discretion? And how should they enforce such restrictions?
B.

Two Kinds of Equality

While the exercise of governmental discretion may lead to various
evils, the focus of this Article is upon two that are of special concern:
first, that discretion will lead to intentional discrimination against
speakers based upon their ideas or message; and second, that it will
lead to intentional discrimination based upon race.s9 There are
substantial differences of opinion over the character of the equality
that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause demand,
differences that correspond to conflicting theories of what values these
constitutional mandates should serve.60 It is not my purpose, at this
point, to adjudicate these differences. What is important, for my
55. See Sullivan, supra note 31, at 66-69.
56. E.g. , Patterson, supra note 41, at 53.
.

57. See id.

58. See Pound, supra note 24, at 927 ("[C)areful limitation of the cases in which discre
tion may be resorted to is clearly indicated.").
59. I limit my discussion here to racial discrimination because it is often understood as
the archetype of group-based discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. The
insights this Article attempts to draw regarding racial discrimination, however, may be
applicable to other forms of discrimination as well.
60. For an extensive discussion of the constitutional ideal of equality that considers both
expressive and racial equality, see generally Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L.
REV. 245 (1983). Professor Karst traces the development of constitutional equality, stressing
the "'moral ideal' of equal citizenship" as a guiding force. Id. at 288 (citation omitted); see
also KENNETH KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION 1 89 (1993) (viewing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 , preservation of abortion rights, and limitations on school prayer as "re
flecting the centrality and the endurance of the principle of equal citizenship in American
law and the American civic culture").
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purposes, is to recognize that these contrasting theories share a com
mitment to some form of equality, in the realms of both race and
speech. At least for the moment, a relatively thin conception of what
these equalities entail will suffice.61
The limitation of this approach, as I explain below, is that it cannot
deal with problems upon which differing conceptions of constitutional
equality come into conflict. For example, it cannot resolve the conflict
over affirmative action, between those who see the Equal Protection
Clause's core command as colorblindness and those who see it as anti
subordination. Nor can it resolve the conflict over limits on campaign
expenditures, between those who see the First Amendment's under
lying rationale as protection of individual autonomy and those who
see its rationale as promotion of a more balanced public discourse.
This approach is nevertheless adequate for my present purposes,
which is to define broadly shared equality norms, and then to consider
how these norms are to be reconciled with the countervailing values
served by discretion.62
1.

Racial Equality

Race discrimination is the archetype of the group-based discrimi
nations that the Equal Protection Clause was enacted to forbid. Since
Korematsu v. United States,63 the Supreme Court has held that racial
classifications are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny."64 There are of
course profoundly different visions of what the Fourteenth Amend
ment's commandment of racial equality requires and, accordingly, of
whether the Equal Protection Clause requires heightened scrutiny of
all race-based classifications. At one end of the spectrum, some would
view virtually any race-conscious government action as constitution61. The approach taken here to the development of constitutional principles draws upon
John Rawls's idea of "overlapping consensus." See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
15 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 340 (rev. ed. 1999) (hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. Rawls endeav
ors to develop principles of justice that would be deemed acceptable by those adhering to a
wide range of comprehensive moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines. RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 15. Similarly, my starting point is to articulate norms of
equality upon which those adhering to different (and conflicting) constitutional theories
might agree. I then examine whether and how these norms are enforced when they come
into conflict with the countervailing values served by official discretion.
62. See Sullivan, supra note 3 1 , at 62 (describing the argument that rules promote formal
equality by limiting decisionmakers' discretion to act on bias or arbitrariness). But see id. at
67 (describing the countervailing argument that more loosely written standards may pro
mote substantive equality better than rules).
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64. Race-based classifications that target both whites and people of color, such as mis
cegenation bans or those which require racial segregation, are also subject to high-level scru
tiny. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1 967) (striking down Virginia's law
forbidding whites from marrying non-Caucasians).
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ally infirm, no matter what group is burdened and what the purposes
of those distinctions might be.65 According to this view, rooted in
Justice Harlan's famous declaration in Plessy v. Ferguson that the
"Constitution is color-blind,"66 the fundamental principle underlying
the Equal Protection Clause is equal treatment regardless of race.
Proponents of the equal-treatment view would therefore regard race
conscious affirmative action programs - designed, for example, to
increase the diversity of universities or to redress the unequal distribu
tion of public contracts - as inherently invidious, because they violate
the equal treatment principle.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who hold that the
essential principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause is a prohibi
tion against subordination.67 If equal treatment is the core principle
underlying the first view of equal protection, then equal status might
be viewed as the core principle animating the second view. Proponents
of the antisubordination view would therefore look much more
favorably on race-conscious affirmative action or desegregation pro
grams aimed at redressing existing inequalities in the opportunities
available to persons of color.68
Despite the differences between the two theories of equal protec
tion - one focused on colorblindness and the other on antisubordina
tion - there is broad consensus that intentional race discrimination is
highly suspect if not always impermissible.69 There is, for example,
65. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (disagreeing with the plurality's suggestion that "state and local govern
ments may in some circumstances discriminate on the basis of race in order (in a broad
sense)'to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination' " (internal citation omitted)).
66. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 146 (1976); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Consti
tution ls Co/or-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 , 63 (1991); Allan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review ofSupreme Court
Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 29, 35 (1995).
68. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating the view that race-conscious affirmative action
should be permitted so long as there is "an important and articulated purpose for its use").
The focus of this Article is not on the cases, such as those involving affirmative action or
"majority-minority" voting districts, in which these two theories of racial equality conflict. It
is instead on those cases in which the equal protection norm that these two conceptions
share comes into conflict with the countervailing value of preserving official discretion.
69. Of course, many would argue that the Equal Protection Clause should prohibit not
only intentional discrimination, but also practices having a disparate impact. See, e.g. , Theo
dore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adju
dication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV 36, 40-41 (1977). This Article does not take up this theoretical
debate. It instead assumes that the Equal Protection Clause proscribes intentional discrimi
nation, while leaving open the question whether it should also be read to proscribe other
practices.
.
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agreement that government should not exclude citizens from jury
venires on the basis of ethnicity; that it should not pass laws designed
to handicap racial minorities' access to the political process; and that
police officers should not selectively target those of a certain race for
enforcement of traffic laws.
Of course, defining the constitutional presumption against inten
tional race discrimination tells us nothing about the principal subject
of my inquiry here: the mechanisms by which this norm should be
enforced without sacrificing the values served by official discretion.70 It
also does not answer the important question of how courts should go :
about determining whether intentional race discrimination is present,
what sorts of evidence they might consider or whether special
prophylactic remedies should be developed to stop such discrimina
tion.
The dangers and difficulties of policing official discretion are most
prominent in cases where officials may be engaging in intentional
discrimination, despite the absence of a facial classification. Settled
equal protection doctrine subjects to heightened scrutiny government
action that is intended to disadvantage one group in comparison with
another. Mere disproportionate impact on people of one racial group
compared to others is not enough, however, as Washington v. Davis71
and Village of A rlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop
ment Corp.72 famously hold.
Determining whether intentional discrimination has occurred can
be a thorny problem, especially when considered in light of the con
siderable discretion that public officials wield in the performance of
their duties. In the absence of smoking gun evidence of intentional
discrimination, for example, how should courts determine whether
police officers are exercising their discretion to discriminate against
drivers of a particular race? How should courts determine whether
voting districts have been drawn to prevent minorities from electing

70. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001)
(contending that the Supreme Court's role is not simply to divine the meaning of the
Constitution, but also to "devise[) and then implement[] strategies for enforcing constitu
tional values").
71. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, black applicants for employment as
police officers in the District of Columbia brought suit under the Equal Protection Clause,
claiming that the District's recruiting procedures, including a written test, were racially dis
criminatory. Id. at 229, 232-33. Rejecting plaintiffs' claim that the racially disparate impact of
the test alone could show an equal protection violation, the Court stated "the basic equal
protection principle that the invidious quality of a Jaw claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240. Washington v.
Davis famously rejected the argument that disparate impact was sufficient to make out a
prima facie equal protection case, saying that such evidence was "not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id.
at 242.
72. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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any candidates? How should courts assess discrimination in a prosecu
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges? Should evidence of dispro
portionate impact be sufficient to make out a prima facie case in any
of these contexts? If so, how should it be measured? And what is
needed to rebut the prima facie case?
The norm against intentional race discrimination does not by itself
answer any of these questions. It does, however, provide a starting
point for assessing . the dangers to racial equality posed by official
discretion, and the mechanisms that have been developed to deal with
this threat.
2.

Expressive Equality

It may be less obvious that the First Amendment mandates equal
ity. Yet the general principle that government, when it regulates
expression, should do so evenhandedly is a staple of First Amendment
jurisprudence.73 The statement that perhaps best captures the central
place of First Amendment equality comes from Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley:
" [A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."74 While this may be an overstatement,
given the areas in which speech can be regulated based on content,75
Justice Marshall's words state the general rule of content and view
point neutrality in the regulation of speech.76 The rationale behind the
rule is that government discrimination of this sort "raises the specter
that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace. "77
73. See, e.g., RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct,
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid." (internal citations omitted)).
74. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (internal citations omitted); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at 941 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Mosley for the
"basic requirement that the government may not aim at the communicative impact of ex
pressive conduct without triggering . . . exacting and usually fatal scrutiny").
75. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-33 n.13 (1973) ("Obscene material may be
validly regulated by a State in the exercise of its traditional local power to protect the gen
eral welfare of its population despite some possible incidental effect on the flow of such
materials across state lines." (internal citations omitted)); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 297-98 (1964) (stating that plaintiffs may be allowed to recover tort damages for
defamation when a defendant's statements were made either "with knowledge" that they
were false, or with "reckless disregard" of the statements' veracity).
76. For a restriction on speech to be considered "content-neutral," it must be "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
77. Simon & Shuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 1 16
(1991); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("Laws of this sort pose
the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but
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Like the Equal Protection Clause, then, the First Amendment ·
looks with disfavor on laws that facially discriminate.7s While the First
Amendment is not exclusively concerned with equality, there is a
widely shared consensus that equality - particularly the idea that
government should not favor some speakers over others because of
their point of view - lies at its core. As Kenneth Karst has observed,
"the principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's
protections against government regulation of the content of speech."79
While acknowledging that absolute equality in the realm of speech is
impossible as a practical matter, Professor Karst recognizes that the
principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of First Amendment deci
sions limiting government officials' discretion to dictate whether
speech will be permitted.so
Just as the Equal Protection Clause frowns on laws that draw ·
express racial classifications, the First Amendment frowns on laws that ·
draw express viewpoint-based distinctions.s1 Beyond that, however,
considerable disagreement exists over precisely what sort of equality
the First Amendment demands.
One theory sees the First Amendment's fundamental purpose as
the protection of individual autonomy, and views with great skepti-

to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coer
cion rather than persuasion.").
78. Of course, the First Amendment is not exclusively concerned with discrimination
against disfavored messages or ideas. There are some restrictions on speech, for example,
that the government may not impose, no matter how evenhandedly it does so. Indeed, the
classic First Amendment protections are more often conceived of in libertarian rather than
egalitarian terms - that is, as things that the government may not do to anyone, rather than
as things they must do (or refrain from doing) equally to all. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Wherever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citi
zens, and discussing public questions."); see also Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner,
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1992) (hereinafter Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner] (dis
cussing the silencing of the streetcorner speaker as the paradigmatic First Amendment viola
tion).
79. Karst, Equality in the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 21.
80. Id. at 29.
81 . Even in this area, however, there are significant differences, as RA V v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), exemplifies. In that case, the Court struck down a St. Paul ordi
nance that drew a content-based distinction within a category of generally proscribable
speech, namely "fighting words." Id. at 395-96. In particular, the ordinance prohibited the
burning of a cross on private property, if done to convey a message of racial hatred. Id. at
380. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, held that the prohibition against
content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination applies even within categories of gener
ally proscribable speech, such as defamation, obscenity, and libel. Id. at 390-94. In his con
curring opinion, Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed, and would have held that the govern
ment was free to draw content-based (and one would presume even viewpoint-based)
distinctions within such categories. Id. at 41 3-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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cism any governmental intrusion into this protected sphere.82 Charles
Fried summarizes this theory's underlying premise as follows:
"Freedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian
right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal
sovereign citizen in the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest
liberty compatible with the like liberty of all others."83 Proponents of
the individual-autonomy school tend to focus on negative liberty th�t is, on the idea that freedom of speech is best promoted when the
government adopts a hands-off approach to the regulation of speech.
But while this vision of the First Amendment might be characterized
as libertarian, or more precisely, negative libertarian,84 what is striking
about Professor Fried's formulation is its emphasis upon equality as
well as liberty.85 To be sure, Professor Fried's conception of the equal
ity that the First Amendment requires may well differ from Professor
Karst's, but equal liberty is integral to both conceptions.86
A conflicting theory holds that the First Amendment's principal
purpose is not to protect individual autonomy or liberty, but to
advance collective self-determination. Associated with Alexander
Meiklejohn, this theory privileges political speech and affords protec
tion to other forms of speech only insofar as they must be protected to
advance the goal of producing an informed electorate.87 It focuses less
82. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233-34 (1992); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 212-14 (1972). As Richard Fallon points out, First
Amendment theorists employ varying conceptions of autonomy. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two
Senses ofA utonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876-79 (1994) [hereinafter Fallon, Two Senses of
A utonomy]. Professors Scanlon and Fried exemplify the conception that Professor Fallon
refers to as "negative libertarian." Id. at 880.
83. Fried, supra note 82, at 233 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted).
84. See Fallon, Two Senses of A utonomy, supra note 82, at 880-83 (describing negative
libertarian conceptions of autonomy).
85. See Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom, Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 735 (1998)
(defining our shared "capacity to respond to argument and evidence" as the "true marriage
of reason as equality" underlying the freedom of speech).
86. For Professor Karst's conception of equality, see Karst, Equality in the First
Amendment, supra note 7, at 26-35. Professor Karst's approach draws on both conceptions of
speech equality that I discuss in the text. His insistence that the fundamental value served by
expressive equality is "the dignity of the individual" suggests an emphasis on the rights of
individual speakers to be treated as equals, typically an argument of the "autonomy" school.
On the other hand, there are aspects of Professor Karst's view that seem to emphasize the
interests of listeners in having access to a marketplace of ideas in which a diversity of views
are available. He notes, for instance, that the equality principle supports claims of access to
the media, because they tend to promote a diversity of views, id. at 48, a sentiment more
characteristic of those who view promotion of a balanced public debate as the First Amend
ment's preeminent value.
87. As Alexander Meiklejohn famously put it: "I believe, as a teacher, that the people
do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems 'because they will be called upon to
vote.' " Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 263; see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 25-28 (1960) (hereinaf
ter MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM].
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on ensuring each individual the right to speak than on making sure
that a spectrum of viewpoints are available to the listening audience.BB
This school understands the First Amendment not simply as a nega
tive libertarian command that government should butt out where
speech is concerned, but also as a positive libertarian command that
governmental action is sometimes necessary to promote a "rich public
discourse. "B9
The structure of the debate between these two competing theories
of expressive equality resembles that of the debate between the two
competing theories of racial equality. Both areas present a conflict
between what might be termed an atomistic vision of equality (one
that tends to focus on differences in the government's treatment of
individuals) and a systemic vision of equality (one that tends to focus
on the impact of government action or inaction upon groups, defined
either by shared race or shared viewpoints).90
As in the area of racial equality, the two competing theories often
yield the same conclusion. In the area of race, the colorblindness and
antisubordination views lead to the same conclusion in dealing with
traditional equal protection problems, such as Jim Crow segregation,
miscegenation laws, and employment discrimination, but collide in
areas such as race-based affirmative action. So too, in the First
Amendment area, the competing visions of expressive equality lead to
88. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 87, at 25-28. Jerome Barron took
up Professor Meiklejohn's emphasis on this point, arguing that a laissez-faire approach to
speech is inadequate to ensure a robust marketplace of ideas. Jerome A. Barron, Access to
the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L REV. 1641, 1656 (1967) ("As a
constitutional theory for the communication of ideas, laissez faire is manifestly irrelevant.").
Asserting that the development of the mass media rendered the traditional negative
libertarian approach to the First Amendment obsolete, Professor Barron argued for the
creation of a right of access to print and broadcast media, so as to promote the expression of
diverse viewpoints that would otherwise be repressed. More recently, this view finds expres
sion in the work of Owen Fiss, who advocates the advancement of a public discourse that, in
Justice Brennan's words, is "uninhibited, robust, and wide open." Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech
and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure] (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (internal quo
tation marks omitted)); see also Owen M. Fiss, Freedom and Feminism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2041,
2043-46 (1 992). Other contemporary exponents of this general theoretical view urge using
the First Amendment as a means to advance race or gender equality. See, e.g. , CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 140 (1987) (suggesting those who really care
about the First Amendment "should turn their efforts to getting speech for people . . . who
have not been able to speak or to get themselves heard"). The relationship between racial
equality and the First Amendment has also received considerable attention from critical race
theorist scholars. See, e.g. , MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RAC�
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
89. See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 88, at 1410.
90. Greg Magarian uses the terms "public rights" and "private rights" to describe a
similar distinction in the First Amendment cases addressing regulations of political parties.
See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights " First Amend
ment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939 (2003). Professor Magarian uses the term "private
rights" to describe what I here refer to as the "atomistic" conception of the First Amend
ment, and "public rights" for what I call the "systemic" conception. Id. at 1 947, 1972.
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identical conclusions with respect to traditional free speech problems,
such as government action that prevents political dissenters from
expressing their views. Some of the most contentious First Amend
ment debates, however, arise in areas where the "individual auton
omy" and "public discourse" theories tend toward opposing conclu
sions. The debate over campaign finance reform illuminates the clash
between these competing theories of expressive equality.91
Without minimizing the significant differences between these
schools of thought, what is most striking is their shared commitment to
equality. For Professor Fried, for example, freedom of expression
is integral to the right of each person to be treated as an "equal
sovereign citizen;"92 for Professor Meiklejohn, the "reason for this
equality . . . lies deep in the very foundation of the self-governing
process."93 Whatever one's conception of the equality demanded by
the First Amendment, there is a widely shared consensus on the
proposition that government should not use its power to suppress
speech based on the message it seeks to convey. In this respect also,
free speech j urisprudence bears a noteworthy resemblance to the
jurisprudence of racial equality. Just as there is a widely shared
consensus that government should avoid intentional racial discrimina
tion, it is also recognized that government should act evenhandedly
when it regulates speech, and avoid disfavoring speakers because of
their messages or ideas.
Some of the most pressing difficulties emerge where there is no
express content- or viewpoint-based law, but there is nevertheless
reason to believe that government is targeting speakers based on
disapproval of their messages or ideas. The Supreme Court has long
91. See Spencer Overton, But Some A re More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign
Finance, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 987, 991-1001 (2002) (describing the conflicting visions of free
speech and democracy animating campaign-finance debate). Proponents of individual
autonomy are much more likely to look with disfavor on schemes that limit contributions or
expenditures on behalf of political candidates. See, e.g., Lillian R. Be Vier, Money and Poli
tics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1045, 1046-47 (1985); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Re
form, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Pos
tulates of Campaign Finance Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 783-84 (2001). On the other
hand, proponents of balanced public discourse are much more likely to look favorably on
such schemes, on the ground that they help give a more equal voice to all citizens. See, e.g. ,
Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2479 (1997) (arguing that limits
on spending may be defended under a democracy-based conception of the First Amend
ment, because they prevent distortion of public debate); David A. Strauss, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) (asserting
that the objective of campaign finance reform is equality). For a study of the ability of well
financed groups to influence "direct democracy" (i.e., the exercise of the initiative and refer
endum power by voters), see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propo
sitions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 505, 517-26 (1982).
92. Fried, supra note 82, at 233.
93. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 26 (1948).
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recognized that vesting excessive discretion to regulate speech in the
hands of public officials can be destructive to the equality that the
First Amendment demands. As Professor Tribe puts it:
Statutes which open-endedly delegate to administering officials the

power to decide how and when sanctions are applied or licenses issued

are overbroad because they grant such officials the power to discriminate

- to achieve indirectly through selective enforcement a censorship of
communicative content that is clearly unconstitutional when achieved

directly.94

The open-ended delegation of such discretion not only allows public
officials to discriminate based upon the message or idea expressed, but
also makes judicial review extremely difficult.95 Absent clearly defined
rules that limit official decisionmakers' discretion, discrimination
against unpopular speech may escape detection. In Part II, I shall
discuss both the development of First Amendment doctrine designed
to guard against this risk, and the core features of this doctrine as they
stand today.
II.

DISTRUSTING DISCRETION: FIRST AMENDMENT EQUAL
PROTECTION

The development of First Amendment Equal Protection jurispru
dence reflects a distrust of official discretion. From its earliest speech
and assembly cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that laws
vesting broad discretion in official actors to regulate or restrict speech
threaten the principle of expressive equality and, in particular, the
imperative that government should not "restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."96
This Part first examines the cases that developed special First
Amendment doctrines to guard against the threat to expressive equal
ity posed by official discretion. It then identifies four prominent fea
tures of First Amendment doctrine, each of which provides a check on
excessive discretion in the regulation of speech: (1) more permissive
standing rules; (2) a suspicion of vague legal standards; (3) a willing
ness to strike down laws on their face rather than simply as applied;
and (4) a thorough appellate review of the evidentiary record. This

94. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-28, at 1056 (footnote omitted). Professor Tribe makes a
related point with respect to the debate between those who take an "absolutist" view of the
First Amendment versus those who urge "balancing" of competing interests, noting that a
categorical approach leaves less room for prejudices to affect the decision whether speech is
to be restricted or regulated. See id. § 12-3, at 794 ("Categorical rules . . . tend to protect the
system of free expression better because they are more likely to work in spite of the defects
in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve fundamental liberties.").
95. Id. § 12-38, at 1056-57.
96. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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Part concludes with a discussion of a recent case presenting a serious
challenge to this doctrine: Thomas v. Chicago Park District.97
A. The Genesis of First Amendment Equal Protection
1.

Public Fora

The Supreme Court has long viewed laws requiring speakers to
obtain permits or licenses before using public fora as "prior
restraints,"98 and looked with disfavor on schemes vesting officials
with broad discretion to regulate speech in public fora.99 The limita
tions upon discretion in this area arise from the risk that public offi
cials might otherwise give preferences to some and disfavor others for
constitutionally impermissible reasons - in particular, because of the
message or ideas expressed.100
Skepticism of laws granting government broad discretion over the
licensing of speech in public places can be traced to three cases
decided between 1938 and 1940 - Lovell v. City of Griffin,101 Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,102 and Cantwell v. Connecti-

97. 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
98. Professor Fiss refers to these cases as involving restrictions upon the "street corner
speaker." See Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, supra note 78, at 1-2; Owen M. Fiss, Why the
State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784-86 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?].
99. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Shut
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 271 (1951). For defenses of the heavy presumption of the prior-restraint doctrine,
see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 11, 92-93 (1981), and Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955). For a critique of prior-restraint doctrine, see Martin H. Re
dish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First A mendment Theory, 70 VA. L.
REV. 53, 53-58 (1984).
100. Summarizing the state of the law in 1958, the Court in Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313, 322 (1958), observed:
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which . . . makes
the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted
or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censorship or prior re
straint upon the exercise of those freedoms.

Interestingly, the above quotation is not limited to freedom of speech, but also expresses
concern about laws vesting control over any constitutional freedoms in the "uncontrolled
will of an official." Notwithstanding this broad language, as explained herein, it is govern
ment officials' discretion in the area of freedom of speech that the Court has viewed with the
greatest suspicion.
101. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distributor of religious pamphlets challenged a permit re
quirement giving broad discretion to city manager).
102. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (unions and union members challenged an ordinance regulat
ing street meetings and public assemblies).
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cut. 103 In each of these cases, the Court struck down laws requiring
official permission to speak subject to vaguely defined standards.104
The requirement of clear standards for regulating speech served as
a surrogate for a showing of discriminatory intent, as illustrated by
Saia v. New York.105 In Saia, a Jehovah's Witness minister challenged
an ordinance regulating the use of sound-amplification equipment.
Despite the lack of clear evidence of intentional viewpoint discrimina
tion, the Court reversed the convictions and held the ordinance
facially unconstitutional due to the unbridled discretion accorded to
the police chief.106 The Court explained: "To use a loud-speaker or
amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are
no standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion."107 This dis
cretion created an irrebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality
without demanding any showing that the scheme had been applied in a
less than evenhanded manner. 108
By 1951, when the Court decided Kunz v. New York,109 the prohi
bition upon laws giving broad discretion to grant or deny permits
to speak in public places was well established.1 10 In Kunz, a Baptist
minister's permit to speak had been revoked, allegedly because he had
ridiculed other religious beliefs.1 1 1 He was thereafter convicted for
speaking in a public place without the required permit.1 12 The Court
struck down the permit ordinance as unconstitutionally vague, despite
the fact that the city had introduced evidence that there might well
have been good reasons for regulating Kunz's activities, specifically,
103. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Jehovah's Witnesses distributing literature challenged a state
law regulating solicitation).
104. See also Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1953) (upholding a statute
because the scheme left administrators with "no discretion as to granting permits" and thus
"no power to discriminate").
105. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
106. Saia, 334 U.S. at 559-60.
107. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
108. But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (plurality opinion) (upholding
a blanket ban on the use of sound "amplified to a loud and raucous volume"). In City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. , 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988), the Court explained the
difference between Saia and Kovacs as follows:

In Saia, this Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks without per
mission from the Chief of Police was unconstitutional because the licensing official was able
to exercise unbridled discretion in his decisionmaking, and therefore could, in a calculated
manner, censor certain viewpoints. Just seven months later the Court held in Kovacs that a
city could absolutely ban the use of sound trucks. The plurality distinguished Saia precisely
on the ground that there the ordinance constituted censorship by allowing some to speak,
but not others; in

Kovacs the statute barred a particular manner of speech for all.

109. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
110. Kunz, 340 U.S. at 293-94.
1 1 1. Id. at 292.
1 12. Id. at 292-93.
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evidence that the speaker's meetings had in the past resulted in
disorder.113 The mere possibility that such discretion might be used to
discriminate against those with unpopular points of view, even without
proof of intentional discrimination against disfavored viewpoints, was
held sufficient to strike down the law on its face.
2.

Censorship ofFilm and the Printed Word

Closely related to the Court's early public forum cases are deci
sions considering laws that vest public officials· with censoring author
ity over books, newspapers, and motion pictures. In Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson,11 4 most commonly invoked for its articulation of the
prior restraint doctrine,115 the Court struck down a state law that
allowed government attorneys to obtain injunctions against those
publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspapers.116 The
Court explained:
If such a statute, authorizing suppression and inj unction on such a basis,

is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible for the legisla

ture to provide that at any time the publisher of any newspaper could be

brought before a court, or even an administrative officer (as the constitu

tional protection may not be regarded as resting on mere procedural de

tails) and required to produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of

what he intended to publish, and of his motives, or stand enjoined. If this

can be done, the legislature may provide machinery for determining in

the complete exercise of its discretion what are j ustifiable ends and re
strain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete
system of censorship.117

One might quibble with Near for underestimating the importance
of procedural protections for speech,118 and for seeming to conflate the
various entities - including legislators, administrators, and the courts
- that might exercise discretion to impose prior restraints on speech.
In fact, the Minnesota system, which at least required a judicial hear
ing before restraining publication of newspapers, surely provided
greater protection for speech than a scheme allowing speech to be

1 13. Id. at 294.
114. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
1 15. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 99, at 654 (describing Near as "a landmark case" be
cause it is "the major pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the doctrine of prior
restraint").
1 16. Near, 283 U.S. at 702. The statute allowed any county attorney in the state to go
into court to "enjoin perpetually the persons committing or maintaining any such nuisance
from further committing or maintaining it." Id. at 702-03.
1 17. Id. at 721.
1 18. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 7, at 518-20 (describing procedural safeguards that
the Supreme Court has implemented to protect First Amendment rights).
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restrained upon the mere whim of an administrative official.119 The
example given by the Court - that of a legislature creating the
"machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion"
who may speak - is arguably less problematic than the discretionary
scheme at issue in Near. For if the legislature creates clear rules
regulating speech, then those rules can at least be evaluated to assess
their fairness; on the other hand, the type of scheme at issue in Near
(vesting discretion in an administrative official) made it very difficult
to assess whether expression was being regulated in an evenhanded
manner.
Although not described in the most transparent fashion, what the
Near Court really seems to be concerned with is the possibility of sub
rosa viewpoint discrimination. The problem with the Minnesota
statute, the Court suggests, is that it allows government officials to
determine the "justifiable ends" of speech. This risk is no more toler
able in a situation where amorphous standards tend to mask viewpoint
discrimination than it is where the legislature expressly engages in
viewpoint discrimination by making a law that favors one speaker over
another. The government's failure to provide sufficiently clear
guidance as to what speech could be regulated effectively ceded to
county authorities and judges the power to decide what could be
published.
Subsequent cases extended Near's skepticism of official discretion .
to the censorship of film. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,120 the
Court mandated adamantine precision in government laws giving
public officials authority to censor "sacrilegious" material. Relying on
Joseph Burstyn, the Court would thereafter strike down laws from
other jurisdictions allowing censorship of motion pictures deemed
"immoral" or "harmful,"121 those portraying "sexual immorality,"122
and those judged by city authorities to be "prejudicial to the best
interests of the people of said City."123 In each case, loosely worded
standards resulted in government officials being granted overly broad
authority to determine what could be exhibited.124

·

1 19. See, e.g., Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 519 (1962) (Brennan, J., concur
ring) (noting that administrative designation of certain materials as "obscene" was constitu
tionally infirm, in the absence of a "judicial proceeding under closely defined procedural
safeguards").
120. 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952).
121. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954).
122. Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 687-88
(1959).
123. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 960 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
124. While striking down laws setting amorphous standards for censoring films, thereby
taking from public officials the discretion to determine which motion pictures the public
could see, the Court refused to take the additional step of prohibiting all prior restraint
schemes in this area. The five-to-four decision in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
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The Court's distrust of official discretion comes to the fore in a trio
of opinions authored by Justice Brennan in the early 1960s: Marcus v.
Search Warrant,125 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,126 and Freedman v.
Maryland.127 These decisions contain some of the Supreme Court's
most extensive discussions of the dangers of schemes vesting unbridled
discretion to regulate speech in administrators or courts. Marcus
struck down a Missouri law authorizing searches for and the seizure of
allegedly "obscene" materials. 128 While recognizing that obscene
materials do not enjoy protection under the First Amendment, the
Court struck down the law because it gave executing officers "the
broadest discretion" to decide what material was "obscene."129 Bantam
Books extends Marcus's intolerance of unbridled discretion in the area
of prior restraints to informal censorship schemes.130 Not only did the
Court broaden standing rules,131 it also recognized that "informal
censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to
warrant injunctive relief."132 And in Freedman, the Court set forth
certain "procedural safeguards" to which censoring bodies must
adhere, including an "adversary proceeding" and a "prompt final judi
cial decision."133 The case thus embodies a procedural model for
cabining official discretion to censor speech.134
3.

The Civil Rights Movement

The censorship cases pave the way for cases occurring at the nexus
between racial discrimination and viewpoint discrimination, where
U.S. 43 (1961), reaffirmed the prohibition against vague and indefinite licensing standards
for motion pictures, while clarifying that prior restraints on film are not automatically un
constitutional. The Chicago ordinance challenged in Times Film Corp. required the commis
sioner to refuse a permit if the film failed to satisfy certain standards. Instead of challenging
these standards, the petitioner based its constitutional claim on the "complete and absolute
freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture." Id. at 46. The Court
declined to forbid all prior restraints, explaining that its prior cases were limited to laws set
ting a " 'vague' or 'indefinite' " standard susceptible to abuse by the decisionmakers. Id. at
47.
125. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
126. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
127. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
128. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 719.
129. Id. at 732.
130. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 59-61.
131. Id. at 64 n.6.
132. Id. at 67.
133. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
134. Freedman typifies the approach to protecting speech against censorship which Pro
fessor Monaghan termed "First Amendment 'Due Process.' " See Monaghan, supra note 7,
at 522.
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First Amendment Equal Protection comes into full bloom.135 These
decisions evince a deeper and broader skepticism of official discretion
than was evident in the permitting and censorship cases, moving be
yond classic prior restraints to restrictions on expressive associations,
breach of peace, and jury verdicts. Though couched in libertarian
terms, these cases are centrally concerned with expressive equality
and, more specifically, with preventing racial bias from infecting the
regulation of public discourse.
Heightened concern with the dangers of official discretion at the
speech/race nexus actually predates the civil rights movement, figuring
prominently in Herndon v. Lowry,136 a 1937 case involving a black man
and member of the Communist Party convicted in Georgia for inciting
insurrection.137 Although the result in this case may seem obvious from
a contemporary standpoint,138 the Court's opinion is noteworthy for its
distrust of juror discretion in the area of political speech, particularly
when questions of race are at issue - a concern that would reappear
almost thirty years later in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.139 A
Fulton County jury had found Herndon guilty of "induc[ing] others to
join in combined resistance to the lawful authority of the state with in
tent to deny, to defeat, and to overthrow such authority by open force,
violent means, and unlawful acts, "140 a crime punishable by death. The
record, however, contained evidence that Herndon had solicited
contributions for the Communist party, but not that he had personally
advocated violent overthrow of the government.141
While the Court might have overturned Herndon's conviction
simply because there was no evidence of imminent violence, it went
further, striking down the statute on its face because it "license[d] the
jury to create its own standard in each case."142 As the Court
explained:
[The Georgia statute] amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh
anyone who agitates for a change of government if a j ury can be per-

135. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1965).
1 36. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
137. For an illuminating discussion of Herndon, see Kendall Thomas, Rouge et Noir
Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo Herndon Case, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2599 (1992).
138. But see ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 397 (4th
prtg. 1948) ("[Of] all the chief sedition defendants . . . . all but one seem to me fairly harm
less. The one exception is Herndon.").
139. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1 40. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 245. The law had been enacted as the result of Nat Turner's
1832 rebellion, but had not been used for almost a century. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION 1 70 (1988).
141. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 253.
142. Id. at 263.
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suaded that he ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect

in the future conduct of others. No reasonably ascertainable standard of
guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus

set to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily vio

lates the guarantees of liberty einbodied in the Fourteenth Amend

ment.143

As obvious as the result in Herndon may seem today, the opinion
is remarkable in several respects. First, it refuses to defer to the state
jurors' finding that imminent violence would result from the speech at
issue, instead undertaking a thorough examination of the record.144
Second, the opinion does not simply overturn the conviction but also
strikes down the statute on its face, because it was so loosely written as
to allow jurors' discretion to impair fair adjudication.145 Third, the
Court suggests that such discretion may carry special dangers where
the death penalty may be imposed,146 foreshadowing later cases that
consider the special dangers of discretion in the context of capital
punishment.147 Fourth, . the Court's opinion suggests a distrust of jury
discretion as well as of judicial discretion, in that the Court conducts
an independent review of the evidence, reverses the conviction, throws
out the statute, and insists upon clearly written standards less subject
to judicial manipulation.148 Fifth, the Court evinces special concern for
the potential infringement of speech given the racial undertones of the
case, recogmzmg the enhanced dangers of quasi-official discretion
where racial bias interacts with official authority to suppress disfa
vored ideas.149
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan150 inherits Herndon's acute con
cern with the dangers of juror discretion where viewpoint discrimina
tion and racial discrimination overlap. Though Sullivan is famous for
holding that public officials may not obtain damages for libel absent
"actual malice,"151 equally significant is the Court's insistence - also
implicit in Herndon
that "we must also in proper cases review the
-

143. Id. at 263-64.
144. Id. at 247-53, 259-60.
145. Id. at 263-64.
146. Id. at 262 (noting·that under the law, if some causal chain resulting in violence may
follow from the speaker's words, "he is bound to make the prophesy and abstain [from
speaking], under pain of punishment, possibly of execution" ) .
147. See infra Part lll.B.2.
148. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 259-64.
149. Id. at 245 (noting the indictment described Herndon's "speeches for the purpose of
organizing and establishing groups and combinations of white and colored persons under the
name of the Communist Party of Atlanta"); id. at 250-52 (quoting materials found in Hern
don's possession advocating African Americans' right to self-determination) .
150. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
151. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
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evidence to make certain that those [constitutional] principles have
been constitutionally applied."152 Instead of remanding, the Court en
gaged in a thorough review of the facts,153 concluding that actual mal
ice could not be established on the evidence adduced at trial. As
Professor Monaghan observed, this skepticism of juror discretion can
be viewed as reflecting a shift in the very meaning of the First
Amendment, from one "conceived primarily as a guarantee that the
voice of the people
the majority
would be heard" to one con
cerned primarily with "protecting unpopular speech."154
Concerns about the special dangers presented by official discretion
when combined with racial bias also figure prominently in NAA CP v.
Button,155 which struck down on its face a Virginia statute regulating
the solicitation of legal business.156 The Court's opinion highlighted the
danger of unequal administration inherent in loosely worded laws,157 a
concern that was especially prominent given the backdrop of racial
bias: "In such circumstances, a statute broadly curtailing group activity
leading to litigation may easily become a weapon of oppression,
however evenhanded its terms appear."158 The Court did not expressly
find that the Virginia statute had been enforced in a discriminatory
way; rather the possibility that the broad discretion vested in official
decisionmakers might be abused was enough to warrant facial invali
dation.159
Most prominent among the First Amendment Equal Protection
cases decided during the Civil Rights Movement are a series of cases
-

-

152. Id. at 285; see also Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First
Amendment Model of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1254 (1996).
153. See THOMAS l . EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 536 (1970)
(stating that the Sullivan Court "carefully reviewed the evidence and itself drew the conclu
sions which the jury would be bound to reach"); Childress, supra note 152, at 1256 (arguing
that the Sullivan Court's "exercise amounted to a virtual reexamination of the facts on
appeal").
154. Monaghan, supra note 7, at 528-29. As Professor Monaghan put it, Sullivan exem
plifies the Court's concern that "like administrative agencies, the jury cannot be expected to
be sufficiently sensitive to the first amendment interests involved in any given proceeding."
Id. at 527-28. Akhil Amar makes the point more directly, noting the Court's implicit concern
that "a southern jury composed of good old boys" would suppress speech advocating racial
equality. AMAR, supra note 16, at 243.
155. 371 U.S. 415 (1 963).
1 56. Button, 371 U.S. at 419-20, 426.
157. Id. at 433.
158. Id. at 435-36.
159. The danger that such a facially neutral statute might be used by the politically
dominant white majority to suppress the speech of the black minority obviated the need to
address the NAACP's alternative claim of race discrimination in the application of Virginia's
law. Id. at 444 ("Because our disposition is rested on the First Amendment . . . we do not
reach the considerations of race or racial discrimination which are the predicate of peti
tioner's challenge to the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.").
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in which the Court invalidated government attempts to regulate vari
ous civil rights demonstrations. In Garner v. Louisiana,160 the Court
reversed the convictions of African Americans prosecuted for
disturbing the peace by taking seats at a whites-only lunch counter.161
Following Garner, the Court reversed convictions for refusing to leave
a whites-only bus depot,162 marching and singing outside the South
Carolina State House,163 "cheering, clapping and singing" near a
courthouse,164 demonstrating in front of a department store,165 sitting
in a library,166 and marching from city hall to the mayor's home.167
These decisions focus on the broad discretion vested in police, prose
cutors, and judges to regulate expression - and, specifically, on the
danger that they will apply such laws in a racially discriminatory
manner that might escape detection absent facial invalidation. As in
Herndon and Sullivan, the threat to expressive equality posed by state
judges' and jurors' discretion leads the Court to insist upon "an inde
pendent examination of the whole record."168 The cases share a
concern with white public officials using discretion given to them
under seemingly neutral laws to target disfavored speech and speak
ers.169
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,110 one of the cases involving
civil rights demonstrations, represents the apotheosis of the Court's
concern with the dangers of official discretion to regulate speech
160. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
161. Garner, 368 U.S. at 173-74.
162. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 156 (1962).
163. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1963).
164. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965).
165. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 89-95 (1965).
166. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966).
167. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 1 1 1 , 112-13 (1969).
168. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (quoting Edwards, 372 U.S. at
235).
169. For example, in the first Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham decision, the Court struck
down a law that required people to "move on" from any street or public sidewalk when
asked to do so by police officers. 382 U.S. at 88. In overturning the conviction of a civil rights
protester who had refused to move along when asked to do so by a policeman, the Court
emphasized the danger of laws dependent upon "moment-to-moment opinions of a police
man on his beat" where speech is concerned. Id. at 90 (internal citation omitted). Although
the ordinance was not focused upon speech activities, the Court's opinion relied on the
threat to expressive equality in striking it down: " Instinct with its ever-present potential for
arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties, that kind of law bears the hallmark of a
police state." Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted). Cox v. Louisiana likewise exemplifies this con
cern, citing early permitting and licensing cases for the proposition that "lodging of such
broad discretion in a public official allows him to determine which expressions of view will
be permitted" and "thus sanctions a device for the suppression of the communication of
ideas." 379 U.S. at 557.
170. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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where racial equality is implicated. Shuttlesworth extends that concern
from police, commissions, prosecutors, and trial judges to state appel
late courts. After leading a four-block march from a Birmingham
church, Reverend Shuttlesworth was convicted of engaging in a
demonstration without first having obtained the required permit.171
As written, the Birmingham ordinance under which Shuttlesworth
was convicted gave the city commission a "virtually unbridled and
absolute power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or 'demonstra
tion' on the city's streets and public ways."172 Without a narrowing
construction, therefore, the ordinance would plainly have violated the
First Amendment.173 The Alabama Supreme Court, however, had
adopted an extremely narrow construction of the statute, under which
a permit "must be granted if, after an investigation, it is found that the
convenience of the public in use of the streets or sidewalks would not
thereby be unduly disturbed."174
Despite this narrowing construction, the United States Supreme
Court reversed. It first held that Reverend Shuttlesworth was free to
challenge the statute, even though he had not applied for the permit,
since he challenged the constitutionality of Birmingham's licensing law
on its face.175 On the merits, the Court acknowledged that the
Alabama Supreme Court's narrowing construction left a law providing
for nothing more than the "even-handed" regulation of traffic.176 The
Court nevertheless reversed the convictions because, at the time that
Shuttlesworth was arrested, the law on the books allowed the city
commission to deny permission to speak on virtually any ground it saw
fit.177 Shuttlesworth thus extends the doctrine of allowing facial chal
lenges to laws infringing on freedom of speech: it requires not only
clear standards, but clear standards prescribed in advance. In doing so,
the Court recognizes not merely that policemen may abuse their
discretion, but also that state judges (both trial and appellate) may do
so as well.
The First Amendment Equal Protection cases arising during the
civil rights movement thus demonstrate a profound distrust of official
and quasi-official discretion to regulate speech, whether placed in the
hands of police, administrators, jurors, prosecutors, or even state
171. Sh11tt/esworth, 394 U.S. at 148-49.
172. Id. at 150 (footnote omitted).
173. Id.
174. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 206 So. 2d 348, 350-52 (Ala. 1 967).
175. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151 ("[A] person faced with such an unconstitutional li
censing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free ex
pression for which the law purports to require a license." (footnote omitted)).
176. Id. at 154-55.
177. Id. at 156.
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supreme court judges. While the Court does not expressly rely on
equal protection doctrine to justify the results reached or the legal
standards articulated, recognition of the dangers to expressive equality
posed by official and quasi-official racial bias is implicit in these deci
sions. Absent federal court intervention, racial bias would inevitably
translate into viewpoint-based discrimination. These cases thus cried
out for closer supervision of government discretion by the federal
courts, and demanded the formulation of strict boundaries to ensure
that officials' prejudices did not result in expressive inequality.
B.

The Features of First Amendment Equal Protection

Skepticism of official discretion animates the public fora, censor
ship, and civil rights era cases. For the most part, these cases arise in
contexts where the Court smelled a rat - that is, where circumstances
suggested that discrimination against disfavored viewpoints or certain
speakers was at play, but where that discrimination was difficult to
substantiate. The special doctrines created in response to this general
problem have remained relatively stable. This Section describes four
features of First Amendment Equal Protection, each of which serves
to limit the threat to expressive equality posed by excessive discretion.
1.

The Requirement of Precision

The most obvious respect in which the Court has demonstrated
its skepticism of official discretion is in continuing to strike down
laws with vaguely defined standards that delegate to public officials
virtually unbridled discretion to determine who may speak.178 The
term "unbridled discretion" has become a watchword for what the
First Amendment forbids, and is closely linked to the Court's general
intolerance for vagueness where speech is criminalized or otherwise
regulated.179
For example, the Court in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub
lishing Co. 180 struck down an ordinance giving the mayor "unbridled
discretion" to grant or deny applications for newsracks on city prop
erty.181 In the course of its decision, the Court explained why precise
standards are so vital, even where an abuse of authority cannot be
shown:
178. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 102 (discussing special skepticism of laws
that "delegat(e) to executive agencies widely discretionary or imprecisely measured powers
of censorship").
179. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-2, at 794 ("Categorical rules thus tend to protect the
system of free expression better because they are more likely to work in spite of the defects
in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve fundamental liberties.").
180. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
181. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 772.
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Standards provide guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts

quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating

against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts,

post hoc rationali

zations . . . and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy,

making it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether
the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expres
sion.182

The requirement of clear standards prescribed in advance prevents
public officials from tilting the expressive playing field. Without such a
requirement, it is all too easy for government to favor or disfavor
speakers in ways that escape detection. But if there are statutes, ordi
nances, or regulations limiting government discretion to regulate or
prohibit speech, it is much more difficult for public officials to
discriminate based on the messages expressed. As the Court expressly
states, the danger of such discrimination is "at its zenith when
the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the
unbridled discretion of a government official."183 Without clearly de
fined standards, it is simply too easy for the suppression of disfavored
points of view to escape judicial detection.
To be sure, cabining government officials' ability to discriminate is
not the only reason for the rule against vagueness. The requirement of
precision also provides notice to prospective speakers of what conduct
is prohibited,184 and avoids the "chilling effect" upon constitutionally
protected expression arising from unclear regulations.185 Guarding
against discrimination is, however, one of the principal reasons why
the Court has long insisted on precision when government regulates
expression.
City of Lakewood and other First Amendment Equal Protection
cases requiring clear standards prescribed in advance can thus be
understood as "soft purpose" cases - cases in which the Court has
been willing to find a violation, even where direct evidence of
intentional discrimination is lacking, due to the mere possibility that
such discrimination might occur. The opinion in Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement186 illustrates this point. In Forsyth County, the
182. Id. at 758.
183. Id. at 763.
184. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1 974) (holding unconstitutional a law
forbidding "contemptuous[]" treatment of the flag because it "fails to draw reasonably clear
lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that are
not"); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 , 614 (1971) (holding that a law making it a
crime for people to annoy passers-by on sidewalk "is unconstitutionally vague because it
subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard").
185. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (noting that freedom of
speech is "delicate and vulnerable" and therefore that "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions").
1 86. 505 U.S. 1 23 (1992).
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Court struck down a local ordinance that allowed government admin
istrators to adjust the fee required for speech activities based upon the
degree of hostility likely to be provoked. When the Nationalist
Movement sought to demonstrate in opposition to a federal holiday
commemorating Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday, the County sought
to "adjust the amount paid in order to meet the expense incident to
the administration of the Ordinance and to the maintenance of public
order in the matter licensed."187 The Court held that the absence of
specific standards for determining what fee to charge was enough to
invalidate Forsyth County's scheme.188
Nor is suspicion of "unbridled discretion" limited to permit
requirements and other forms of prior restraint. For example, in City
of Houston v. Hill,189 the Court struck down a Houston ordinance that
made it unlawful to "oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman
in the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making
arrest."190 The Court concluded that this ordinance swept too broadly,
and intruded upon the ability of citizens to challenge police actions
verbally without arrest. As the Court explained, "we have repeatedly
invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to
arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them."191
Although the ordinance was content and viewpoint neutral,192 the
Court held it facially invalid because it gave police officers too much
leeway to target speakers of whom they disapproved.193
More recently, the Court's decision in Reno v. A CL U struck down
portions of the Communications Decency Act prohibiting the
dissemination of "indecent" and "patently offensive" materials to
those under 18 as insufficiently specific under the First Amendment.194
The absence of precise definitions for either term left open an imper
missibly large "risk of discriminatory enforcement" that required the
·

187. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 127 (internal citation omitted). The record in
cluded testimony regarding the various rates that the administrator had charged for various
permitted activities in the past, ranging from $5 to $100. Id. at 132.
188. Id. at 133.
189. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
190. Hill, 482 U.S. at 455 (quoting HOUSTON, TEX., ORDINANCES § 34-ll(a) (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
191. Id. at 465.
192. Id. at 459.
193. Id. at 465 n.15 ("Houston's [ordinance] effectively grants police the discretion to
make arrests selectively on the basis of the content of the speech."). There was general
agreement on this point, even amongst the justices who considered the majority's opinion
too sweeping in other respects. See id. at 480 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.) (agreeing that the ordinance is unconstitutional
because "it is clear that Houston has made no effort to curtail the wide discretion of police
officers under the present ordinance").
194. 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997).
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statute's facial invalidation.195 The Court recognized this risk and
upheld the plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the term "patently offen
sive" notwithstanding the fact that this term is part of the three-prong
test for assessing whether material is "obscene."196
All of these cases rest on the Court's recognition that, absent re
straints upon official discretion, government may discriminate against
disfavored viewpoints in a manner likely to escape detection. Subject
to narrow exceptions,197 the Court has generally required government
to walk a fine line when it regulates expression.
2.

Receptivity to Facial Challenges

The requirement of precision is but one manifestation of the
Court's more general suspicion of official and quasi-official discretion
where expressive equality is at issue. Another feature of First
Amendment doctrine closely linked to concerns regarding official
discretion is the Court's receptivity to facial challenges.
Outside the First Amendment context, the standard for facial
challenges is extremely strict. For a successful facial challenge to be
mounted outside the First Amendment context, "the challenger must

195. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872.
196. Id. at 872 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
197. One of the few Supreme Court decisions to uphold regulations of demonstrations is
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Ward considered a regulation that re
quired speakers in the Central Park bandshell to use amplification equipment and an experi
enced sound technician provided by the City. Id. at 784. The Court rejected the argument
that this arrangement gave government officials impermissibly broad discretion to regulate
speech, stating that "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of
regulations that restrict expressive activity." Id. at 794; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 724, 732-33 (2000) (upholding a Colorado "bubble zone" law regulating speech in front
of health-care facilities, despite imprecision as to the meaning of the activities regulated,
namely "protest, education, or counseling"); id. at 739-40 (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowl
edging that these terms "at first blush" seem to present a vagueness problem, but finding it
"not fatal" because it "pretty clearly fails to limit very much at all").
The Court has also applied a more relaxed standard where the government funds artistic
expression. For example, in National Endowment for the A rts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998),
the Court upheld a scheme vesting a federal agency with substantial discretion to award
grants to artists and charging the agency with responsibility to ensure "artistic merit." Id. \It
572-73. The Court actually rests its conclusion that the statute is viewpoint-neutral on the
indeterminacy of terms like "decency" and "respect," stating that "one would be hard
pressed to find two people in the United States" who would agree on their meaning. Id. at
583. Finley thus permits the exercise of discretion in this area for a reason somewhat differ
ent than Ward: not because the dangers of discrimination are minimal, but because of t4e
impossibility of crafting standards to prohibit such discrimination without obliterating the
discretion that public officials must have in order to carry out their duties. See also Arkansas
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (allowing a public television
station to exclude an independent candidate from political debate, where there was no evi
dence that it did so based on opposition to his views).
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establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." 1 98
In free speech cases, by contrast, a facial challenge may be brought
even where a law may validly be applied in some of its applications.199
The question, as explained in City of Houston v. Hill, is whether the
law in question reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally pro
tected conduct. "200 Thus, the Hill Court struck down a municipal ordi
nance prohibiting interference with police officers, even though there
were some forms of interference with the police that could justifiably
be proscribed without infringing on speech, and even though there was
no evidence that the content-neutral statute had been applied against
disfavored viewpoints.201 The mere possibility that the law could be
used to suppress speech critical of police officers was enough to strike
it down on its face.202
Within the general category of laws susceptible to facial challenges
on First Amendment grounds, it is important to distinguish laws that
are impermissibly vague (for failing to set sufficiently precise stan
dards for regulating speech) from those that are impermissibly over
broad (because they burden a substantial amount of protected
speech).203 The dangers of discriminatory enforcement, as I have
already explained, are obvious with respect to the vague laws which,
by their very nature, give authorities room to discriminate against
speakers whose message they disapprove of.204 Yet, dangers are also
present with respect to overbroad laws - even ones that set reasona
bly clear standards and are therefore not vague - because those laws
may be selectively enforced in a manner that infringes upon speech.205
As Professor Karst has observed, overbreadth doctrine often serves
the First Amendment interest in equality, since an overbroad statute

198. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). For a critique of the Salemo
rule, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 239-42 (1994).
199. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
200. 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quoting Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
201. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459.
202. Id. at 459.
203. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-31, at 1033-35; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 903-07 (1991) (hereinafter Fallon, Making Sense of
Overbreadth ].
204. The prohibition against vague laws is not limited to those which infringe upon free
speech, although this prohibition has been applied more robustly in speech cases. See Fallon,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, supra note 203, at 904.
205. See id. at 908 (observing that overbroad statutes may "provide a cover for content
based hostility to constitutionally protected expressive activity").
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raises a more pronounced risk of selective enforcement.206 An exces
. sively broad law may function as a sort of dragnet, sweeping in many
from which authorities may target those harboring disfavored views.
As with the requirement of precise standards, the Court's willing
ness to entertain facial challenges under the First Amendment is not
solely grounded in the need to cabin the possibilities of discrimination
that can accompany official discretion. Among the other justifications
for this rule are elimination of laws that would chill people from
engaging in protected speech,207 and vindication of the litigants' rights
"to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of
law."208 But limiting official opportunities to suppress disfavored
speech is one of the important purposes served by allowing facial
challenges under the First Amendment.
3.

Liberal Rules ofJusticiability

Related to, though analytically distinct from, the Court's willing
ness to entertain facial First Amendment challenges is its relaxation of
ordinary rules of justiciability.209 For purposes of assessing the rela
tionship between procedural safeguards and official discretion, two
aspects of First Amendment doctrine are noteworthy.
First, in prior restraint cases, the Court has allowed litigants to
challenge the constitutionality of laws infringing upon speech even
when such litigants have not applied for the permit or license required
under the challenged scheme. For example, in City of Lakewood, the
206. Karst, Equality in the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 38. For example, in Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980), the Court
struck down an ordinance prohibiting solicitation by charitable organizations that used less
than 75 % of monies received for nonadministrative purposes. Also, in Secretary of State v.
Joseph H. Munson Co. , 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984), the Court struck down a statute that dif
fered only in that it allowed an administrative waiver for "financial necessity." In both cases,
the statutes at issue set reasonably clear standards, yet still raised the possibility of imposing
a disproportionate burden on those with "unpopular" messages. See id. at 967 ("It is equally
likely that the statute will restrict First Amendment activity that results in high costs but is
itself a part of the charity's goal or that is simply attributable to the fact that the charity's
cause proves to be unpopular.").
207. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988)
("[T)he mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion . . . intimidates parties into
censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually abused.");
Thornhill. v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) ("It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power
by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the dan
ger to freedom of discussion.").
208. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. l , 3.
209. To say that laws vesting public officials with broad authority to censor speech may
be struck down on their face is one thing; to allow litigants whose speech is not itself pro
tected to bring such a challenge is another. See Dorf, supra note 198, at 261 -62 (distinguish
ing two views of overbreadth). But see TRIBE, supra note 74, § 1 2-27, at 1023 (noting that
some have understood overbreadth as an exception to ordinary standing rules, but taking the
position that it really reflects a right to be j udged by a properly drawn rule).
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Court allowed a newspaper publisher to challenge a municipal licens
ing requirement without having applied for the license. The Court
observed that "a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the
hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint
and may result in censorship," even without a showing that the power
vested in the hands of public officials has actually been abused.210 The
very absence of standards makes it difficult to distinguish between the
legitimate exercise of the power to deny a permit and the exercise of
that power to suppress a disfavored viewpoint.211
The second rule confers more generous standing by allowing liti
gants to challenge the constitutionality of a vague or overbroad law,
"even though its application in the case under consideration may be
constitutionally unobjectionable. "212 Indeed, litigants may bring facial
challenges to such laws without showing that their conduct is itself
protected by th e . First Amendment.213 Under this rule, litigants need
not show that others affected are incapable of bringing suit on their
own.214 The Court has justified this "exception" to the general rule
forbidding third-party standing by reasoning that the "very existence"
of imprecise or overinclusive laws can inhibit the expression of others
not before the Court.215
4.

Independent Factfinding

A staple of First Amendment doctrine is an independent examina
tion of the evidentiary record on appeal. The Court's willingness to
discard ordinary rules against appellate factfinding in First Amend
ment cases - and to second guess lower-level decisionmakers arises in part from concern that official discretion will be applied in a
less-than-evenhanded fashion.216
As New York Times Co. v. Sullivan exemplifies, the Court is not
content simply to articulate principles in speech cases, but frequently
insists upon making its own review of the evidence "to make certain
that those principles have been constitutionally applied."217 The
210. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757.
211. Id. at 758.
212. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 1 29 (1992); see also Sec'y of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984).
213. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988).
214. Joseph H. Munson Co. , 467 U.S. at 957-58.
215. Id. But see Dorf, supra note 198, at 261 (noting that the special standing and over
breadth rules developed in First Amendment cases have also been applied in cases impli
cating other fundamental rights) .
216. The line of cases involving demonstrations during the civil rights era, see discussion
supra Section 11.A.3, exemplify the willingness to engage in such appellate factfinding.
217. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). So, too, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 502 (1984), another defamation case involving the actual-malice standard, the Court
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willingness to undertake a thoroughgoing reexamination of the record,
rather than deferring to a lower court's findings, also extends to areas
other than defamation. In determining whether expression falls within
the generally proscribable category of obscenity under the standards
set forth in Miller v. California,218 the Court has long insisted upon an
"independent examination" of the evidentiary record to determine
whether the material in question is patently offensive and appeals to
prurient interests.219 Like the rules allowing for broader standing and
facial challenges in First Amendment cases, this rule stems at least in
part from a concern that official discretion will be abused to suppress
speech conveying a disfavored message or idea.
The flip-side of such heightened judicial inquiry into the underly
ing facts, of course, is an unwillingness to defer to nonjudicial findings
and conclusions. This is perhaps evident in the Freedman v. Maryland
guidelines, which require prompt judicial review of certain "prior
restraints" on speech, and place the burden on the government to
obtain such review.220 It is equally evident in Sullivan and its progeny
which, in recognition of the dangers to expressive equality posed by
juror discretion, characterize issues as legal rather than factual so as to
take matters out of the jury's hands and into the court's.221 Just as the
Freedman guidelines stem from an unwillingness to defer to low-level
bureaucrats, the rules crafted in the defamation cases evince an
unwillingness to defer to juries. In both cases, the Court's refusal to
defer arises from concern that expressive inequality is an inevitable
by-product of the decisionmakers' discretion.
C. Thomas v. Chicago Park District
At first glance, the Supreme Court's recent unanimous opinion in
Thomas v. Chicago Park District222 might seem like a repudiation of at
held it "imperative that judges - and in some cases j udges of this Court - make sure that it
is correctly applied." See also Childress, supra note 152, at 1261 -67.
218. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
219. See, e.g. , City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 n.6 (1987) ("[A Jn independent
review of the record is appropriate where the activity in question is arguably protected by
the Constitution."); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 1 53, 160 (1974) (holding that appellate
courts must conduct an independent review in order to protect against possible abuses by
censoring authorities and juries).
220. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
22 1 . In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1 974), for example, the Court
held that the remedies for defamation should reach "no farther [sic] than is necessary," and
therefore struck down state standards allowing publishers and broadcasters to be subjected
to punitive damages. In so holding, the Court expressly relied on the dangers inherent in
leaving juries with discretion to award punitive damages for defamation - specifically, that
j uries would be "free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular
views" thereby leading to self-censorship by the press. Id. at 350.
222. 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
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least some of the features of First Amendment Equal Protection. In
Thomas, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago scheme regulating the
usage of public parks, despite arguments from would-be speakers that
the regulations accorded municipal officials unacceptably broad dis
cretion. The Supreme Court held: (1) that public entities need not
comply with the Freedman procedural guidelines when they engage in
"content-neutral" speech regulation, even when that regulation takes
the form of a prior restraint; and (2) that Chicago's ordinance pre
scribing when a permit would issue was sufficiently specific to mini
mize the risk of sub rosa viewpoint-based discrimination and to permit
effective judicial review.223
To understand the significance of Thomas, both in terms of what it
does and what it does not do, it is helpful to contrast the Supreme
Court's opinion in the case with the more sweeping opinion of the
Seventh Circuit authored by Judge Posner.224 Had the Supreme Court
adopted Judge Posner's analysis, it would have represented a sharp
departure from settled rules designed to guard against discrimination
with respect to political speech. As it stands, however, the Supreme
Court's opinion represents a slight shift in the discretion/equality bal
ance toward greater recognition of the need for some discretion to be
vested in municipal decisionmakers regulating the use of public
spaces.
Both the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court rejected a facial First
Amendment challenge to Chicago's park-permit scheme brought by a
group advocating the repeal of marijuana laws. The Seventh Circuit's
opinion embraces a conception of the First Amendment that focuses
on the quantity of speech permitted rather than on equality of oppor
tunities for expression, at odds with the Supreme Court's longstanding
skepticism of laws leaving officials with broad discretion to grant or
deny permits to speak in public places. For example, while ostensibly
recognizing the "danger in giving officials broad discretion over which
political rallies shall be permitted to be conducted on public prop
erty,"225 Judge Posner's opinion proceeds to minimize the dangers
posed by such a scheme. For Judge Posner, the critical question was
whether the regulations imposed by the city "reduce[] the amount of
speech" in this public forum, suggestive of a "more speech is better"
interpretation of the First Amendment.226 Yet his opinion gives short
shrift to the critical question: whether the city's rules are sufficient to
ensure equality of opportunities for expression and, more specifically,
to guard against public officials' misusing their discretion to suppress
223. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323-24.
224. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 227 F.3d 921, 923-28 (7th Cir. 2000).
225. Id. at 924.
226. Id. (emphasis added).

2450

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2409

disfavored messages or ideas. Under Judge Posner's standard, plain
tiffs would be obliged to show that the regulations were actually
applied to them in an unfair way because of hostility toward their
message or ideas227 - a standard close to the intentional discrimina
tion requirement typically applied to allegations of race discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Among the provisions challenged by plaintiffs was one giving
Chicago officials discretion to reject a permit because of a "material"
misrepresentation. While one might believe that the term "material" is
sufficiently specific as to present a tolerably low risk of content- and
viewpoint-based discrimination, Judge Posner's opinion goes further,
asserting that "if this discretionary feature of the regulation were
excised, the regulation would be more restrictive than it is. "228 Like
wise, in rejecting the challenge to the discretionary "waiver" provision
contained in the regulation, the circuit court stated that " [c]urtailing
speech is an odd way of protecting speech. "229 What the court appears
to mean by these statements is that a more precisely written regulation
might bar more speech. The problem with this statement is that it
disregards that ensuring equality, and in particular preventing against
governmental discrimination based upon disapproval of the speaker's
message, is at the heart of the traditional requirement of precision in
rules that regulate speech.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Thomas also represents a signifi
cant departure from traditional First Amendment doctrine with
respect to the facial-challenge rule. Judge Posner's opinion asserts that
facial challenges to speech regulations, as distinct from as-applied
challenges, invite "semantic nitpicking and judicial usurpation of the
legislative drafting function in an effort to avert, without creating
loopholes, dangers at best hypothetical and at worst chimerical. "230 Put
another way, Judge Posner views the mere possibility that official
discretion will be abused to be insufficient to justify facial invalidation,
even where public demonstrations in parks - among the quintessen
tial public fora - are at issue.
Judge Posner was surely correct to recognize that some degree of
regulation is necessary for anyone's speech rights effectively to be
exercised - without some regulation, after all, competing groups
would be hard pressed to determine who gets to use the stage at what
times. Where the opinion departs from established precedent is the
high threshold it imposes upon the would-be speaker to demonstrate
227. Id. at 925 ("The opportunities for abuse are manifest but are minimized by the fact
that if there is an abuse the victims can bring a j udicial challenge to the permit regulation as
applied to them.").
228. Id. at 925.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 924.
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that the government acted for improper reasons in refusing to grant a
permit. Absent a showing that the government is "trying to restrict the
expression of unpopular ideas,"231 Judge Posner's opinion suggests
that courts should defer to the decisions of governmental decision
makers charged with regulating the use of public spaces. This ignores
the teaching of cases such as Shuttlesworth, Forsyth County, and City
of Lakewood, which recognize that the very absence of sufficiently
precise rules makes it practically impossible to assess whether
discrimination against disfavored speakers is taking place.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion that Chicago's permit scheme was facially constitutional, it
did so on narrower grounds. The Court's opinion tinkers with First
Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence while leaving its basic
structure intact. The Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit
in recognizing the need for municipalities to exercise some control
over limited public spaces such as parks through the enactment of
a permit process.232 It also agreed with the Seventh Circuit on the
inapplicability of the Freedman procedural requirements in the
absence of some sort of content-based scheme.233 Where the Supreme
Court departed from the Seventh Circuit was in its recognition of the
dangers to expressive equality that exist even where the law in ques
tion does not expressly draw a content-based distinction.234
The Court emphasized that a permit may be denied only for one of
the specified reasons set forth in the ordinance, finding these grounds
to be "reasonably specific and objective. "235 While recognizing that the
city's power to grant waivers might conceivably be abused to advan
tage favored speakers, the Court held that the regulations were suffi
ciently specific to prevent discrimination against unpopular ideas from
occurring beneath the surface:
The prophylaxis achieved by insisting upon a rigid, no-waiver application

of the ordinance requirements would be far outweighed, we think, by the
accompanying senseless prohibition of speech (and of other activity in

the park) by organizations that fail to meet the technical requirements of
the ordinance but for one reason or another pose no risk of the evils that
those requirements are designed to avoid.23 6

231. Id. at 928
232. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322-23 (2002).
233. Id.
234. Citing Forsyth County, the Thomas Court stated the long-standing principle that
"where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant
or deny a permit, there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content."
Id. at 323.
235. Id. at 324.
236. Id. at 325.
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Justice Scalia's majority opinion highlights this point by empha
sizing that the alternative view - one that would permit no discretion
to be exercised by officials charged with regulating speech - would
have far-reaching consequences. It would, he notes, invalidate "every
obscenity law, or every law placing limits upon political expendi
tures,''237 since all of these laws vest some discretion in government
officials to determine when to enforce them. Implicit in this opinion is
a recognition that vesting some degree of discretion in public officials
is inevitable - even where the regulation of speech is at issue. The
opinion does not, however, abandon the insistence upon clear and
definite standards that, as cases such as City of Lakewood emphasize,
are essential to guard against the discriminatory use of this discretion.
In the end, the principal significance of Thomas is its narrowing of
the circumstances under which the procedural model championed by
Professor Monaghan and embodied in Freedman will be applied.238
Thomas does not overrule Freedman, but holds its guidelines inappli
cable to content-neutral schemes of speech regulation. It shifts the
balance slightly - but only slightly - toward greater recognition of
the need for official discretion in regulating access to public places,
given the minimal danger of expressive inequality that the Court
perceived to exist.
III.

DISCRETION AND DISCRIMINATION: CONVENTIONAL EQUAL
PROTECTION

Part II traced the development of and described the doctrines
designed to prevent official discretion from distorting the expressive
playing field. This Part assesses the quite different standard that the
Supreme Court has applied in considering the exercise of official
discretion outside the realm of speech. In particular, it examines cases
where governmental or quasi-governmental actors are claimed to have
exercised their discretion to discriminate based on race.
If the First Amendment cases described in Part II share a distrus�
of official discretion, then the Equal Protection Clause cases discussed
in this Part share a resignation that some degree of inequality must
be tolerated in order to preserve needed discretion. In the area of
public education, for example, the Court has exhibited a willingness to
tolerate educational inequalities, absent clear evidence of intentional
racial discrimination. In the administration of the death penalty, the
Court has acknowledged that the discretion which permeates our
criminal justice system may sometimes allow racial bias to enter the

237. Id.
238. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
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decisionmaking process, and has frankly stated that such inequalities
are inevitable.
The general approach taken in constitutional race discrimination
cases is that the imperative of preserving official discretion necessarily
limits the ability of courts to ferret out discrimination. At least one of
the reasons for this tolerance is suggested by Thomas v. City of
Chicago and made explicit in McCleskey v. Kemp: namely, that it
would prove too much or, more precisely, thrust upon the courts an
impracticable burden. Government (let alone the courts) could hardly
function if, in the name of promoting equality, the courts stripped de
cisionmakers of discretion in any circumstance where discretion might
possibly result in invidious discrimination. The benefit of this
approach is that it allows for individualized justice, empowering jurors
and other decisionmakers to consider intangible factors that call for
lenity in particular cases. The cost is that, as McCleskey suggests, it
necessarily requires that some inequalities remain beyond the reach of
the courts.
A.

The Intent Standard Revisited

The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the Equal Protec
tion Clause does not forbid practices having a disparate racial impact,
but only those having a racially discriminatory intent or purpose.239
This Article does not take issue with the now-settled proposition that
the Equal Protection Clause's target is intentional discrimination.240
The critical issue, for my purposes, is not whether this is correct as a
theoretical matter, but how courts are supposed to implement this
norm. More specifically, I seek to answer the question why the Court
has not adopted mechanisms comparable to those adopted in the First
Amendment Equal Protection cases to guard against intentional racial
discrimination occurring behind a veil of discretion.241
At first glance, the requirement of showing discriminatory intent
might seem the most obvious distinction between the Supreme Court's
equality doctrines in the areas of expression and race. After all, the
239. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). This Article uses the terms
"motive," "intent" and "purpose" synonymously. But see GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 751-52 (13th ed. 1997) (raising the possibility that
focus on discriminatory "motive" may differ from focus on discriminatory "purpose").
240. For critiques of the intentional discrimination standard, see generally Charles L.
Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987), and Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1 105 (1989).
241. Implicit in my approach is the idea that race and speech equality cases articulate a
similar norm - namely, prohibiting intentional discrimination - but have adopted very dif
ferent mechanisms to implement this norm. See Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra
note 10, at 57, 60 (distinguishing the Supreme Court's role in articulating norms from its role
in developing a means by which to enforce these norms).
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Supreme Court has never expressly limited the First Amendment's
mandate of equality to intentional discrimination against those with a
disfavored message or viewpoint. Nevertheless, as set forth in Part II,
the Supreme Court on numerous occasions has suggested that inten
tional discrimination is at the root of its doctrines requiring particu
larly searching review of schemes that vest government decisionmak
ers with broad discretion to regulate speech. These rules are not only
designed to detect intentional discrimination based on speakers'
messages or ideas; they are also designed to prevent such discrimina
tion from occurring in the first place. This is perhaps most explicit in
City of Lakewood, where the Court explains its insistence upon clear
guidelines as a prophylactic measure designed to prevent "discrimi
nat[ion] against disfavored speech. "242 As the Court further explains,
the absence of clear standards makes it all too easy for decisionmakers
to explain their decisions on content- and viewpoint-neutral grounds,
using "post hoc rationalizations" and "shifting or illegitimate criteria"
to hide their discriminatory intent.243
.
The question I seek to address is why the Court has not embraced
comparable doctrines in Equal Protection Clause, cases to detect,
deter, and remedy race discrimination. To be sure, the Court has
clearly held that disproportionate impact may be a factor in deter
mining whether discriminatory intent exists.244 But in cases stretching
from Milliken v. Bradley245 through Washington v. Davis, and from
McCleskey v. Kemp through United States v. A rm�trong,246 the Court
has - in most though not all contexts - made it increasingly difficult
to prove discriminatory intent. This high standard is, at least in part,
rooted in the Courts' recognition that tolerating some racial inequali
ties is simply the price to be paid for providing governmental and
quasi-government actors with the discretion they need in order to
function properly.
Although Washington v. Davis and A rlington Heights are the deci
sions most commonly cited as defining the requirement of discrimina
tory intent, they are not the first to state it. Even before Brown,247 the
Supreme Court's decision in Snowden v. Hughes declared that the
"unequal application" of state laws is "not a denial of equal protection
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination. "248 Snowden discusses earlier �ases in which
242. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1 988).
243. Id.
244. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
245. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
246. 517 U.S. 456 (1 996).
247. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
248. 321 U.S. 1 , 8 (1944).
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discrimination based on race was found to violate equal protection.
For example, it characterizes Yick Wo v. Hopkins249 as a case in which
"extrinsic evidence" revealed a discriminatory purpose. Snowden
likewise characterizes jury selection cases as involving "extrinsic
evidence of purposeful discriminatory administration of a statute fair
on its face," while carefully qualifying those cases by stating that the
mere showing that blacks were not included on a particular jury is
insufficient to make out an equal protection violation.250 The Snowden
Court's characterization thus expressly acknowledges that facially
neutral laws may be susceptible to discriminatory enforcement, where
public officials are given latitude with respect to their administration
and enforcement. What is not clear is how courts are supposed
to gauge whether that discretion is being misused, and what sort of
"extrinsic" evidence suffices to demonstrate (or at least raise a prima
facie case of) purposeful discrimination.251
Justice Stevens raises this question in his Washington v. Davis
concurrence. While agreeing with the Court's holding that the Equal
Protection Clause bars only "purposeful discrimination," Justice
Stevens trenchantly remarked that this holding raises the question
how courts should go about assessing whether such a purpose exists.252
In different contexts, Justice Stevens suggested, application of the
discriminatory intent requirement will implicate different evidentiary
issues, such as the extent of deference to be paid to the trial court's
factfinding, the extent to which one characterizes the issue as factual
or legal, and empirical evidence of disproportionate impact.253 Stating
that the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition extends only to inten
tional discrimination, then, raises as many questions as it answers. Left
unresolved by Washington v. Davis and even by Arlington Heights,
despite the latter's delineation of some factors that may bear upon the
intent inquiry, is precisely how courts should determine whether
discriminatory intent exists in different contexts.
B.

The Intent Standard Applied

Two areas are particularly useful in illustrating the general
approach to discerning whether discriminatory intent exists when gov
ernmental decisionmaking occurs behind a veil of discretion. The first
is the Court's approach to the problem of assessing intentional

249. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
250. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 9.
251. Cf Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1 127 (describing numerous factors that the Court has
taken into consideration in determining discriminatory intent in the educational context).
252. 426 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
253. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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discrimination in the context of school segregation. The second is its
approach to claims of racial discrimination in the implementation of
the death penalty, where the discretion vested in prosecutors and
jurors makes it difficult to discern whether improper motives are at
work in any particular case. In both areas, the Court has shifted from a
posture of skepticism toward official discretion, to one of greater trust.
Implicit in this shift is a willingness to allow some intentional race
discrimination to persist undetected as the inevitable by-product of the
need to protect official discretion.
1.

Desegregation

While the Court had stated the intent requirement even before
Brown v. Board of Education,254 the early desegregation cases demon
strated a willingness to find that equal protection had been denied
even where clear evidence of deliberate racial discrimination was
absent. Brown itself eschewed a reliance upon discriminatory intent,
focusing instead on the effects of segregation - in particular, the
"feeling of inferiority" that segregation tended to create in black
schoolchildren.255 The Court's school segregation opinions over the
next two decades adopted a similar approach both in determining
whether equal protection was violated and in assessing the scope of
permissible remedies.256 The focus upon eliminating segregation "root
and branch" reflects the Court's early willingness to look beyond the
noxious intent of individual evildoers, and instead commit the courts
to remedying a system that, through the actions of numerous
anonymous decisionmakers, denies equality of educational opportuni
ties based on race.257 In so doing, the Court considerably narrowed the
discretion of local school boards to make decisions on such matters as
pupil reassignment, entrusting that authority instead to the federal
courts.
The Supreme Court has subsequently construed these cases as
involving discriminatory intent, even though their holdings were not
couched in those terms.258 The difficult question that remains is how

254. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
255. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
256. See Mark D. Rosenbaum & Daniel P. Tokaji, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and
Criminal Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1941, 1950-57 (2000) (book review). Illustrative of the
more intense scrutiny devoted to public education is Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430, 435-37 (1968) (focusing on absence of racially identifiable schools as a measure of
whether equal protection had been achieved).
257. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1950-51 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 43839).
258. As Washington v. Davis, for example, states: "The school desegregation cases have
also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law

June 2003]

First Amendment Equal Protection

2457

the courts should go about assessing whether such a discriminatory
purpose exists. To borrow from City of Lakewood, the question is how
courts can and should go about detecting racial discrimination
shrouded behind "post hoc rationalizations," without unduly infring
ing upon official discretion.259
While immediate post-Brown desegregation cases loosely applied
the requirement of discriminatory intent (in contrast to Snowden and
later decisions such as Davis and A rlington Heights), the tension
between the promotion of racial equality and the maintenance of offi
cial discretion appeared even in those early cases.260 This difficulty is
comparable to those which led the Supreme Court, in the context of
speech regulations, to insist upon clear standards prescribed in
advance, thus limiting official discretion and preventing speech regula
tors from discriminating based on the messages or ideas expressed.
Why, then, has the Court not imposed similar procedural require
ments on such decisionmaking in its equal protection cases? One
obvious answer is that decisions in this area do not lend themselves to
the sort of precise standards that the Court has insisted upon in its
First Amendment cases. Judgment calls regarding the allocation of
scarce financial resources, for example, may necessitate giving
government entities broad discretion to determine how to manage
their schools. Ferreting out racial bias in all such decisions would
arguably require a degree of judicial supervision that would deprive
local school boards and city councils of the discretion they require to
function and, quite possibly, overwhelm the federal courts.

claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose." 426 U.S. at 240.
259. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988).
260. Two cases decided against the backdrop of court-ordered desegregation, both
authored by Justice Black, illustrate the Court's difficulties in grappling .with this tension. In
both Griffin v . County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Palmer v . Thompson, 403
U.S. 217 (1971), the question before the Court was whether a government entity's decision
to close public facilities in the wake of a desegregation order violated equal protection. Grif
fin held unconstitutional a Virginia county's decision to shut down its public schools and
shift resources to a fund formed to operate private schools for white children in that county.
While recognizing that states enjoy "wide discretion" to determine whether their laws will
operate statewide or only in certain counties, Justice Black's opinion for the Court saw
through this attempt to evade court-ordered desegregation. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231. In
Palmer v. Thompson, the Jackson, Mississippi city council closed five public swimming pools
in the wake of a desegregation order. 403 U.S. at 219. Although the circumstances bore a
striking similarity to those in Griffin - in. particular, it seemed clear that the pools had been
closed to prevent blacks and whites from swimming together - Justice Black distinguished
Griffin, expressly grounding his opinion in Palmer in the difficulties inherent in discerning
discriminatory intent, noting, "[I]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motiva
tion, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment." Palmer,
403 U.S. at 224. For criticism of the motivation-blind approach taken by Justice Black in
Palmer, see Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Anti
discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1976).
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Such concerns with giving local entities adequate breathing space
within which to operate come to the fore in Milliken v. Bradley,261
which reversed a lower court order that required an interdistrict
remedy for school segregation in Detroit. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Milliken put a premium on protecting "local autonomy"
over decisions of educational policy, asserting that " [n]o single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools."262 By the time of Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman,263 decided after Washington v. Davis and
Arlington Heights, the Court had backed away from the searching
scrutiny of local officials' education-related decisions that was evident
in its earlier desegregation cases. The Court in Brinkman vacated the
imposition of a systemwide remedy because of an inadequate showing
of systemwide discriminatory intent.264 Like Justice Black's Griffin
opinion, the Court acknowledged the perils of attempting to discern
the motivations of multimember public bodies.265 But as in Milliken,
the Court nevertheless held that deference to the autonomy of local
officials requires that federal courts refrain from a systemwide remedy
absent a clear showing.
The latter desegregation cases strike the balance in favor of discre
tion, holding that federal oversight of local school boards' decisions on
educational policy is impermissible without clear evidence that a local
school board has engaged in purposeful discrimination.266 Implicit in
these decisions, most notably Milliken and Brinkman, is an inclination
to respect the discretion of government officials, even if it means that
illicit discrimination may remain undetected. The proper functioning
of public schools, the Court seems to suggest, depends upon preserv
ing such discretion. Also implicit in these decisions is a heightened
sensitivity to the limitations of courts in discerning whether invidious
discrimination is really at work with respect to any particular decision
of a public entity. Undoubtedly, the Court's reluctance to intrude too
deeply into local decisionmaking - and its concomitant willingness to
tolerate such discrimination - is partly a reflection of the changing
makeup of the Court during these years. Yet it might also be
construed as reflecting an increasing awareness of the practical diffi
culties involved in detecting illicit motivation, and a skepticism about

261. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
262. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741.
263. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
264. Brinkman, 433 U.S. at 414.
265. Id. ; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (recognizing the "diffi
culties in determining the actual motivations of the various legislators that produced a given
decision" ) .
266. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, al 1951-52.
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the capacity of the courts adequately to remedy segregation even
where it may be the product of intentional discrimination. The school
desegregation cases thus evince a shift from skepticism to greater
tolerance of official discretion, at least in the context of racial
discrimination.
2.

The Death Penalty

A similar shift is evident in the Court's consideration of claims of
racial equality in the administration of the death penalty, and particu
larly in the shift that took place between the decisions in Furman v.
Georgia267 and McCleskey v. Kemp.268 While the Justices who formed
the Furman majority expressed concern with the threat to equality
posed by the discretion inherent in the imposition of the death
penalty, McCleskey contains perhaps the most explicit declaration that
some inequality in the imposition of criminal punishment is the inevi
table price to be paid for giving the institutions of democratic self
govemment the discretion they need to function.269
In Furman, a fractured Court struck down the death penalty as
administered in Georgia and Texas, and in other states by implica
tion.270 Although the case was decided under the Eighth Amendment,
the potential for racial discrimination arising from the discretionary
system for implementing the death penalty is a common thread
running through the opinions of the justices who formed the fractured
majority.271 Justice Douglas's opinion, for example, stated that the
"uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries" made it impossible to
assess how great an impact racial bias had on the outcomes.272 His
reasoning resembles the First Amendment Equal Protection line of

267. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
268. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
269. The Court's attempts to grapple with the problematic relationship between discre
tion and racial equality begins even before Furman. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971 ), the Court rejected a claim that the absence of standards to guide the jury's discretion
violated the Constitution. "In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of hu
man knowledge," the McGautha Court broadly stated, "we find it quite impossible to say
that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or
death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." Id. at 207.
270. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem
for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1997).
271 . The five justices who formed the majority joined only in a brief per curiam opinion,
but otherwise wrote separately. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall would have invalidated
the death penalty outright. The other three, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, reserved
j udgment on this question, concluding only that the manner in which it was applied was con
stitutionally unacceptable. For a more detailed discussion of the j ustices' concerns regarding
discretion and attendant inequality in the administration of the death penalty, evident in the
five Furman concurrences, see Patterson, supra note 41, at 47-53.
272. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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reasoning - evident in such cases as Shuttlesworth, City of Lakewood,
and Forsyth County in which the Court has recognized that the lack
of precise guidelines for regulating speech makes it practically impos
sible for courts to determine whether improper motives (such as a
desire to suppress particular viewpoints) are at work. While not going
so far as to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se, Justice
Douglas thought the "discretionary statutes" before the Court uncon
stitutional in their operation: "They are pregnant with discrimination
and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of
equal protection of the laws . . . . "273
Post-Furman decisions struggled to resolve the tension between
the constitutional mandate of racial equality and the discretion intrin
sic in the states' systems for determining whether to impose the death
penalty.274 The difficulty in reconciling these two values is evident in
Gregg v. Georgia,275 in which seven members of the Court stated their
view that the death penalty does not under all circumstances violate
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.276 The Gregg plurality
nevertheless insisted that states must articulate guidelines for the ad
ministration of the death penalty, stating that "where discretion is
afforded a sentencing body . . . that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action. "277
The Gregg plurality opinion thus presents a noteworthy point of
comparison with the standards set in First Amendment Equal Protec
tion cases such as City of Lakewood. The public fora cases have long
emphasized the need for public entities to specify clearly the reasons
for which applications to speak may be granted or denied. The
requirement of clear rules specified in advance - in both the prior
-

273. Id. at 256-57. The other four· justices who formed the Furman majority likewise
linked discretion and discrimination in the administration of the death penalty. See Patter
son, supra note 41, at 53 (citing concurring opinions). Justice Marshall's opinion labeled the
discretion authorized by the earlier decision in McGautha "an open invitation to discrimina
tion," observing that blacks were sentenced to death at a much higher rate than whites.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring). In attempting to explain the apparent
inconsistencies in the imposition of the death penalty, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
likewise observed: "[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sen
tenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
274. In the four years after Furman, at least thirty-five state legislatures enacted statutes
allowing the death penalty in at least some murder cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179-80 & n.23 (1976) (citing statutes).
275. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
276. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("We hold
that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed . . . . "); id. at
207 (White, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 227 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
277. Id. at 189 (plurality opinion).
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restraint and death penalty contexts - is designed to prevent discre
tion from resulting in discrimination, while at the same time making it
easier for courts to meaningfully review cases in which authorities are
alleged to have acted on constitutionally impermissible grounds.
There is, however, an important respect in which the death penalty
cases depart from the First Amendment Equal Protection model. In
the speech cases, the Court has imposed upon regulating authorities
the obligation to delineate what may trigger both the grant and denial
of permission to speak. Two of Gregg's companion cases, however,
expressly disallowed a comparable symmetry. Roberts v. Louisiana218
and Woodson v. North Carolina219 both hold that some discretion must
be left with the sentencing authority. While recognizing that Furman
disapproved of "unbridled jury discretion" in the imposition of the
death penalty, Woodson deems some such discretion necessary.280
After Furman's emphasis on the dangers of racial inequality inher
ent in a discretionary system for administering the death penalty, one
might have thought that a system that clearly set forth the circum
stances in which the death penalty is obligatory would comply with the
Constitution. Such a system could be expected to reduce the dangers
of racial inequality to which the various Furman opinions pointed. The
opinions in Woodson and Roberts, however, emphasize the counter
vailing value in allowing "consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense."281 Allowing the jury to consider such factors, under this view,
promotes more individualized justice, since mitigating circumstances
that call for lenity may come into play. Such discretion is not only
appropriate as a part of the implementation of the death penalty, the
Court concluded, but constitutionally required.
The post-Furman death penalty opinions thus illustrate the uneasy
relationship between discretion and racial equality. On the one hand,
in Woodson and Roberts, the Court emphasizes the importance of
preserving discretion, so that mitigating circumstances can be taken
into consideration in administering individualized justice. On the other
hand, Gregg follows Furman in implicitly recognizing the dangers that
may arise from such discretion - including the possibility that racial
bias will creep into the process - while at the same time expressing

278. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
279. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
280. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
281. Id. at 304; see Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (finding the vice of a mandatory death
sentence statute to be a "lack of focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the
character and propensities of the offender").
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confidence that guidelines crafted to cabin such discretion can control
such improper factors.282
The Court's attempt to balance the competing objectives of equal
ity and discretion in the administration of the death penalty was short
lived. In Lockett v. Ohio,283 the balance tilted decisively in the direc
tion of affording discretion to sentencing authorities, even if it meant
sacrificing regularity. Lockett rejected an Ohio law that limited the
mitigating factors that a jury could consider in deciding whether to
withhold the death penalty. While asserting the necessity of main
taining a "proper balance between clear guidelines that assure relative
equality of treatment and discretion to consider individual factors,"
the Lockett decision privileges the latter over the former.284 Lockett
places greater value on the individualized justice that may result from
discretion than on the need to ensure equality.
,
Lockett set the stage for McCleskey v. Kemp,285 a decision that
brings together the heightened concern for discretion evident in the
post-Furman Eighth Amendment cases and the high standards for
proving discriminatory intent evident in equal protection cases such as
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. In McCleskey, the Court
was presented with the most thorough study ever developed of racial
inequalities in the administration of the death penalty. The Baldus
study, introduced by McCleskey's attorneys, provided strong evidence
that (1) those murdering whites were far more likely to receive
the death penalty than those murdering blacks, and that (2) black
murderers were more likely to receive the death penalty than white
murderers.286
In McCleskey, the Court's prioritization of discretion over equality,
implicit in Lockett, becomes even more prominent. Justice Powell's
282. Patterson accurately sums up the uneasy balance embodied in the 1976 decisions as
follows: " [T)he Court tried to strike a balance between discretion, which yields individual-·
ized treatment, and standards that guide or channel discretion and prevent arbitrariness or
discrimination." Patterson, supra note 41, at 65-66.
283. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
284. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 620. This caused some to read the Supreme Court's opinion as
indicating that it was getting "out of the business of telling the states how to administer the
death penalty." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 305, 305 (1984);
see Jeremy Rabkin, Justice and Judicial Hand-Wringing: The Death Penalty Since Gregg, 4
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 18 (1985). Although this proved to be an overstatement, Lockett indeed
signaled that a higher premium would be placed on giving sentencing bodies some discretion
in deciding whether to impose a death sentence, even if it meant that some inequalities
would have to be tolerated. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 69 ("Lockett marks the turning
point where the Court began to favor individualization over equality.").
285. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
286. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87. Baldus and his colleagues found that those who
murdered whites were 4.3 times as likely as those who murdered blacks to receive the death
penalty, even after accounting for 230 nonracial variables. Id. at 287. The study found that
black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive the death penalty as nonblack defen
dants. Id.
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opinion for the McCleskey majority emphasized that discretion is an
integral component of the criminal justice system.287 Through a rigor
ous application of the discriminatory intent requirement, the Court
concluded that no violation of equal protection had been shown,
either by the jury that determined McCleskey's sentence or by the
state legislature that maintained the death penalty in the face of its
alleged discriminatory effects.288 The Court decisively rejected
McCleskey's argument that the racially disparate impact shown in the
Baldus study demonstrated a "constitutionally significant risk of racial
bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process."289
The most illuminating portion of the McCleskey opinion is its
remark that the defendant's claim "taken to its logical conclusion,
throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire
criminal justice system."29° For if the Court were to accept
McCleskey's proposition that racial bias infected the state's system for
imposing the death penalty, it would cast doubt upon the constitution
ality of the discretion vested in actors throughout every aspect of the
criminal justice system, from cops on the beat to prosecutors to judges
and juries.291 Justice Brennan's dissent summed up this concern as a
fear of "too much j ustice."292 The Court's holding in McCleskey may
be construed somewhat more charitably as an acknowledgment that
racial inequalities are the price to be paid for the discretion the Court
believed essential to the criminal justice system to function.293
McCleskey marks the effective end of the Court's attempts to
balance discretion and racial equality in the administration of capital
punishment. It would, however, be inaccurate to regard the McCleskey
majority as blind to the existence of racial disparities in the admini
stration of the death penalty. The majority all but admits that some
racial bias may creep into decisions about whether to impose the death
287. Id. at 297.
288. Id. at 292-99.
289. Id. at 313.
290. Id. at 314-15.
291. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1955-57 (discussing the McCleskey
majority's view that the eradication of the disparities documented in the Baldus study was
beyond its legitimate reach).
292. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
293. See Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1 145 ("Discretion in this context, far from being a rea
son to distrust decisionmaking, is a reason to insulate it from attack."). An internal memo
randum from Justice Scalia following oral argument in McCleskey even more clearly articu
lates his recognition of and resignation to the fact that this discretion makes racial
discrimination inevitable: "Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot hon
estly say that all I need is more proof." EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE
FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLE INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 211
(1998).
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penalty, but maintains that the elimination of all such bias is simply
beyond the institutional capacities of courts.294 There are, moreover,
some things that courts can do even after McCleskey to reduce the
impact of such bias on the sentencing process. For example, as the
Court held just a year before McCleskey, the discretion inherent in the
death penalty cases requires that a criminal defendant be permitted to
question prospective jurors in voir dire about possible racial bias in a
case where race may be an issue.295 And as will be discussed at greater
length below, the Court has imposed stringent limitations to prevent
peremptory strikes from being exercised in a racially biased manner.296
Yet the McCleskey majority appears to concede the point that,
notwithstanding these protections, some racial bias will inevitably
enter the process. McCleskey thus provides perhaps the most explicit
acknowledgment that toleration of some racial discrimination is
required in order to preserve discretion.297
C.

Explaining Conventional Equal Protection

The areas analyzed above are just two of those in which the Court
has adopted a more tolerant approach to official discretion, even
where it may result in racial inequality. As Mark Rosenbaum and I
have argued, this approach understands the role of the courts as
limited to the detection of individual bad actors.298 The dominant
paradigm therefore focuses on identifying "bad apples" rather than
examining whether the tree is poisoned by more widespread discrimi
nation within discretionary systems.299 One example is the problem of
racial discrimination in police practices. In general, the Court has
sought to preserve police discretion to determine whom to stop and
arrest, notwithstanding the risk of racially discriminatory enforce
ment.300 The difficulties of making a discrimination claim arise not
294. McC/eskey, 481 U.S. at 313 n.37; see also Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at
1956-57 (describing McC/eskey's core message that " [e]ven if systemic discrimination within
our criminal justice processes exists, the Court must leave it untouched - as though the
Constitution itself demanded that such discrimination remain invisible, or, at the very leas�,
be defined as something other than discrimination").
295. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
296. See infra Part IV.A.
297. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution,
85 MICH. L. REV. 174 1 , 1797-98 (1987) (suggesting that such a conclusion was necessary for
the Court to uphold the death penalty).
298. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1957.
299. Id. at 1949.
300. Recent examples of this tolerance include Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996) (holding that traffic stops are permissible when there is probable cause to believe a
traffic-code violation has occurred), and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
(holding that an arrest may occur for traffic violations). The dangers of racial discrimination
furnish the backdrop for the Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment issue before it. See
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only from the exacting intent standard, but also because of the high
bar that must be met to establish one's standing to seek equitable
relief301 and the difficulties in obtaining evidence needed to show an
equal protection violation.302 The result is that it is extremely difficult
to obtain relief in those cases where discretion shrouds covert
discrimination.
What explains the very different balance struck between official
discretion in the Conventional Equal Protection cases as compared to
the First Amendment Equal Protection cases? Three possibilities
warrant consideration.
1.

Trust

One possibility is that the Court simply may not believe that offi
cial decisionmakers today - be they local school officials, prosecutors,
jurors, or police officers - are as likely to engage in intentional racial
discrimination. The Court may feel more comfortable vesting discre
tion in official decisionmakers in race cases (at least in these contexts)
than in speech cases, because there is a lesser likelihood of that discre
tion being exercised in a constitutionally impermissible manner. Put
another way, the Court may simply be less distrustful of officials
misusing their discretion to discriminate based upon race than on
viewpoint, at least in the circumstances presented by these cases.
2.

Capacity

The second possible explanation for the differences between First
Amendment Equal Protection and Conventional Equal Protection is
that, as a practical matter, it is less difficult to create mechanisms by
which to curb discretion in the realm of speech. After all, it is fairly
id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("(A]s the recent debate over racial profiling demon
strates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for
stopping and harassing an individual."). Defenders of such tolerance might be expected to
respond to such concerns by noting that intentional racial discrimination may still be chal
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause. It is certainly true that those who believe that
they are victims of racial discrimination may still assert equal protection claims. What this
response does not, however, adequately grapple with is just how difficult it is as a practical
matter to successfully make such a challenge. See also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251
F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to an alleged practice of
stopping motorists based on race, on the ground that the plaintiffs' proof of discriminatory
intent was inadequate).

301. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that an African
American man seeking to challenge the LAPD's use of chokehold lacked standing because
there was no immediate threat that this tactic would be used upon him again).
302. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (2003) (holding that to show dis
criminatory effect, a defendant seeking discovery must adduce "some evidence that similarly
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not"). For a discus
sion of how Whren and Armstrong combine to make it more difficult to prove selective en
forcement, see Hall, supra note 53.
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easy for public entities to adopt specific rules for issuance of a permit
to speak in a public park. It is much more difficult to prescribe precise
and rigid standards to curb racial discrimination by juries administer
ing the death penalty or police officers deciding whom to stop. Simi
larly, the Court may feel that it is beyond the institutional capacity of
courts to check possible racial discrimination arising from the exercise
of official discretion.303
3.

Valuation

A third explanation is that the Court may value discretion and
inequality differently. It may believe that discretion is of greater im
portance in the areas of public education, administration of criminal
punishment, and law enforcement than in areas involving speech.
Alternatively, it may believe that intentional expressive discrimination
is a greater evil than intentional race discrimination (at least in the
contexts described above). The valuation explanation suggests that it
is more important to stop government from discriminating based on
message or ideas - even if it requires curbing official discretion than to stop it from discriminating based on race. Put simply, the
Court may value expressive equality more highly than racial equality,
or place a lower value on discretion where speech is at issue than
where group-based discrimination is alleged.
* * * *

Each of these three explanations undoubtedly has something to do
with the enhanced skepticism that the Court has applied to discretion
in the First Amendment as opposed to Conventional Equal Protection
cases. To understand the relative importance of these factors, I
now tum to lines of precedent that - though decided under the
Equal Protection Clause - bear some similarities to the First
Amendment Equal Protection cases. These cases show that the
Court has been especially sensitive when considering threats to
racial equality in the realm of political participation. They therefore
suggest that a concern with political equality underlies the difference
between First Amendment and Conventional Equal Protection. These
Unconventional Equal Protection cases provide evidence that
valuation - as in particular the high value attached to equality in the

303. A related practical concern is the burden on courts charged with policing discre
tion, especially in the criminal-justice system. Cf Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen
in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1; William H.
Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1999,
at 1, 2 ("The number of cases brought to the federal courts is one of the most serious prob
lems facing them today.").
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realm of political participation - plays a substantial role in deter
mining how much discretion official decisionmakers will be afforded.
IV.

DISCRETION AND PARTICIPATION: UNCONVENTIONAL EQUAL
PROTECTION

In assessing the differences between First Amendment Equal
Protection's and Conventional Equal Protection's treatment of discre
tion, it is helpful to examine three areas of equal protection inquiry
that depart from the norm. These areas, which I collectively refer to as
"Unconventional Equal Protection" involve: (1) racial discrimination
in the selection of j urors, (2) restructuring of the political process to
the disadvantage of minorities, and (3) the principle of one person,
one vote.
The overriding questions to be considered in examining these cases
are why the Supreme Court has chosen to depart from its Conven
tional Equal Protection rules, and whether that departure bears any
relationship to the reasons underlying the First Amendment Equal
Protection cases' skepticism of official discretion. My answer is that
the approach that the Court has taken in each of these areas can be
understood as motivated by concerns similar to those which underlie
the First Amendment Equal Protection cases. For each of these areas
involves government activities that bear critically upon political par
ticipation. The more intense skepticism that the Court has applied to
official discretion in each of these areas is grounded in the concern prominent in at least some of the First Amendment Equal Protection
cases304 - that government discretion will be subtly exercised to deny
equality in areas of democratic participation.
A. Jury Exclusion
The first area in which the Supreme Court has departed from its
Conventional Equal Protection rules is in cases involving racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors. There the Court has adopted
a rule that allows a prima facie case to be made on something less than
the ordinary showing.305 In striking down such discriminatory devices
304. See, e.g. , supra notes 101-104, 135-177 and accompanying text.
305. For more detailed discussions of the development of equal protection law in the
area of juror selection, see Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation A kin
to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 207-10 (1995); Swift, supra note 23, at 300-38; Michael
A. Cressler, Note, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 349 (1991-92); Michael A. Desmond, Note, Limiting a Defendant's Peremp
tory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 400-06 (1993); Melissa C. Hinton, Note, Edmonson v. Leesville Con
crete Co.: Has Batson Been Stretched Too Far?, 57 MO. L. REV. 569, 571-77 (1992); Bradley
R. Kirk, Note, Milking the New Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory
Challenge on Racial Grounds in Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19
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as the "key man" system and, more recently, in proscribing discrimina
tion in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the Court has exhibited
a greater suspicion of discretion than is evident in other areas of equal
protection law.306
That the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial discrimination in
the selection of grand and petit juries has been settled since three
cases decided in 1879: Strauder v. West Virginia,307 Virginia v. Rives,308
and Ex Parte Virginia.309 These early cases, however, reveal the diffi
culties in ferreting out intentional discrimination in the selection of
juries - and the problems inherent in cabining the discretion of state
officials when it comes to jury selection. Strauder involved an express
prohibition against blacks serving on either grand or petit juries, a
prohibition the Court held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.310
Rives, however, held that cases may be removed to federal court only
where state law expressly prohibited blacks from serving as jurors.311
The third case, Ex Parte Virginia, affirmed the power of the federal
courts to intervene even in the absence of an express racial classifica
tion, where such intentional discrimination could be proven. The
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a federal prohibition
against discrimination in the selection of jurors.312 While providing
some federal check on the discriminatory misuse of state officials'
discretion in the area of juror selection, Ex Parte Virginia leaves open
the question of how to prove intentional discrimination.
The first case to address this question was Neal v. Delaware,313
decided the following year. Neal rejected the defendant's claim that
the case should have been removed to federal court, where there was
no express exclusion of blacks prescribed by state law.314 Neal reversed
PEPP. L. REV. 691, 697-712 (1992); and Robert T. Prior, Comment, The Peremptory Chal
lenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER L. REV. 579, 583-89 (1993).
306. Amar, supra note 305, at 207 (describing these as first- and second-generation jury
exclusion cases); Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1119-20 (describing the "venire selection and panel
selection tests").
307. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking down a law excluding blacks from juries and allowing
the case to be removed to federal court).
308. 100 U.S. 313 (1 879) (limiting removal to cases where there was an express prohibi
tion against blacks serving on juries).
309. 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (holding that a federal criminal prohibition against discrimina
tion in selection of juries was a valid exercise of authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
310. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304, 308.
3 1 1. Rives, 100 U.S. at 321-22.
312. Ex Parle Virginia, 100 U.S. at 344.
313. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
314. Neal, 103 U.S. at 393. In Neal, the Supreme Court applied a "conclusive" presump
tion that the state's law complied with the Fourteenth Amendment's nondiscrimination
requirement - and therefore an irrebuttable presumption against the propriety of removal
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the conviction, however, on the ground that the defendant should
have been permitted to make an evidentiary showing to support his
claim that blacks had nevertheless been systematically excluded from
jury pools. In particular, the defendant had introduced evidence
showing that no blacks, from a population of over 20,000, had ever
been summoned as jurors - a factual showing that, six years before
Yick Wo, the Court held sufficient to make out a prima facie case.315
Notwithstanding Neal, a series of tum-of-the-century cases denied
relief to criminal defendants who alleged or showed a pattern of
excluding African Americans from juries.316 But in Carter v. Texas,311
the Court found an equal protection violation where the defendant
alleged that jury commissioners had selected no black grand jurors for
several years, even though blacks constituted one-fourth of registered
voters.318 Carter distinguished prior cases on the ground that the
defendant in the case before it had never been given the opportunity
to introduce evidence in support of his discrimination claim, even
though he stood ready to call witnesses.319 The Court's opinion sug
gests that statistically significant variations from the population at
large, occurring within a system that provides an opportunity for offi
cials to discriminate, creates a presumption that equal protection has

- where state courts had struck down a state-law requirement of exclusion and the legisla
ture had not attempted to reenact it. Id. at 389-90. Given the absence of an express prohibi
tion requiring exclusion, a' defendant would be required to prove discrimination in the state
court's actions. The Court applied and extended this presumption in Bush v. Kentucky, 107
U.S. 110 (1883), to a state whose legislature had twice reenacted laws requiring exclusion
even after a state-court holding that such discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amend
ment as interpreted in Strauder. This presumption did not, however, apply to an indictment
handed down by grand jurors selected before the state court struck down the exclusionary
law. Bush, 107 U.S. at 122; see Swift, supra note 23, at 302-03 (describing the presumption
applied in Rives, Neal, and Bush).
315. Neal, 103 U.S. at 397.
316. These included cases in which defendants provided affidavits asserting that no
blacks had been selected as grand or petit jurors in their counties. Tarrance v. Florida 188
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1903) (applying Smith to reject a defendant's motion to quash venire and
panels of grand and petit jurors, based on an affidavit alleging that for many years none of
some 1400 African American men in the county had been selected); Brownfield v. South
Carolina, 189 U.S. 426, 427 (1903) (rejecting a challenge based on allegations that the grand
jury was composed solely of whites in a county in which blacks constituted four-fifths of reg
istered voters); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1896) (concluding that competent
evidence of race-based exclusion was lacking where the defendant had submitted affidavit
asserting that none of the some 1300 black registered voters in the county had been selected
as grand j urors).
317. 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
318. Carter, 177 U.S. at 448.
319. Id. at 447-49.
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been denied.320 Put simply, disparity plus discretion would equal (a
prima facie case of) discrimination.321
Although the practice of excluding blacks from juries continued
unchallenged for decades,322 the Court reinvigorated the Carter
formula starting in the mid-1930s. In Norris v. Alabama,323 the Court
struck down the state's key man system. State law gave jury commis
sioners discretion to select men "generally reputed to be honest and
intelligent" as jurors, and no black had been called for grand or petit
jury service in decades.324 The Court held this sufficient to make out a
prima facie case325 and rejected the suggestion that it should simply
defer to the state court's finding that there was insufficient evidence of
purposeful discrimination.326 After a careful weighing of the evidence
adduced below, it concluded that no reasonable explanation but inten
tional discrimination against blacks could be provided for the statisti
cal disparity demonstrated.327
Norris marks an important turn in the development of equal
protection doctrine in the area of jury selection, not only because of its
application of the "discretion plus disparity equals discrimination"
formula, but also because of its willingness carefully to scrutinize the
state's explanations for the disparities shown. Over the next several
decades, the Court would apply this analytic framework to strike down
the juror-selection practices of numerous states.328
320. See Swift, supra note 23, at 308 (stating that Carter establishes the elements of a
prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection).
321. See Ortiz, supra note 240, at 1 127 ("(T]he jury cases require a showing of disparate
impact plus a showing that the jury selection procedure was susceptible to abuse . . . . ") .
322. See Swift, supra note 23, at 308 ("[T]otal exclusion of African-Americans from jury
eligibility appears to have continued for over a generation in some states without further
challenge.").
323. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
324. Norris, 294 U.S. at 590-91 . The evidence showed that 666 of 8801 male residents of
the county over twenty-one were black. Id. at 590.
325. Id. at 591 .
326. Id. at 590 ("(W]henever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal right and
findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the former, it is incumbent upon us
to analyze the facts in order that the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be
assured.").
327. Id. at 592-98.
328. See, e.g. , Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1967) (finding a prima facie case
of intentional discrimination based on the statistical disparity in jury composition under a
system in which j ury lists were composed from tax digests separating white and black vot
ers); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967) (same); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 2425 (1967) (same); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-62 (1953) (finding a prima facie case
based on the statistical disparity in jury composition under a system in which names of black
and white potential jurors were printed on differently colored tickets); Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 463, 466-69 (1947) (holding that the absence of blacks on grand and petit juries for
thirty years, under a system that gave commissioners discretion to decide who was qualified
to serve, proved purposeful discrimination); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 402-06 (1942)
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The jury exclusion cases thus apply a less deferential standard than
is characteristic of Conventional Equal Protection analysis. Even after
Washington v. Davis329 and A rlington Heights clarified that (in the
absence of an express racial classification) discriminatory intent must
be shown to establish an equal protection violation, the Court has
adhered to the "discretion plus disparity equals discrimination"
formula in its jury selection cases. In Castaneda v. Partida, the Court
relied on the statistically significant underrepresentation of Mexican
Americans on grand juries, along with evidence of "a selection proce
dure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral," to hold that
a denial of equal protection had been established.330 While expressly
recognizing that the holdings of Washington v. Davis and A rlington
Heights required something more than disparate impact, the subjec
tivity of Texas's system combined with the evidence of disparate
impact was held sufficient to make out a prima facie case, if only in
this area.331 The Court proceeded to undertake a thorough examina(holding that the absence of blacks on a grand jury list, where there were qualified blacks
but jury commissioners had discretion to choose acquaintances that they believed qualified,
made a prima facie case); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (finding an equal protection
violation based on statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of blacks on county
grand juries, plus a discretionary system whereby commissioners limited selection to their
personal acquaintances); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359-62 (1939) (holding that the
absence of blacks from venire, in a system that gave commissioners power to exclude based
on character and community standing, made a prima facie case of discrimination); Hale v.
Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 614-15 (1938) (holding that a fifty-year exclusion of blacks from
grand-jury service, coupled with evidence that only white persons' names had been put on
the jury wheel, made a case of discrimination).
Especially illuminating is the opinion in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 348 (1970),
which challenged the manner in which grand juries were selected in many Georgia counties.
Under Georgia law, state superior court j udges selected six-person jury commissions in each
county, which in turn selected grand j uries, which in turn selected five-person boards of edu
cation. Id. The Turner plaintiffs argued both that this system was facially unconstitutional
and that it was applied in a discriminatory manner. Despite the broad discretion vested in
both state j udges and grand juries, the Supreme Court rejected the facial challenge. Id. at
353-55. It accepted, however, plaintiffs' argument that discretion, in conjunction with evi
dence of a substantial statistical disparity within a county, made a prima facie case of jury
discrimination. Id. at 360; see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1972)
(holding that a significant statistical racial disparity in selection of grand jurors under a sys
tem providing for a racial designation on questionnaires presented a prima facie case of ra
cial discrimination).
329. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), implicitly acknowledged that the
jury selection cases allowed a less stringent disparate-impact test for assessing whether inten
tional discrimination has occurred, explaining this difference as follows:
It is . . . not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact - in the jury cases for example,
the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires - may for all
practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the dis
crimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.
Id. Left incompletely explained is what "circumstances" lead the Court to believe that dis
criminatory intent may be inferred from disparate impact in the jury selection context, but
not others.
330. 430 U.S. 482, 494, 497 (1977).
331. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493, 495-97.
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tion of the evidence on which the state relied to prove nondiscrimina
tion, and despite the district court's finding to the contrary, concluded
that the state had failed to meet its burden.332
More recently, the Court has grappled with the tension between
racial equality and discretion in the exercise of peremptory challenges
by prosecutors, criminal defendants, and civil litigants. The issue first
arose in Swain v. Alabama,333 in which the prosecutor used his
peremptory strikes to eliminate all of the six blacks on the venire. The
Court declined to undertake an inquiry into whether the prosecutor
intentionally excluded all blacks (or any other group) because of their
race, but created a "presumption" that peremptories were exercised
for race-neutral reasons - a presumption that, under Swain, was all
but irrebuttable.334 For although the defendant alleged that blacks had
not served on any county jury for years, the Court held such evidence
insufficient to rebut the presumption because it could not be shown
that the absence of blacks was (except in the immediate instance) the
result of prosecutorial action alone.335 As a practical matter, this made
it impossible to prove intentional discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges.336
In sharp contrast to the cases involving grand and petit jury
venires, Swain represented a strong inclination to preserve prosecu
tors' discretion with respect to peremptories, even in the face of
compelling evidence of intentional race discrimination. Over twenty
years later in Batson v. Kentucky,337 the Court decisively reversed
course, overruling Swain by holding that an inference of discrimina
tion could be drawn in similar circumstances.
Batson attempted to adapt the "disparity plus discretion equals
discrimination" formula into a workable framework for reviewing
claims of discrimination in the exercise of peremptories, one that
would preserve discretion while ferreting out intentional discrimina
tion, and that has since been expanded beyond prosecutors to criminal
defendants338 and civil litigants,339 and beyond race discrimination to

332. Id. at 498-500. The district court found that there was a prima facie case of dis
crimination, but that it had been rebutted by evidence showing that Mexican Americans
constituted a "governing majority" in the county. Id. at 491.
333. 380 U.S. 202, 210 (1965).
334. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
335. Id. at 224-25.
336. Justices Goldberg and Douglas dissented in Swain, believing the evidence of pur�
poseful discrimination overwhelmingly clear from both the prosecutors' actions and the fact
that no blacks had ever served as jurors in the county. Id. at 237.
337. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
338. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1 992).
339. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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sex discrimination.340 Recognizing that Swain had imposed a "crippling
burden of proof" on defendants seeking to prove discrimination,341
Batson articulated a new test, under which a prima facie case could be
made by showing membership in a cognizable racial group whose
members were eliminated by the prosecutor's exercise of perempto
ries.342 More nebulously, the defendant must also show that "relevant
circumstances raise an inference" of intentional discrimination.343
Batson thus leaves to trial judges the problem of deciding what should
cause an inference of purposeful discrimination to be drawn.344
While the Batson Court blithely asserted that it was not "per
suaded by the State's suggestion that our holding will create serious
administrative difficulties,''345 eliminating discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges has proven to be practically difficult - and
threatens to overburden the capacity of courts now required to make
case-by-case determinations whether discrimination exists.346 Three
issues that have arisen since Batson are of particular interest in deci
phering the effort to balance the discretion inherent in the exercise of
peremptory challenges against the imperative of racial equality.
The first pertains to the circumstances in which an inference of
discrimination can be drawn from disparate impact. In contrast to
allegations of systemic discrimination in jury composition, the exercise
of peremptory challenges in a particular case turns on a very small
sample. Is a prima facie case of disproportionate impact made out, for
example, when a prosecutor or criminal defendant strikes two of three
African American jurors, and only one of ten white jurors? Some
courts have allowed such scant evidence of disparate impact to make

340. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
341. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
342. Id. at 96. This requirement was later modified in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991), which held that criminal defendants may object to the use of peremptories to strike
prospective jurors of other racial or ethnic groups.
343. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
344. In his Batson concurrence, Justice Marshall expressed the view that the Court's
opinion did not go far enough to root out intentional race discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges, and that the only effective way would be to ban them entirely. Id. at
107 (Marshall, J., concurring). Some commentators have expressed agreement with Justice
Marshall's position. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Per
emptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 157 (1989);
Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for A bolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986); Clara L. Meek, Note, The Use of Peremptory Chal
lenges to Exclude Blacks from Petit Juries in Civil Actions: The Case for Striking Peremptory
Strikes, 4 REV. LITIG. 175 (1984).
345. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
346. See Alschuler, supra note 344, at 199.
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out a claim, and to shift the burden to the party exercising the peremp
tory.347
The second issue is what kind of showing is required to rebut the
prima facie case. In this area, the Supreme Court has issued two deci
sions of significance since Batson, both of which tilt the balance
toward greater discretion for parties exercising peremptories. In
Hernandez v. New York,348 a prosecutor defended his decision to strike
Latino jurors not because of their race but because of their ability to
speak Spanish, which might make them reluctant to accept the official
translation of the court's interpreter. The plurality held this explana
tion race-neutral. In Purkett v. Elem,349 the Court accepted as race
neutral the prosecution's explanation for striking two black males, that
he did not "like the way they looked" because of their goatees. The
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the justification given
must "make[] sense" in order to be accepted.350 These decisions tilt the
balance toward discretion at the expense of equality, allowing litigants
to make up ostensibly race-neutral, yet pretextual justifications that
courts are bound to accept.351 On the other hand, some lower courts
have rejected superficially race-neutral explanations that appear to be
functioning as surrogates for race.352
The third issue pertains to the standing of those who may seek
relief for alleged discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges - a question that necessarily implicates the broader ques
tion of whose equality rights Batson and its progeny protect. This issue
was resolved by cases that rejected a defendant's Sixth Amendment
claim based on the exclusion of jurors of a different race,353 but
allowed an equal protection claim to be brought based on such exclu347. Some of the lower courts have answered this question in the affirmative. See, e.g. ,
United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1 453-54 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prima facie
case was made where three of nine Hawaiian jurors were struck); United States v. Alvarado,
923 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a prima facie case was made where a prosecu
tor struck four of seven minorities on the venire).
348. 500 U.S. 352 (1991 ).
349. 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995).
350. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69.
351. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say Nol: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discrimi
natory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1 994); Swift, supra note
23, at 329-30 (suggesting that Hernandez and Purkett "could effectively undo Batson by
permitting attorneys to stockpile rote justifications known to be acceptable as race neutral to
particular judges").
352. See, e.g. , United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a
prosecutor's explanation that jurors were struck because of residency in low-income, black
neighborhood and therefore likely to believe that police "pick on black people"); People v.
Turner, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting an explanation that black jurors
were struck not because of race but because they were from Inglewood, in which blacks
comprise 49.9% of voting-age population).
353. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
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sion.354 Citing the opportunity that jury service provides for citizens to
"participate in the democratic process,"355 the Court upheld a defen
dant's standing to challenge the exclusion of those of a different
race.306 Over the vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, the majority pro
ceeded to hold that litigants have third-party standing to challenge the
exclusion of different-race jurors. Although Justice Scalia focuses on
the injury-in-fact prong of the test for third-party standing, what is
most remarkable about the Court's opinion is its finding the requisite
"close relation" between the litigant and juror to lie in their "common
interest" in eliminating discrimination.357 If this were enough to satisfy
the third-party standing requirement, then a litigant in almost any case
could meet this prong, simply by claiming a desire to remedy to consti
tutional wrong suffered by the person whose right was allegedly vio
lated. 358
Whether or not the juror-selection cases have achieved a salubri
ous balance between the values of discretion and equality, there can
be no question that they have created an analytic framework that sig
nificantly departs from Conventional Equal Protection. Without
renouncing the requirement of discriminatory intent, the Court has
allowed intent to be presumed where a disparate impact is produced
by a discretionary system. It has adopted an analysis that requires
careful scrutiny of the evidence, even at the risk of second guessing the
judgments of prosecutors and even trial courts. While affirming that
jurors' equality interests underlie the insistence on eradicating inten
tional race discrimination from the process of selecting juries, the
Court has been generous in according third-party standing to ensure
that such discrimination is addressed. It thus shares at least some of
the characteristics of First Amendment Equal Protection.
B.

Political Restructuring

As explained in Part III, the Supreme Court has generally been
reluctant to find an equal protection violation in the absence of a
facial classification or a showing of intentional discrimination. There
is, however, a series of cases that does not seem to fit into either of
these categories. In Hunter v. Erickson,359 Washington v. Seattle School

354. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
355. Id. at 407.
356. Id. at 408. The Court relied in part on Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), a decision
that, without a majority opinion, allowed a white defendant to challenge the exclusion of
African Americans from juries.
357. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413.
358. See Kirk, supra note 305, at 709.
359. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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District No. 1 ,360 and Romer v. Evans,361 which I collectively refer to as
the "political restructuring" cases,362 the Court struck down laws
deemed to impose unequal burdens on the ability of certain groups to
participate in the political process.363
These cases are difficult to explain in light of traditional equal pro
tection jurisprudence since they do not involve laws that expressly
target a particular racial group, nor do they involve the typical show
ing of intentional discrimination.364 It is therefore easy to view these
cases as constitutional oddballs, difficult or impossible to explain in
light of accepted equal protection principles.365 Viewing these cases
alongside the juror selection cases, however, reveals their shared con
cern with the danger of prejudice subtly denying equal participation.
More to the point, they share a concern that - absent a more strin
gent test for determining whether equal protection has been denied intentional discrimination on the part of the polity may escape detec
tion.
Of these three cases, Hunter is perhaps most easily understood in
light of traditional equal protection doctrine. Hunter struck down an
Akron charter amendment which prohibited implementation of any
ordinance prohibiting housing discrimination absent approval of a
majority of the city's voters.366 Enacted by the Akron electorate, the
charter amendment not only effected a repeal of existing fair housing
ordinances, but also required approval of voters before any future
ordinance could be implemented.367 The Court struck down Akron's
charter amendment.
360. 458 U.S. 457 (1 982).
361. 517 u .s. 620 (1996).
362. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down an amendment to
the California Constitution prohibiting state or local entities from enacting laws limiting dis
crimination by private landlords).
363. Mark Rosenbaum and I have elsewhere explored the principle of equal access to
the political process that, we claim, lies at the heart of these cases. Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark
D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge
to State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 136 (1999) ("It might be
tempting to view Hunter and Seattle School District as anomalies . . . in light of the Supreme
Court's general insistence that only facially or intentionally discriminatory laws violate the
Equal Protection Clause.").
364. Amar & Caminker, supra note 20, at 1024-29.
365. See, e.g., id. at 1022-29 (contrasting ordinary equal protection analysis with the doc
trine applied in Hunter and Seattle School District); David J. Barron, The Promise of
Cooley's Cities: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 560-61 (1999)
(characterizing Seattle School District and Romer as "jurisprudential enigmas"); Tokaji &
Rosenbaum, supra note 363, at 136 ("It might be tempting to view Hunter and Seattle School
District as anomalies . . . in light of the Supreme Court's general insistence that only facially
or intentionally discriminatory laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.").
366. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386 ( 1969).
367. Id. at 389-90.
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While intentional discrimination on the part of the electorate
might well have been inferred from the circumstances, the Court did
not expressly make a finding of discriminatory intent on the part of
Akron's voters.368 Instead, the Court reasoned that the charter
amendment required racial minorities to run a special legislative
gauntlet that no other groups were required to run.369 In particular, it
drew "a distinction between those groups who sought the law's protec
tion against racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the sale
and rental of real estate and those who sought to regulate real prop
erty transactions in the pursuit of other ends."370 Although the charter
amendment on its face treated all racial and religious groups the same
- e.g., it did not distinguish blacks from whites, or Christians from
Jews - the Court recognized that minorities would bear the brunt of
this law's impact.371 After the charter amendment, only racial and
religious minorities would have to obtain the approval of the Akron
electorate to enact favorable legislation. By precluding them from
approaching the city council on the same terms as others, the charter
amendment "place[d] special burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process," something that the Court viewed as "no more
permissible than denying them the vote, on an equal basis with
others."372 The Court therefore treated Akron's law as a race-based
distinction, subject to strict scrutiny.373
Hunter may plausibly be understood as only a slight departure
from traditional equal protection doctrine, since the Akron charter
amendment was apparently driven by a desire to insulate private racial
discrimination from government interference. It is therefore easy to
understand it as involving intentional discrimination, difficult to miss
yet hard to prove under the equal protection test subsequently articu
lated in Washington v. Davis.
Somewhat more difficult to understand in these terms is Washing
ton v. Seattle School District No. 1 ,374 a case decided after Washington
v. Davis. In Seattle School District, the Court broadened the rule of
Hunter to strike down a statewide initiative that had the practical
effect of barring school boards from adopting race-conscious desegre
gation programs.375 Like the Hunter charter amendment, the Washing
ton initiative "subtly distort[ed] governmental processes in such a way
368. Amar & Caminker, supra note 20, at 1024.
369. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 391.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 392-93.
374. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
375. Seattle Sch. Dist. , 458 U.S. at 463.
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as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve
beneficial legislation."376 In particular, after enactment of the Wash
ington initiative, only proponents of race-conscious desegregation
were precluded from going to their local school boards to seek favor
able legislation. Because racial minorities were deemed to be the ones
benefiting most from race-conscious busing, the Court held that the
law placed special burdens on minorities' access to the political
process, in violation of the Hunter principle.377 As in Hunter, it did not
require evidence of intentional racial discrimination on the part of the
electorate in making its decision.378
The Court's opinion does nevertheless suggest a concern that hard
to-prove racial discrimination may partly explain the result. Near the
outset of the opinion, for example, the Court notes the district court's
frank conclusion that it was practically impossible to ascertain the
extent to which "racial bias" was a factor in the Washington elector
ate's enactment of the antibusing initiative.379 Probing the intent of all
the voters who supported the initiative is beyond the capacity of any
court. Later in the opinion, the Court expressly agrees that "purpose
ful discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Constitution.' "380
In attempting to reconcile its conclusion with Washington v. Davis's
requirement of intentional discrimination, the Seattle School District
Court explains: "We have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into
motivation in all equal protection cases."381 Without abandoning the
requirement of intentional discrimination, the Court held that laws
that restructure the political process to the disadvantage of minorities
would be deemed "inherently suspect."382
The Court does not deny that a concern with intentional discrimi
nation underlies its holding. What it does deny is that a "particularized
inquiry" into discriminatory intent is always required.383 In Seattle
School District, the Court was willing to infer discriminatory intent
376. Id. at 467.
377. Id. at 483-84.
378. Id. at 484-85; see also Amar & Caminker, supra note 20, at 1034-35.
379. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 465.
380. Id. at 484 (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)).
381. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
382. Id.
383. The Court's recent opinion in City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation, 538 U.S. 188 (2003), lends further support to my interpretation of Hunter and
Seattle School District as "soft purpose" cases. See supra note 20. The Cuyahoga Court de
scribes Hunter as among the cases "in which we have subjected enacted, discretionary meas
ures to equal protection scrutiny and treated decisionmakers' statements as evidence of such
intent." Id. at 1393. Later in the opinion, Cuyahoga cites Seattle School District for the
proposition that "statements made by decisionmakers or referendum sponsors during delib
eration over a referendum may constitute relevant evidence of discriminatory intent in a
challenge to an ultimately enacted initiative." Id. at 1395.
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from the fact that the Washington electorate chose to impose special
burdens on minorities' ability to enact beneficial legislation. But the
Court does not adequately explain why it should apply a different, less
searching test for assessing discriminatory intent in this context than in
others.
This question is magnified when Seattle School District is examined
in conjunction with Crawford v. Board of Education,384 decided the
same day. In Crawford, the Court upheld an initiative that, at first
glance, might seem indistinguishable from the one struck down in
Seattle School D istrict. At issue in Crawford was a California constitu
tional amendment, which prohibited California courts from requiring
racial busing in circumstances where it was not required by the United
States Constitution.385 Both the Seattle School District and Crawford
initiatives, then, made it more difficult for racial minorities to secure
race-conscious busing programs. The critical difference, in the major
ity's view, was that the Crawford initiative in no way limited access to
the political process. Instead, it represented a "mere repeal" of a
constitutional provision that had been interpreted to extend protec
tions over and above those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment:
" [H]aving gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution,
the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally
throughout the United States."386 Because the California initiative did
not restrict access to the political process, but only limited the reme
dies available for de facto discrimination under state law, the Court
applied its conventional test for assessing whether the law was
"enacted with a discriminatory purpose."387 In contrast to Seattle
School District, where the "practical effect" of the initiative on minori
ties was deemed sufficient to show a prima facie equal protection
violation, the Crawford Court insisted on a clear showing of discrimi
natory purpose.388
Read together, what is clear from Crawford and Seattle School
District is that the critical question was whether the initiative limited
access to a political, as opposed to a judicial forum. After enactment of
the Crawford initiative, minorities in California were as free as they
had been before to approach their local school boards, seeking racial
busing programs to reduce de facto school segregation. After enact
ment of the Seattle School District initiative, by contrast, minorities in

384. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
385. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 532.
386. Id. at 542.
387. Id. at 543-45.
388. Id. at 545 ("Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a disproportionate ad
verse effect on racial minorities, we see no reason to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclu
sion that the voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose.").
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Washington were no longer free to approach their local school boards,
seeking desegregative busing for the same purpose.
What is less clear - and inadequately explained by the opinions in
either case - is why a different standard should apply when a state
wide initiative limits access to a political forum, rather than a judicial
forum. Seattle School District's suggestion that it is not abandoning the
requirement of discriminatory intent, but merely applying a more
searching test for intent in this context only magnifies the confusion.
Was there any greater reason to believe that the Washington antibus
ing initiative sprang from discriminatory intent than the California
antibusing initiative? Would it be any easier to develop evidence of
intentional discrimination in one case than the other? In short, what
calls for explanation is why courts should apply a different equal
protection test when a law regulates access to political as opposed to
judicial relief.
The most recent political-restructuring case, Romer v. Evans, relies
on a logic similar to Hunter and Seattle School District, though it too
fails to explain why access to the political process warrants special
treatment. Romer struck down an amendment to the Colorado Consti
tution that prohibited local antidiscrimination protections for gays and
lesbians.389 While not expressly relying on Hunter or Seattle School
District, and while addressing discrimination based on sexual orienta
tion and not race, the Romer Court applied a nearly identical principle
of equal political access to strike down the Colorado initiative: "Cen
tral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance."390 The Colorado initiative violated this prohibition, the
Court concluded, by making it more difficult for gays and lesbians to
enact protective legislation. To be sure, the Romer Court avoids
express reliance on either Hunter or Seattle School District. More
clearly than either of these cases, the Romer Court grounds its holding
on discriminatory purpose, stating that "laws of the kind now before
us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born
of animosity toward the class of persons affected."391 But as in Seattle
School District, the Court provides little explanation for why a
presumption of discriminatory purpose should be drawn in this
context but not others.
The questions raised by the political-restructuring cases thus
parallel those raised by the j ury-selection cases. In both areas, the
389. 5 1 7 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
390. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
391. Id. at 634. For a discussion of the antigay animus behind Amendment Two, see
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW
21-24 (2002).
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Court has applied an unconventional rule of equal protection, which
presumes a violation even without the direct evidence of intentional
discrimination ordinarily required. While not abandoning the general
rule that intentional discrimination must be shown, the Court applies a
more sensitive test for assessing whether such intent exists. But at least
on the surface, there appears to be an important difference: while the
special rule applied in jury-selection cases arises from suspicion that
official discretion may lead to covert intentional discrimination, the
special rule applied in the political-restructuring cases may actually
promote discretion.392 In Seattle School District, for example, the Court
refers approvingly to the power of local school districts to determine
how best to meet students' needs, noting that such matters as student
assignment had been "firmly committed to the local [school] board's
discretion."393 The problem with the Seattle School District initiative,
then, was that it removed that discretion from local school boards.
A closer examination of the political-restructuring cases, however,
shows that the problem with which they are concerned is not so much
whether discretion exists, but where it is vested. In Hunter, Seattle
School District, and Romer, discretion to adopt protective legislation
was removed from the entities perceived to be more accessible to the
burdened group, and placed at a more remote level of government. In
Hunter, for example, the discretion to adopt fair housing laws was
removed from the city council and vested in the electorate. In Seattle
School District, the discretion to adopt desegregative busing was
removed from local school boards and vested in the state legislature or
statewide electorate.394 Similarly, in Romer, the discretion to adopt
antidiscrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians was removed
from the local to the state level of government. Thus, while protecting
discretion in one sense, these cases limit discretion in another. In
particular, they limit the discretion of the electorate to create special
rules of access to the political process that burden identifiable groups.
It is precisely this intrusion into the ability of the electorate to
structure its government that the dissenting justices, in Seattle School
District and in Romer, found so objectionable. Justice Powell's
dissenting opinion in Seattle School District voices objection to the
majority's "unprecedented intrusion into the structure of a state
government."395 Justice Powell proceeds to explain that the matter of
how best to order the institutions of state and local government is for
392. David Barron makes this point, in emphasizing that Seattle School District and
Romer are driven by a concern with "preserving local discretion" to adopt appropriate
remedies for discrimination or segregation. Barron, supra note 365, at 579.
393. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 479-80 (1982).
394. Id. at 474 ("Those favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now must
seek relief from the state legislature, or the statewide electorate.").
395. Id. at 489 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the people, and not the federal judiciary, to decide - each state's elec
torate should have the freedom to "structure the decisionmaking
authority of its government" as it deems appropriate.396 Justice Scalia's
blistering dissent in Romer echoes these concerns, decrying the
Court's intrusion into the State of Colorado's prerogative to deter
mine how its government should be structured. In Justice Scalia's
view, the Colorado initiative represented a legitimate effort by the
electorate to "counter both the geographic concentration and the
disproportionate political power of homosexuals."397 Justice Scalia's
view would thus leave to the discretion of the "majority of citizens"
the decision whether a ban on gay-protective local laws are appropri
ate.
The dispute between the majority and the dissenters, in other
words, is not over whether discretion exists, but over where that
discretion should lie: in local elected officials or in the electorate. In
Hunter, Seattle School District, and Romer, the Court limits the discre
tion of the electorate to determine the structure of its government,
vesting that discretion in local entities perceived to be more respon
sive to minorities. The political-restructuring cases, of course, impli
cate a very different sort of discretion from that at issue in the
jury-selection cases. While the jury-exclusion cases involve questions
of whether a single individual's decisions (i.e., those of a prosecutor or
defense attorney) are motivated by discriminatory intent, the
political-restructuring cases implicate the discretion of a larger group
(i.e., the electorate). But in both cases, the concern underlying the
Court's especially searching inquiry is to guard against discrimination,
where access to the democratic process is at stake.
The political restructuring cases thus share the First Amendment
Equal Protection cases' concern with promoting a fair political
discourse, one that minimizes the possibility that discrimination
against disfavored groups will go undetected. And because they impli
cate participation in the political process, the Courts in Hunter, Seattle
School District, and Romer found it necessary to strike down the laws
denying equal access on their face. While none of the opinions explain
the reasons for facial invalidation of the laws at issue, it is not difficult
to perceive why: as in the First Amendment context, the mere
existence of these laws is sufficient to chill - and indeed, entirely
freeze out - the disadvantaged groups from fully participating in the
political process. The only remedy that would suffice, accordingly, is
facial invalidation.
The relationship to First Amendment Equal Protection also
explains why the Seattle School District Court (again without explana396. Id. at 493.
397. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion) allowed a party whose standing was in question to proceed as
plaintiff. The injury in Seattle School District was a denial of political
participation, yet the challenge to Washington's initiative was brought
not by a member of the group whose right to equal participation was
denied (for example, one seeking to advance desegregative busing at
the local level), but rather by the Seattle School District - the entity
that had enacted one of the programs banned by the initiative.
Without explaining its reasons, the Seattle School District Court grants
third-party standing to the district to assert the rights of others not
before it but whose rights to political participation would otherwise be
denied. The high value attached to equality of political participation
thus explains the Court's decision to constitutionalize limits on official
discretion, in a way that departs from Conventional Equal Protection
analysis.
C.

One Person, One Vote

The third area in which the Court has departed from Conventional
Equal Protection in order to guard against the distorting impact of
excessive discretion is the "one person, one vote" line of cases. At first
glance, grouping this line of cases with the juror-selection and
political-restructuring cases might seem odd. For unlike the special
rules developed in those cases, the one person, one vote rule was not
designed - at least not expressly - to deal with race discrimination.
A closer examination of the one person, one vote cases, however,
reveals that the decisions are motivated by similar concerns, which
bear a close resemblance to those underlying First Amendment Equal
Protection jurisprudence. In particular, they arise from a concern that
without clear rules by which to cabin official discretion over the elec
toral process, discrimination against politically disfavored groups
might otherwise escape detection.
The one person, one vote cases arise against a backdrop of prac
tices designed to diminish the voting strength of African Americans.
After initially refusing to involve itself in the elimination of practices
designed to prevent African Americans from voting,398 the Supreme
Court struck down devices such as the grandfather clause,399 the all
white primary,400 gerrymandered districts,401 the interpretation test,402
and the poll tax.403 Though none rest on the First Amendment, the
398. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 ( 1903) (affirming the denial of equitable relief to black citizens disallowed from registering to vote).
399. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
400. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
401. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
402. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 150 (1965).
403. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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decisions striking such practices - like the rule requiring clear rules in
the regulation as speech - serve as a prophylactic against decision
makers acting based on venal motives. Louisiana v. United States, for
example, concluded that the state's test requiring interpretation of the
Constitution was susceptible to discriminatory application, because
the test vested government officials with "a virtually uncontrolled
discretion as to who should vote and who should not. "404 So too, in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down
Virginia's poll tax, noting the dangers of discriminatory application
against African Americans but finding that it was unnecessary to
determine whether the poll tax served this purpose in order to hold it
unconstitutional.405
The one person, one vote rule was not expressly justified by a
desire to stop racial discrimination, but nevertheless shares with these
cases an emphasis on the need to control the distorting effects of offi
cial discretion upon the electoral process.406 In Baker v. Carr,407 the
Court reversed its previous holding that legislative reapportionment
presented a nonjusticiable "political question" due to the impossibility
of formulating judicially manageable standards.408 One year later, in
Gray v. Sanders, the Court held unconstitutional a "county unit"
system for counting votes, under which votes in rural counties were
weighted more heavily than those cast in urban counties.409 And a year
after that, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court required that state legislative
seats "must be apportioned on a population basis."410 The rule was

404. Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 1 50; see also SAMUEL ISAACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 95-102 (1988) (describing
the demise of discretionary techniques used to suppress black vote).
405. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 n.3. As Rich Hasen explains, the Court in Harper originally
planned to issue a summary affirmance of the lower court opinion that had upheld the poll
tax. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CA RR TO BUSH V. GORE 36-37 (2003). The Court changed course, however,
after Justice Goldberg circulated a proposed dissent to the per curiam affirmance. Id. at 37.
The proposed dissent more expressly addressed the discriminatory purpose of the poll tax,
noting that "the principal aim of this limitation was the disenfranchisement of the Negroes."
Id. at 179.
406. See Andrew S. Marovitz, Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-Person,
One- Vote to Judicial Elections Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 1 1 93, 1201
(1989) (describing the roots of the one person, one vote rule in cases involving race discrimi
nation within the electoral process).
407. 369 U.S. 1 86 (1962).
408. Colesgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that courts should avoid
entering the "political thicket" of malapportionment).
409. 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
410. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). Earlier that year, the Court had decided Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), striking down unevenly apportioned congressional districts under
Article I, § 2.
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subsequently extended to require roughly equal districts in local as
well as state elections.411
Like the First Amendment rule of precision, the one person, one
vote rule may be understood as a device to prevent the playing field
from being tilted for or . against particular groups, including those
defined by political party or race. The great virtue of the one person,
one vote rule is its simplicity. As Spencer Overton puts it: "The one
person, one-vote rule promotes uniformity, consistency, fairness, and
neutrality in decisions about apportionment by limiting judicial discre
tion to one simple question: Do all districts have the same number of
residents? "412 The rule thus provides a relatively clear and easily
administrable standard.413
There are, however, both theoretical and practical difficulties with
the standard. Voting rights scholars have criticized, for example, the
"incompletely theorized" character of the one person, one vote rule.414
While the opinions advert to general conceptions of political equality
to support this rule,415 they are less than specific about both the
"parameters of this claimed right"416 and the objective(s) it is supposed
to serve.417 On the practical side, the one person, one vote rule
(perhaps because of . its weak theoretical moorings) provides little

411. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968).
41 2. Overton, supra note 32, at 79.
413. As Professor Ely put it: " [A]dministrability is its long suit, and the more trouble
some question is what else it has to recommend it." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 121 (1980).
414. Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v.
Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (2002); see also Barbara Y. Phillips, Recon
sidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote
Dilution Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561 (1995) (criticizing the "simplistic and deceptive slogan,
one person, one vote," and stating that subsequent difficulties in determining vote-dilution
standard arise from "confusion created by the Court's initial failure to exercise theoretical
and jurisprudential fortitude").
415. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567 ("To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased,
he is that much less a citizen."); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Ad
dress, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing
- one person, one vote.").
416. Samuel Isaacaroff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 649 (2001); see also
TRIBE, supra note 74, § 13-3, at 1065 ("The Reynolds opinion did little to illuminate the spe
cific scope and content of the one person, one vote rule.").
417. Professor Gerken notes several possible theories, including (1) preventing an en
trenched group from preventing others from sharing power, (2) guarding against racial and
other group-based forms of animus, (3) making sure that all voters are effectively repre
sented, and (4) preventing "expressive harm" to those treated less favorably. Gerken, supra
note 414, at 1421-27; see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi
zarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-1 2 (1993) (assessing the notion that expressive harm is a
cognizable constitutional injury).
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defense against more sophisticated apportionments designed to di
minish the power of out-of-power parties, nonincumbents, and racial
minorities.418
The practical and theoretical insufficiencies of the one person, one
vote rule thus led the Court to back away from cases asserting not only
a right to quantitative equality (i.e., population equality) but also a
right to qualitative equality (i.e., equal voting strength).419 Specifically,
in Mobile v. Bolden,420 the Court insisted upon the conventional
showing of discriminatory purpose in a claim challenging a scheme
alleged to diminish minority voting strength.421 The problem with
application of Conventional Equal Protection standards is that
requiring voting districts of equal size may not get at all the cases in
which lines have been drawn with the intent to diminish the voting
strength of a particular racial group.
Notwithstanding the theoretical and practical limitations of the .
one person, one vote doctrine, there can be no question that it
represents a departure from Conventional Equal Protection. Like the
jury-selection cases, the one person, one vote cases seek to reduce
opportunities for discrimination by placing limits on discretion. Like
the political-restructuring cases, the one person, one vote cases seek to
advance some conception of political equality.422 And like the First
Amendment Equal Protection cases, the one person, one vote cases
aim to eliminate inequality through objective bright-line rules.
The Unconventional Equal Protection decisions share a willing
ness to find an equal protection violation on something less than the
ordinary showing of discriminatory intent, adopting a rule that is
designed at least in part to prevent illicit motives from seeping into a
discretionary decisionmaking process - and to avoid the inherent dif
ficulties that courts would otherwise face in determining whether
418. See Overton, supra note 32, at 81 ("Under the one-person, one-vote rule, shrewd
and calculating legislators have the ability to game the system by drawing districts of equal
population that minimize the political strength of rival political groups . . . . ).
"

419. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness
in Racial Vote Dilwion Claims, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989) (distinguishing
qualitative and quantitative vote-dilution claims).
420. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
421 . After Mobile v. Bolden, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973, to clarify that discriminatory intent is not required. See Heather Gerken, Under
standing the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1674 (2001) (citing S. Rep.
No. 97-417, at 2, 16-34 (1982)).
422. Indeed, Hunter v. Erickson (and therefore, by implication, Seattle School District
and Romer) expressly rely on the one person, one vote rule in formulating the rule prohib
iting laws that restructure the political process to disadvantage the interests of a racial mi
nority. 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969) ("[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any per
son's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size.")
(citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
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intentional discrimination has entered into the decisionmaking
process.423 Yet they also share a failure, in the end, to explain their
reasons for this departure from Conventional Equal Protection.
D. Bush v. Gore
The one person, one vote cases form the ostensible basis for what
is arguably the most unconventional of Unconventional Equal Protec
tion cases, and certainly the one that has generated the most public
and scholarly criticism.424 This decision is also the equal protection
case whose reasoning most closely resembles that applied in the First
Amendment Equal Protection cases.425
At least four aspects of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore are
remarkable, both for their departure from Conventional Equal Protec
tion analysis and their similarity to First Amendment Equal Protec
tion: (1) the holding that the absence of specific standards for
recounting violated equal protection, (2) the assumption that candi
dates Bush and Cheney had standing to assert the equal protection
rights of voters,426 (3) the remedy ordered, which suggests treatment of
the equal protection argument as a facial challenge rather than an as
applied challenge, and (4) the willingness to second-guess both public
officials charged with counting votes and the Florida Supreme Court.
Although it is risky to read any great shifts in legal doctrine into
Bush v. Gore, given the circumstances under which it was written427
and the Court's explicit attempt to cabin its ruling,428 its action on each

423. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61 (stating the "fundamental principle . . . of equal
representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or
place or residence within a State").
424. See, e.g. , VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME
COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT (2001) (charac
terizing Bush v. Gore as criminal); Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. husB and Its Disguises: Free
ing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001) (characterizing the
Court's analysis as a shell game); Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup,
LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3 (characterizing the Court's action as a "constitu
tional coup").
425. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality After Bush v. Gore: A First Amendment
Approach to Voting Rights, in FINAL ARBITER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF B USH V. GORE FOR
LAW AND POLITICS (forthcoming 2004) (discussing Bush v. Gore's relationship to First
Amendment doctrine).
426. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1093, 1094 (2001) (arguing that Bush lacked standing and that the Court improperly treated
his equal protection argument as a facial rather than as an as-applied challenge).
427. JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too CLOSE TO CALL 264-65 (2001) (reporting that the writing
of what would become the majority opinion took place in the morning of December 12,
2000, the day it was issued).
428. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities."). For an explication of reasons for doubting that Bush v. Gore will have
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of these points suggests a connection to First Amendment Equal Pro
tection that is worthy of exploration. In silently borrowing from these
cases, the Court exhibits a suspicion of discretion - not only of public
officials but also of state judges including those at the appellate level
- characteristic of First Amendment Equal Protection.429 The real
progenitors of Bush v. Gore, then, are not the one person, one vote
cases like Reynolds v. Sims that the majority cites, but First Amend
ment Equal Protection cases such as Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham that
it does not mention.
1.

The Equal Protection Holding

The Court concluded that the absence of sufficiently precise rules
for determining which undervotes should be counted violated equal
protection. The principle upon which the Court purports to rely is:
"Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may
not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's
vote over that of another. "430 The recount procedure in Florida
violated this principle, the Court explained, because of the "absence of
specific standards to ensure its equal application. "431
The Florida Supreme Court had of course articulated the standard
according to which ballots should be evaluated: the intent of the voter.
This standard, however, was deemed insufficient to rein in the discre
tion of the canvassing boards responsible for conducting the recounts;
instead what was required were "specific rules designed to ensure
uniform treatment."432 In other words, what was wanting was a defini
tion of which ballot markings should count as votes (e.g., "hanging
chads" count as votes if and only if at least two corners are detached)
that would eliminate subjective judgments. Because of the absence of
such a clear rule, the Court notes, vote-counters in different counties
(and sometimes even within a county) were applying different rules
for determining which votes would count.433
As authority for its equal protection holding, the majority cites
four cases: Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,434 which struck down
significant precedential value, see Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 386-92 (2001).
429. See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 737, 750 (2001) (arguing that the decision may be understood to rest on principle that
"at least where the right to vote is concerned, the states may not use discretionary standards
if it is practicable to formulate rules that will limit discretion").
430. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
431. Id. at 106.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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the poll tax, and three of the early one person, one vote cases - Gray
v. Sanders, Reynolds v. Sims, and Moore v. Ogilvie435• These cases
cannot by themselves justify the decision the Court reaches. As an
initial matter, each of the four cases upon which the majority relies
rested upon a disparate impact upon an identifiable class of voters.436
In Harper, for example, voters of limited means were the ones
dis-advantaged by the poll tax requirement.437 And in Reynolds,
Moore, and Gray, voters in larger urban counties were treated less
favorably than voters in smaller urban counties.438 Thus, while the
Bush v. Gore majority cites a concern that the absence of any stan
dards will result in "arbitrary" treatment, the cases upon which it
relies have to do with disfavored treatment of an identifiable group of
voters. In particular, they focus on the differential treatment afforded
to voters of a particular class, definable by lack of wealth (in Harper)
and place of residence (in the one person, one vote cases).439
In fairness to the majority, there is a sense in which the problem
that it characterized as "arbitrary and disparate treatment" resembles
the one person, one vote cases. As the Court notes, different counties
were applying different standards for determining which votes should
be counted,440 leading to a risk that the voting strength of certain
counties was diminished in comparison to others. Yet the comparison
to these cases remains strained, since none of them held that the
absence of sufficiently clear and specific standards - without any
evidence 'of a disparate impact upon a particular group of voters violated equal protection. Rather, in each of those cases, the evidence
before the Court demonstrated that voters in certain counties were
quantifiably denied equal voting strength. In Gray, for example, the
435. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
436. See Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 684
(2001) (noting the absence of an ex ante race, party, residence, or wealth based classification
in Florida's recount scheme); Tribe, supra note 424, at 225 (noting that the cases cited by the
majority each involved schemes that "had the purpose and effect of granting greater voting
power to a particular class").
437. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
438. Moore, 394 U.S. at 819; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545-51 (1964); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
439. There is at least one case in which the Supreme Court has allowed an equal protec
tion case to proceed, notwithstanding the absence of any claim that the plaintiff was treated
unfavorably as the result of her membership in a definable class. In Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), the Court reversed the dismissal of an equal protection claim
alleging "irrational and wholly arbitrary" denial of an easement, even though the plaintiff
"did not allege membership in a class or group." Id. at 564. With little explanation, the Court
allowed her to state a claim based on her allegation that she had been treated less favorably
than others similarly situated without any rational basis. Id. But in Willowbrook, unlike Bush
v. Gore, an identified plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to intentional differential
treatment. Id.
440. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (stating that "each of the counties used varying
standards to determine what was a legal vote").
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county-unit system gave each resident of the least populous Georgia
county influence equal to that of 99 residents of Fulton County.441
None of the one person, one vote cases invalidated an electoral
scheme based solely upon the absence of "clear and specific
standards. "442
The one person, one vote cases therefore are not sufficient to
justify the conclusion that the Court reached. The more apt compari
son would have been to speech cases like Shuttlesworth, City of
Lakewood, and Forsyth County, in which the Court held that insuffi
ciently precise standards for determining who may speak violate the
First Amendment.443 City of Lakewood, for example, rests its require
ment of precise standards on the recognition that it is otherwise too
easy for decisionmakers to disfavor certain speakers and get away with
it, by relying on "post hoc" explanations for its decisions.444 In a similar
vein, Forsyth County condemned the "overly broad licensing discre
tion" arising from the absence of sufficiently clear and specific
standards.445 In both cases, the real concern is that loose standards
provide too much opportunity for decisionmakers to exercise the
discretion in a less than evenhanded fashion - a concern present in
Bush v. Gore with respect to the Florida Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, Bush v. Gore does not even mention the First
Amendment Equal Protection cases upon which it implicitly relies. Of
course, if the Court had cited cases like Shuttlesworth, Forsyth County,
and City of Lakewood, it would have been required to explain its
reasons for importing speech doctrine into an equal protection case, in
light of its prior refusal to treat voting as an activity protected by the
First Amendment.446 Accordingly, if the Court's implicit reliance on
First Amendment doctrine is to be justified, some additional explana
tion of the link between voting and speech is required.

441. Gray, 372 U.S. at 371. The only evidence the Bush v. Gore Court cites that would
appear analogous is that Broward County "uncovered almost three times as many new
votes" as Palm Beach County, "a result markedly disproportionate to the difference in
population between the counties." 531 U.S. at 107. The majority's opinion, however, did not
simply deal with the discrepancy between these two counties, but instead with the perceived
statewide problem arising from the lack of adequate vote-counting rules.
442. Cass Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REY. 757, 764 (2001).
443. See ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE
LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 132-33 (2001) (suggesting that Bush v.
Gore's holding may best be understood in light of First Amendment cases).
444. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1 988)
445. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 123 (1992).
446. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1 992) (rejecting the argument that a chal
lenge to write-in voting stated a First Amendment claim); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1 966) (striking down a poll tax while avoiding the question whether
the First Amendment protects the right to vote).
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The Assumption ofJusticiability

The second aspect of Bush v. Gore that warrants scrutiny is its
unexplained assumption that candidates Bush and Cheney had stand
ing to assert the equal protection violations suffered by the voters
harmed. According to the Court, the injury caused by the absence of a
clear vote-counting rule was "the equal dignity owed to each voter."447
But if it was the rights of the voters that were being violated, what
conferred standing upon the candidates?
As Professor Chemerinsky has explained, the general rule is that
"plaintiffs only have standing to raise their own claims and cannot
present the injuries suffered by third parties not before the Court."448
While there are exceptions to this general rule - where, for example,
there are obstacles to third parties coming forward to assert their
rights or where there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and
the third party - it is not self-evident that those conditions existed in
Bush v. Gore.449 The standing of candidates Bush and Cheney is
especially dubious given that they could not show that the absence of
specific standards actually injured them or subjected them to any
greater harm than their opponents.450
Here again, the Court's assumption of standing would make sense
if this were a First Amendment case. For in those cases, the Court
has allowed litigants to challenge the constitutionality of schemes, the
implementation of which threatens to deny expressive equality,
without showing that they were treated less favorably than other
speakers. Those whose rights are not violated may challenge laws that
"delegate[] overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker," and there
fore impinge upon the protected speech of others not before the
court.451 Moreover, First Amendment plaintiffs are not required to
show that the rightholders cannot press their claims on their own,452
nor to demonstrate a close relationship to the third-party rightholders.
-

447. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.
.

448. Chemerinsky, supra note 426, at 1099.
449. Id. at 1 101. But see Tribe, supra note 424, at 229-30 & n.232 (arguing that Bush met
the requirements for third-party standing).
450. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a
Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 77, 85 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (arguing that Bush lacked third-party standing
unless his "supporters [were] disproportionately likely not to have their votes counted under
the prescribed process"); Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 676 (2001) (observing that if recount had proceeded, Bush might
have won "by a wider margin").
451. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965).
452. Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984).

2492

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2409

One might object to the importation of standing rules derived from
prior restraint cases, on the ground that these cases rest on the "chill
ing effect" upon others not before the Court.453 But while the "chilling
effect" metaphor may not easily translate from the speech to the
voting context, a similar problem exists: without a broad standing rule,
the rights of others - either to have their voices heard or to have their
votes counted - will be denied.
3.

The Remedy

The most problematic aspect of Bush v. Gore is the remedy
ordered - namely, issuance of a stay order that immediately stopped
the manual recounts and, three days later, an opinion that prevented
them from restarting.454 If the equal protection problem was the lack
of a sufficiently definite standard for counting votes, then why not
remand for the Florida Supreme Court to articulate such a standard?
Justice Souter's dissent makes this point.455 The majority's explanation
was that the recounts had to be completed by December 12, the day
the Court issued its opinion.456 Commentators have almost uniformly
found that reason unconvincing since it was a matter of state law
whether Florida wished to avail itself of the "safe harbor" provision
requiring the choice of electors by that date.457
While the critics are correct that this aspect of Bush v. Gore is
difficult to justify, there is a better explanation that might be offered
for the decision to stop the Florida recounting process. In declaring
the recount process invalid altogether and ordering that it be put to a
halt, the Court acted as though it were considering a facial challenge
to the Florida manual-recount scheme.458 Such a challenge may

453. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129.
454. For a critical analysis of the prophylactic remedy issued in Bush v. Gore, see Tracy
A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v.
Gore, 1 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 387 (2002) (describing the remedial aspect of Bush
v. Gore as "unnecessary and inappropriately tailored under the Court's guiding standards for
issuing such extraordinary relief.") Even some of those who defend other aspects of Bush v.
Gore have criticized the remedy ordered. See, e.g. , McConnell, supra note 450, at 675 (giving
the decision only two and one-half cheers because of its decision to halt recounts altogether
instead of remanding); see also Sunstein, supra note 442, at 767-68 (concluding that the rem
edy ordered is the part of the opinion "most difficult to defend on conventional legal
grounds").
455. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 132-33 (Souter, J., dissenting).
456. Id. at 1 10.
457. Id. ; see also McConnell, supra note 450, at 675; Sunstein, supra note 442, at 767-68.
458. See Chemerinsky, supra note 426, at 1094 (criticizing the Court for "decid[ing] the
case before the Florida law was applied," when Bush had raised only an as applied rather
than a facial challenge to that law); Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., at 43-44, Bush v.
Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (stating that "the contention that the 'intent of the
voter' standard violates equal protection . . . is nothing more than an argument that the con-
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ordinarily be entertained only where there is "no set of circumstances"
under which the law could validly be applied.459 But even Salerno,
which sets forth a stringent test for when a facial challenge may be
maintained, acknowledges that a different rule for facial challenges
applies in the First Amendment context.
If we see First Amendment Equal Protection cases as the progeni
tors of Bush v. Gore, we can make some sense even of the remedy that
the Court ordered. As I have already explained, Shuttlesworth struck
down on its face an ordinance conferring broad discretion on munici
pal decisionmakers to deny permission to demonstrate based on an
amorphous health and welfare standard.460 While the Court's invalida
tion of this portion of the ordinance simply followed precedent that
had long been settled, what was remarkable about Shuttlesworth is
that it reached this conclusion even after the Alabama Supreme Court
had provided a narrowing construction aimed at curin� the constitu
tional defect. What Shuttlesworth and its progeny thus require are not
just narrow and definite standards, but clear standards prescribed in
advance. 461 Allowing a state · court to save the statute (and therefore
Shuttlesworth's conviction) through a post hoc narrowing construction
would defeat that purpose. For through such construction, the state
court would accomplish what prior First Amendment cases forbade
municipal officials from doing: tilting the expressive playing field
against disfavored speakers through uneven application of vague stan
dards.
Shuttlesworth thus reflects distrust of municipal and judicial deci
sionmakers. More specifically, the decision suggests a concern that
without clear standards set forth by law in advance, state courts
(including the state's highest court) might exercise their discretion to
discriminate against disfavored speakers. This was not, of course, an
implausible fear regarding the Alabama courts of the 1960s. Nor is it
implausible to suppose that, at least in the eyes of the Supreme Court,
there were reasons to distrust the Florida Supreme Court in 2000. The
Court's refusal to remand for the state court to articulate a clear
vote-counting rule may therefore be understood as reflecting its skep
ticism of that court's capacity to do so in an evenhanded manner. In
the event of a remand, the Court might have feared, the state court
could have chosen a standard for counting votes that would benefit its
test and recount procedures of Florida's election code . . . are on their face unconstitu
tional").
459. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1989). But see Dorf, supra note 198, at
236 (arguing that Salerno's statement of the facial-challenge rule is not consistent with what
the Court has actually done).
460. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969).
461. But see TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-32, at 1036-37 (noting an increased willingness of
Court to allow saving constructions of facially invalid laws).
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favored candidate. Hence the requirement of clear standards pre
scribed in advance amounted to a facial invalidation of a state law that
failed to provide such standards.462
4.

Lack of Deference

The final aspect of Bush v. Gore that bears consideration is the
Court's willingness to second-guess the decisions of both administra
tive factfinders and the court below. This is evident in the Court's
explicit distrust of the county canvassing boards conducting the
recounts, and in its implicit but palpable distrust of the Florida
Supreme Court.463 The Court's mode of analysis reflects the "inde
pendent examination" of the facts reminiscent of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
The Court digs deep into the record to note various defects in the
manner in which votes were being counted, exposing what it undoubt
edly perceived to be the dark underbelly of the vote-counting process.
It implicitly rejects, moreover, Justice Stevens's suggestion that the
Court should assume that the "single impartial magistrate" overseeing
the recount process would have provided sufficient safeguards against
unequal treatment of similarly marked ballots.464 As Justice Stevens
put it, the majority's conclusion can only rest upon "an unstated lack
of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who
would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed."465
Finally, as already noted, the Court reversed and called the election
instead of remanding, thereby refusing to leave to the Florida
Supreme Court the decision whether Florida law required the vote
counting to be completed by the "safe harbor" deadline. It is no
stretch to believe that the Bush v. Gore Court's distrust of the deter-

462. I do not here deal with what some might believe the most serious conceptual prob
lem with the remedy ordered: the fact that it systematically disadvantaged those who cast
their votes in counties using the most unreliable systems (the "hanging chad" punch cards)
relative to those using more reliable systems. Thus, on this argument, even flawed manual
recounts result in lesser inequality than no recounts at all. This argument was suggested in
two footnotes within Gore's brief. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., at 43 n.24, Bush v.
Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) ("The manual recounts can ameliorate some of the
disparity created by the use of different marking and counting equipment."); id. at 50 n.28
("Counting none of the votes would be vote dilution with a vengeance."). If this argument is
correct, however, it suggests not that the Court's remedy went too far, but that it did not go
far enough. Rather than simply declaring only the recount scheme constitutionally invalid,
this argument suggests, it should have declared the entire election violative of equal protec
tion. Cf Thomas, supra note 454, at 387-88 (arguing that the prophylactic remedy imposed in
Bush v. Gore exacerbated harm to voters, by "den[ying] the fundamental right to vote of
Florida voters who cast a legal vote not counted by the tabulation systems").
463. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108-09 (2000) .
464. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 128.
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minations made by vote-counting officials and the state courts led it to
choose this remedy.
* * * *

The aspects of Bush v. Gore discusssed above track the four key
features of First Amendment Equal Protection: (1) the requirement of
precision, (2) liberal rules of justiciability, (3) receptivity to facial
challenges, and (4) independent examination of the evidence.466 Of
course, an account of Bush v. Gore that rests upon its connection to
First Amendment Equal Protection is at odds with the Supreme
Court's own explanation for its decision. The Court nowhere expressly
references the First Amendment cases from which it silently borrows.
Nor does this account justify the Court's smuggling First Amendment
doctrines into a voting case, a step - or perhaps more accurately a
leap - that the Court has heretofore refused to take.467 If Bush v.
Gore or any of the other Unconventional Equal Protection cases are
to be understood in light of First Amendment doctrines, we must con
sider why such a leap might be appropriate.
V. A MORE PERFECT UNION: E QUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The failure to acknowledge the relationship between the First
Amendment and voting is not limited to Bush v. Gore but is charac
teristic of voting cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause. It
can be traced directly to a case decided almost thirty-five years earlier,
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, one of the four equal protection
cases upon which Bush v. Gore relies. Justice Douglas's opinion in
Harper raised, but explicitly failed to settle, the relationship between
the First Amendment and the right to vote:
It is argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, particularly

by reason of the First Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be

conditioned upon payment of a tax or fee. We do not stop to canvass the

relation between voting and political expression. For it is enough to say

that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.468

466. See supra Part 11.B.
467. See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
468. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (citation omitted). For
arguments that the First Amendment should be considered a source of the right to vote, see
Justice Brennan's opinion in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974), and Karst, Equality
in the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 53-59.
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Harper's avoidance of this question has hindered the recognition of
the links between the First Amendment and the principle of equal par
ticipation. Had the Court addressed the question, it might have
avoided the confusion evident in such cases over the proper relation
ship between First Amendment equality and equality in other areas of
political participation ever since.469
Taken together, Thomas v. Chicago Park District and Bush v. Gore
suggest a reconciliation of the divergent approaches to the problem of
discretion and inequality. Although decided under the First Amend
ment, Thomas gestures toward Conventional Equal Protection analy
sis, in relaxing the general requirement of precision and in suggesting
that same deference should be accorded to official decisionmakers.
Bush v. Gore, on the other hand, moves equal protection doctrine in
the area of voting closer to that which has traditionally been applied in
the First Amendment context. This is evident not only in its quasi
First Amendment holding that the absence of sufficiently specific rules
for vote counting creates a constitutional problem, but also in its care
ful scrutiny of the actions of state officials and judges, its assumption
that Bush and Cheney had standing, and its willingness to entertain
what amounted to facial challenge of Florida's scheme. Put differently,
Thomas moves in the direction of greater toleration for discretion
characteristic of Conventional Equal Protection (thereby risking
expressive inequality), while Bush v. Gore moves in the direction of
lesser toleration for discretion characteristic of First Amendment
Equal Protection (to further equality in the electoral process).
It remains to be seen whether these cases are simply blips on the
radar, or harbingers of a more lasting change. While it is not my objec
tive here to soothsay, it is worth asking whether there is any justifica
tion for this convergence. This Part argues that there is, and suggests
the directions in which the law of expressive and electoral equality
might productively move from its recognition. In particular, such
recognition might move us toward a clearer understanding of the
special dangers to equality that may arise from official discretion to .
grant or withhold access to channels of political participation. It would
thereby promote a more perfect union of the discordant doctrines of
discretion that predominate under the First Amendment and the ·
Equal Protection Clause. More importantly, it would further the con
stitutional vision of a more perfect union by enhancing the opportu
nity of all citizens to participate in the conversations of democracy.

469. Professor Hasen notes that, at the time of Harper, the Court viewed the First
Amendment right of political association as "somewhat interchangeable" with the Four
teenth Amendment right to equal participation. HASEN, supra note 405, at 209 n.55. It was
Chief Justice Warren's suggestion that the Harper opinion rely on equal protection rather
than the First Amendment. Id.
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A. Lines of Convergence
1.

Equal Participation

At this point, it is helpful to recall the three factors identified at the
conclusion of Part III to explain why the Court takes a harder look at
discretion in some contexts than in others: (1) trust, (2) capacity, and
(3) valuation. It is apparent that, to some extent, each of these factors
plays a role in the approach taken to the relationship between equality
and discretion in different circumstances. For example, in the civil
rights era speech cases, such as Shuttlesworth, distrust of official deci
sionmakers appears most prominent. On the other hand, in Conven
tional Equal Protection cases, such as McCleskey, the Court seems
more concerned with the institutional capacity of the judiciary to
police discrimination that tends to accompany official discretion. It is
not so much that the Court trusted jurors to act free from racial bias,
as that it believed the courts are unable to stop such bias without
stripping decisionmakers of necessary discretion.
There can be no denying that each of the explanatory factors I
have identified plays some role in the doctrines developed. While it is
difficult to gauge the impact of each of them - and while I certainly
do not mean to underestimate the importance of the "trust" and
"capacity" factors - the heightened value accorded to equality in the
realm of political participation is vital to explaining the differences I
have identified. This is the common thread running through the First
Amendment and Unconventional Equal Protection cases.
The First Amendment Equal Protection cases from Thornhill to
Shuttlesworth to Forsyth County share a preoccupation with govern
ment selectively regulating access to channels of communication especially where core political speech is concerned - behind a veil of
discretion. So too, the atypical equal protection rules applied in the
jury-exclusion, political-restructuring, and one person, one vote cases
stem, at least in part, from cognizance of the special dangers that exist
where official or quasi-official misuse of discretion threatens to deny
citizens an equal voice in democratic processes. In various contexts,
these cases implement requirements of precision and relax ordinary
rules regarding justiciability, facial challenges, and appellate factfind
ing. Adoption of these doctrines serve the overriding objective of
promoting equality in the realm of political participation, and
preventing official misuse of discretion from denying such equality.
These concerns seem to take on special significance where racial bias
threatens to distort the process of democratic decisionmaking, a
recognition implicit in First Amendment cases like Shuttlesworth as
well as Unconventional Equal Protection cases like Washington v.
Seattle School District and Reynolds v. Sims.
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Whatever one thinks of Bush v. Gore, its line of reasoning taps into
an important insight: that the concerns arising from discretionary
access to the political process are similar to those which arise from
discretionary systems of regulating expression. There is a stronger and
a weaker version of this claim. The stronger version asserts that the
First Amendment itself extends to voting and other forms of political
participation that have traditionally been examined under the lens of
equal protection.470 The weaker version asserts that such forms of
political participation are important for reasons similar to those
warranting heightened protection for speech equality - even though
they are not protected by the First Amendment. The weaker version
would justify the importation of First Amendment modes pf analysis
into Equal Protection Clause cases on the ground that the interests at
stake in these cases, if not themselves First Amendment interests, are
worthy of special protection from official discretion for similar
reasons. Put another way, this view asserts that there is a common
constitutional value underlying rights of speech and rights of political
participation.
It is the weaker version of this claim that I seek to press here namely, the incorporation of a First Amendment Equal Protection
approach to inequalities in the realm of political participation is j usti
fied because the interests at stake are valuable for similar reasons.
Acceptance of the First Amendment Equal Protection approach to
political equality does not require belief that the vote itself falls within
the scope of the First Amendment. This approach does, however,
depend on acceptance of the proposition that rights of equal political
participation bear a sufficient similarity to rights of equal expression
such that the two should be examined under comparatively protective
doctrines.
To see the relationship between speech interests and other
interests of political participation, it is helpful to revisit the areas that
depart from the Conventional Equal Protection model. The special
attention paid to discretion in the jury-exclusion, political
restructuring, and one person, one vote cases arises at least in part
from their shared concern with equality of political participation. This
is self-evidently true of the political-restructuring cases and the one
person, one vote cases. Each of these decisions are expressly
concerned with leveling the political playing field. In Hunter, Seattle
470. Such an argument might draw support from Akhil Amar's contention that the very
meaning of the First Amendment changed through its incorporation by way of the Four
teenth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend
ment, 101 YALE L.J. 1 193, 1277 (1992). But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (re
jecting a First Amendment challenge to a state prohibition on write-in voting). For an
argument that the First Amendment should be construed to extend to voting rights, see
Michele Logan, Note, The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First Amendment, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 727 (1993).
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School District, and Romer this means removing barriers to a numeri
cal minority's access to local government. The right to seek "beneficial
legislation" from one's government on equal terms with all other citi
zens, if not itself protected by the First Amendment, bears a conspicu
ous resemblance to interests protected by the speech and petition
clauses. In both cases, there is an interest in being able to approach
one's government on equal terms as all other citizens. The political
participation cases protect against exclusion from the political conver
sation because of one's race (or, in the case of Romer, sexual orienta
tion) by adopting a more sensitive test for assessing whether a
discriminatory purpose exists.
So too, the one person, one vote cases hinge upon a conception of
equal political participation, albeit one that may be incompletely
developed. In particular, the one person, one vote cases do not explain
what sort of inequality they are guarding against (for example,
schemes that skew the process to the advantage of a political party, a
racial group, or incumbents). What is clear from the one person, one
vote cases, however, is that they are rooted in a conception of the
"equal dignity owed to each voter." In Bush v. Gore, for example, the
Court notes that the states might chose to take away from their citi
zens the right to cast votes for the President entirely. What the state
may not do is to selectively disenfranchise its citizens. The greater
power to deny political participation entirely does not include the
lesser power to do so on an unequal basis.
The role that juries play as instruments of democratic self
government can likewise help explain the connection between the
j ury-selection cases, the political-restructuring cases, and the one
person, one vote cases. The j ury, from the Founding on, has served not
only as a factfinder but also as a fundamental component of the
American democracy.471 Alexis de Tocqueville famously remarked
that "the jury is above all a political institution," taking the position
that "it is essential that the jury lists should expand or shrink with the
lists of voters."472 The post-Batson jury-selection cases likewise rely on
the central place of the jury as a forum for democratic participation, a
role distinct from its function as a mechanism by which to educate the

471. Amar, supra note 305, at 218-21 ("[T]he jury was an essential democratic institution
because it was a means by which citizens could engage in self-government.").
472. ALEXIS D E TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250-51 (J.P. Mayer & Max
Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1848). Another European expa
triate, German philosopher Frances Lieber, made a similar point about the American jury
system: "Self-government, to be of a penetrative character . . . consists in the presenting
grand jury, in the petty jury, in the fact that much which is called on the European continent
the administrative branch is left to the people." FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND
SELF-GOVERNMENT 321 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 3d ed., rev., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippin
cott & Co. 1891).

2500

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2409

citizenry.473 For example, in extending third-party standing to criminal
defendants challenging peremptory strikes of other-race jurors,
Powers v. Ohio expressly stated: "The opportunity for ordinary citi
zens to participate in the administration of justice has long been rec
ognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury sys
tem. "474 Jury service, Powers proceeds to explain, "preserves the
democratic element of the law."475 It is democracy in action. For this
reason, mechanisms that deny equal participation on juries warrant
especially rigorous review.
Understanding the jury box as a forum for political participation
on par with the ballot box not only helps explain the special scrutiny
accorded to race-based peremptories in cases such as Batson; it also
helps explain the apparently divergent approaches to juror decision
making evident in Conventional Equal Protection cases like
McCleskey and First Amendment Equal Protection cases like
Herndon and New York Times v. Sullivan. In particular, McCleskey
suggests an unwillingness to limit the discretion of juries, since doing
so would effectively restrict their ability to participate in this forum for
democratic conversation. While the Court properly views juror deci
sionmaking (at least sometimes) as the exercise of rights of political
participation, it is willing to take power away from these institutions of
democracy in cases where the political expression of unpopular
minorities is placed at risk. This risk may be viewed as less acute in
death penalty cases, because the jury is not regulating access to
channels of political participation in these cases. Because the death
penalty cases present no danger of distorting public discourse to the
disadvantage of a locally unpopular minority, the Court may be
unwilling to override jury decisionmaking in this area.
The Court's decision this past term in Ring v. A rizona,476 requiring
the jury to find the preconditions for imposition of a death sentence,
supports this interpretation of McCleskey. Ring suggests that respect
for the critical role that the jury plays in democratic self-government
at least partly underlies the Court's unwillingness to override the
jury's decisionmaking authority - absent a countervailing infringe
ment on rights of political participation, as was present in cases such as
Herndon and New York Times v. Sullivan.477
473. See Amar, supra note 305, at 221 (noting de Tocqueville's distinction between "ac
tual self-government through juries" and "development of self-governance skills from jury
service").
474. 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991 ).
475. Powers, 499 U.S. at 407.
476. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
477. 376 U.S. 254 (1 964). One might still believe that McCleskey underestimates the
dangers or undervalues the harms resulting from discriminatory implementation from the
death penalty. Indeed, Mark Rosenbaum and I have taken such a position. See Rosenbaum
& Tokaji, supra note 256, at 1965 (arguing for an approach that would take into considera-
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To be sure, the special importance of equality in the realm of po
litical participation is not the only factor supporting the special doc
trines created to curb the distorting effects of discretion in the First
Amendment and Unconventional Equal Protection cases. Concerns
with the capacity of courts to create an administrable remedy and
distrust of decisionmakers in particular contexts also play a role in
shaping the legal doctrine. For example, the refusal of the McCleskey
Court to interfere with juror decisionmaking - tainted as it may be
with racial bias - arises in part from the difficulty of coming up with a
suitable remedy, short of holding the death penalty unconstitutional in
its entirety. And if the death penalty were entirely invalidated, the
Court feared a slippery slope with · respect to . less severe forms of
criminal punishment.478 So too, the reluctance of the courts to enter
the fray with respect to claims of racial discrimination by police
departments might arise from remedial concerns.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has not demonstrated the
same reluctance to interfere where claims of race discrimination in the
composition of juries are at issue. For example, despite the public
attention devoted to issues of racial profiling in the enforcement of
traffic laws, courts have so far been unwilling to adopt rules like that
adopted in the jury-exclusion cases - i.e., the existence of discretion
plus a statistical disparity equals a prima facie case of discrimination.479
Even if the value attached to political participation is not the only
reason for the heightened sensitivity accorded official discretion in
First Amendment and Unconventional Equal Protection cases, it is an
important part of the explanation.
2.

The Priority of Participation

Still wanting, however, is a theoretical explanation for prioritiz
ation of equality in the realm of political participation. Why should
equality in the realm of political participation be given greater protec
tion from discretionary decisionmaking than equality in other areas?480
Asserting that there is an expressive element .to rights of political
participation only partly explains these differences.

tion the "interplay between McCleskey's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
claims"). My argument here is not that McC/eskey was correctly decided, but only that its
holding can be reconciled with cases like Herndon and New York Times if we understand the
Court to be especially concerned with racial bias creeping into jury decisionmaking when
political expression is at issue.
478. See id. at 1956-57.
479. Id. at 1969-70.
480. For an argument that the right to political participation is among the core values of
equal citizenship, see Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth A mendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 26-29 (1977).
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In seeking such an explanation, it is instructive to revisit the com
peting theories of First Amendment equality discussed in Part I, one
atomistic (focusing on the individual speaker's interest in autonomy)
and the other systemic (focusing on a balanced public discourse that
allows a diversity of groups to have their views aired). It has not up
until now been necessary to adjudicate these views, at least for my
purposes, because they share a concern with preventing the govern
ment from singling out particular speakers for disfavored treatment
because of their messages or ideas. But having now reviewed the doc
trines developed to resolve the tension between equality and discre
tion in various contexts, we may assess what theoretical justification
might exist for these differences. In particular, we may consider
whether either of these theories provides a satisfactory account of the
different rules applied in the First Amendment Equal Protection,
Conventional Equal Protection, and Unconventional Equal Protection
cases. That is not to suggest that all of these cases have been correctly
decided. It is certainly possible that some of these cases were incor
rectly decided, and even that some of the doctrines that have devel
oped are wrongheaded. But departures from our settled precedent
should lead us at least to question the explanatory power of the pre
dominant First Amendment theories.481
Such an examination reveals that neither the atomistic nor the
systemic views of expressive equality provides a wholly satisfactory
account of the different equal protection standards. An atomistic view
of the First Amendment, predicated upon individual autonomy, has no
convincing explanation for why rights of political participation should
receive special protection, in comparison with other interests. It
cannot, for example, explain why a prospective Latino juror has a
more important interest in being free from racial discrimination on the
part of a prosecutor, than does a Latino driver on Interstate 5 stopped
by the California Highway Patrol for going five miles over the speed
limit. It is not apparent that one's interest in individual autonomy is
any less implicated by the former than the latter example. The
contrary would instead appear to be the case. Nor is it immediately
evident how a theory predicated on individual autonomy would
explain the greater scrutiny accorded to victims of quantitative mal
apportionment, as opposed to those sentenced to death as a result of
racial bias within the capital sentencing system.
481. Cf RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 42 (suggesting that theories
of justice should be measured by how well they account for our "considered j udgments"
reached after due consideration). My suggestion draws upon Rawls, in suggesting that con
stitutional theories should be evaluated, at least in part, by how well they account for con
sidered judgments reflected in settled case authority. As in Professor Rawls's work, this is
not to suggest that such judgments are beyond revision. Id. But comparing our considered
judgments to what various theories of free speech would appear to demand at least provides ,
a starting point by which to evaluate the adequacy of those theories.
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The special doctrines created to monitor inequalities in the politi
cal process also defy explanation under an atomistic theory premised
on individual autonomy. This theory can perhaps explain a case like
Harper, striking down the poll tax, on the ground that our right to be
treated as equal citizens - and to exercise the most basic of roles as a
citizen by casting a vote - should not be denied on account of limited
means. But it is difficult to explain the rule developed in the one
person, one vote cases on the ground that it is necessary to respect
each individual's right to be treated as an "equal sovereign citizen."482
The harm to individual autonomy arising from such deviations from
the one person, one vote seems quite attenuated.483 It is, for example,
difficult to see how an individual voter's right to vote is denied by be
ing placed in a voting district that is slightly larger than a neighboring
district, to the extent that we view each voter atomistically. For each
voter is still able to cast a vote for his or her preferred candidate, and
thereby to realize his or her interest in self-representation. The real
harm can only be judged by virtue of the impact of malapportionment
upon the groups negatively affected by such malapportionment - for
example, African Americans as a group, to the extent they are more
likely to reside in larger voting districts, and therefore have their
collective political power diminished.484
Indeed, the atomistic theory even has difficulty explaining some of
the differences within First Amendment doctrine. Take, for example,
the case of National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,485 which upheld
a highly discretionary system of distributing public funds for artistic
expression. The vague standard for allocation of federal funds in
Finley, based on "artistic merit," allows and indeed requires public
officials to evaluate the content of speech in determining how public
monies are spent. Suppose, however, that a state legislature were to
develop a scheme of publicly financing political-advocacy organiza
tions that left a state commission discretion to award funds based upon
"political merit." Such a scheme could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny, allocating as it does vast discretion to public officials that
very easily could be used to advance favored viewpoints and put dis
favored viewpoints at a relative disadvantage. The atomistic view
cannot, however, explain why political expression should be privileged
over artistic expression.
482. Fried, supra note 82, at 233.
483. But see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu
tional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072 (1980) (explaining the one person, one vote rule as
"an expression of the equal respect in which we as a society aspire to hold each individual").
484. See Gerken, supra note 421, at 1682-84 (defining the right to an undiluted vote as
an aggregate right, in part because it can only be understood by reference to an individual's
relation to the group).
485. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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At first glance, the systemic theory of the First Amendment based
upon creation of a robust public discourse seems to do better. The
First Amendment Equal Protection cases - especially those arising
out of the civil rights era and those arising from dissident political
speech - likewise appear to rest on some conception of a fair political
discourse. The objective, after all, in these cases was to prevent
unfriendly bureaucrats, juries, and judges from tilting the expressive
playing field to the disadvantage of an insurgent political force.
The systemic theory also provides some explanation for the differ
ences between First Amendment Equal Protection and Conventional
Equal Protection, since the idea of a democracy that allows all seg
ments of society to be heard - regardless of wealth, race, or political
influence - underlies this theory.486 A malapportioned state legisla
ture, which leaves each voter in one county with ninety-nine times the
voting strength of each voter in another county, would seem to violate
this principle. So too, the systemic view would appear to do a better
job at first glance of explaining the political-restructuring cases. In
particular, these cases can be understood under this theory as dealing
with the concern that hidden racial bias may distort the public debate,
leaving the voices of certain disfavored segments of society unheard.
It also does a good job of explaining the first generation of jury exclu
sion cases, which focused upon one segment of society - African
Americans - being denied the opportunity to have their voices heard
in one important facet of the democratic process. The greater skepti
cism with which courts view the exercise of official discretion when it
impinges on expressive equality is of less importance when that discre
tion, although perhaps arising from racial bias, does not "skew" the
democratic process.
A closer examination of the systemic view, however, reveals some
serious problems. For one thing, a theory that focuses on systematic
distortions of the public debate cannot explain the distinction between
Seattle School District and Crawford very well. Recall that the distinc
tion between the initiatives in the two cases was that one regulated
access to the political process and the other access to a judicial rem
edy. It is not immediately apparent why one distorts public debate any
more than the other - the only difference is the forum within which
that debate takes place. But if the only goal is a fair public discourse, it
is not immediately apparent why distortions of that discourse should
be treated with less deference when they take place in a political
rather than a judicial forum.
This theory also cannot explain a case like Bush v. Gore, since
there was little evidence described in the Court's opinion that
486. Owen Fiss, for example, predicates his theory on the idea that the speech of some
should not be permitted to "drown[) out the voices of others or systematically distort[] the
public agenda." Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 98, at 786.

June 2003]

First Amendment Equal Protection

2505

Florida's recounting procedure allowed the playing field to be tilted
for or against anyone. It was not, for example, clear that urban
dwellers were disadvantaged by the vote-counting procedures rather
than rural dwellers, that Republicans were disadvantaged relative to
Democrats, or that whites were disadvantaged relative to blacks. At
best, the Court may have suspected that one group of citizens (those
supporting Bush) might be placed at a relative disadvantage by
Florida's manual-recount procedure. In all the other cases, there was
proof that a class of voters was being disadvantaged. Finally, the
systemic theory does a poor job of explaining the special scrutiny that
the Court has accorded the exercise of peremptory challenges. For if
both sides of a case have the opportunity to strike prospective jurors
they disfavor - whether upon grounds of race, gender, age, or view
point - there would seem to be very little risk that the jury's dialogue
would be "distorted."
What the systemic theory misses is the importance of equal partici
pation in both the First Amendment Equal Protection and Unconven
tional Equal Protection cases. For theorists in the Meiklejohn tradi
tion, " [w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said. "487 But the focus on equal par
ticipation in the Unconventional Equal Protection cases belies the
suggestion that the breadth of speech product available to listeners is
all that matters - it also matters that each citizen have the opportu
nity to speak and to have her voice heard. Put another way, it is
important for all citizens to have an equal opportunity to partake in
the conversations of democracy.
This is closely related to a more fundamental objection that liberal
scholars have raised to theories which rest upon some conception of a
fair political process or rich public discourse. Any such theory must
somehow explain what a just process would look like. As Professor
Tribe puts it: "Deciding what kind of participation the Constitution
demands requires analysis . . . of the character and importance of the
interest at stake."488 While proponents of democracy-based theories of
the First Amendment refer to the ideal of a "rich public debate,"489
determining what a fair public debate looks like requires some norma
tive theory of rights - a vision of how the political system ought to

487. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 87, at 26; see also Barron, supra
note 88, at 1653 (quoting Meiklejohn with approval). But see Karst, Equality in the First
Amendment, supra note 7, at 39-41 (arguing that even if one accepts Meiklejohn's proposi
tion, there is still a need to define public fora broadly "in order to ensure that all will be
heard").
488. Tribe, supra note 483, at 1069; see also TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-1, at 787 (noting
that a conception of free speech that rests upon political participation must ultimately ex
plain why these things are to be valued).
489. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 88, at 1410.
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function.490 To speak of "distortions of public debate,"491 as scholars
who advocate a systemic conception of speech are wont to do, is there
fore a bit of a cheat. Different observers are likely to have radically
different views as to what a fair political process would look like, and
therefore about what it means for the political process to be distorted
or skewed, either in the area of expression or with respect to other
areas of political participation. Relying on some vision of a fair politi
cal process therefore cannot allow us to escape normative judgments
about how we value various political and civil rights, and which should
be given priority in particular circumstances.492
The debate between the majority and the dissent in Romer brings
this problem dramatically to light. Both sides try to explain their views
in terms of some vision of a fair political process, yet arrive at diamet
rically opposed conclusions. The majority envisions a fair political
process as one that is free from animus against a particular group of
citizens, including antigay animus. In particular, a fair political process
rests on two principles: (1) "that government and each of its parts
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance," and (2)
that the electorate may not close off such access based upon "animos
ity toward a class of persons. "493
Justice Scalia's dissent sees the process problem quite differently.
For him, the problem that the Colorado electorate was trying to
address was that of a geographically concentrated and powerful cadre
of citizens "capturing" a local government, thereby undermining the
clearly expressed will of a majority of state voters. He characterizes
the initiative as a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans
to preserve sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws."494 For Justice
Scalia, the fact that the initiative may have been borne of hostility or
animus towards gays was irrelevant.495 In short, his dissent envisions a
fair (or at least a constitutional) political process as one in which a
majority of the state's electorate rules, even if it acts based upon
animus toward a particular group.
The point here is not to debate whether the majority or dissent has
the better argument. It is instead to emphasize that both of their
490. See Overton, supra note 32, at 83 (noting that "one's assumptions about how de
mocracy works or should work" may explain the choice between rules and standards with
respect to the democratic process).
491 . Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 88, at 1413.
492. See Tribe, supra note 483, at 1069. Of course, Professor Ely's elaboration of a proc
ess-based theory of constitutional rights may be seen as an attempt to explain how such
normative judgments should be made. See generally ELY, supra note 413.
493. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996).
494. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
495. Id. at 644.
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arguments depend upon a vision of how politics should function. The
systemic theory of speech thus cannot get around the sticky problem
of defining what sort of democratic participation the Constitution
requires. No theory of political participation, whether grounded in the
First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause, can escape these
sorts of judgments.
While neither the atomistic nor the systemic theory provides a
completely satisfactory account of the ideal of equal participation evi
dent in the First Amendment Equal Protection and Unconventional
Equal Protection cases, parts of both theories are essential to this
ideal. The systemic view of the First Amendment properly recognizes
that there is something special about political discourse that demands
especially searching review of schemes that vest discretion to regulate
in this area. The atomistic view captures the idea that it is not suffi
cient simply to have a range of ideas available to those interested in
hearing them, but that it is also important to provide an opportunity
for equal participation in the processes of democracy.
The approach I suggest is thus not exclusively atomistic or sys
temic, but instead carries elements of both. Professor Fallon's explana
tion for the special overbreadth rules applicable under the First
Amendment nicely captures this duality: "The First Amendment,
more even than any other constitutional provisions conferring funda
mental rights, contributes vitally to the preservation of an open,
democratic political regime, at the same time as it secures rights of
high importance to particular individuals."496 But First Amendment
cases, as I have attempted to show, are not the only ones specially
concerned with the twin goals of promoting an open democracy and
protecting the individual's right to be treated as an equal sovereign
citizen. That ideal is also implicit in the Unconventional Equal Protec
tion cases looking with special skepticism upon discretion that impli
cates equal political participation, whether that discretion is wielded
by police officers, bureaucrats, juries, judges, or the electorate. It is
therefore worth exploring whether there are other areas of political
participation that might benefit from closer examination, under the
light cast by First Amendment Equal Protection cases.
B.

New Directions

In Snowden v. Hughes, the Court stated that "the necessity of a
showing of purposeful discrimination is no less in a case involving
political rights than in any other."497 As my discussion of the Uncon
ventional Equal Protection cases shows, the Court has not consistently

496. Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, supra note 203, at 884 n.192.
497. 321 U.S. 1 , 11 (1944)
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adhered to this rule. The truth is that the Court has embraced a differ
ent analysis for assessing purposeful discrimination in considering
schemes that threaten equal political participation, just as it has
adopted a different analysis in considering schemes that mask pur
poseful discrimination in the First Amendment context. Yet it has
never expressly acknowledged the link between the line of reasoning
applied in equal protection cases implicating access to the political
process and in expressive equality cases decided under the First
Amendment.
In each of these areas, the Court has adopted a version of what
might be termed "front end" strict scrutiny. Traditional strict scrutiny
only kicks in on the "back end," requiring the government to show
narrow tailoring to a compelling interest only after a prima facie case
has been shown (e.g., after intentional race discrimination or content
based classification has been shown). But if the plaintiff cannot show a
facial classification or prove discriminatory purpose, then the govern
ment is never required to meet this burden.
The Unconventional Equal Protection cases on the other hand,
apply a more searching test on the front end in determining whether a
prima facie case is made. The jury-selection cases allow such a case to
be made where a discretionary system has a disparate impact on a par
ticular group. The political restructuring cases allow such a case to be
made where the "practical effect" of a law enacted by the electorate is
to make it more difficult for a particular minority group to secure
beneficial legislation. The one person, one vote cases impose a
presumption of unconstitutionality where there are significant dispari
ties in the size of a voting district, without even a showing of disparate
impact upon any particular racial group. They also evince a more
relaxed approach to justiciability and facial challenges, as well as a
willingness to examine more thoroughly the evidentiary record on
appeal. Each of these doctrines indicates a searching form of up-front
scrutiny arising from the special concern with potential inequalities
that may affect political participation. This is comparable to what the
Court has long done in First Amendment Equal Protection cases,
striking down discretionary schemes on their face without requiring
proof of actual content or viewpoint discrimination. The principal
difference is that in the First Amendment Equal Protection cases, the
presumption is irrebuttable. For instance, as in Forsyth County or
Shuttlesworth, the government cannot win by showing that - despite
the existence of a discretionary scheme that left its officials room
within which to discriminate - it did not really discriminate. The Bush
v. Gore Court, interestingly, appears to have applied a similar irrebut
table presumption.
One might object to importation of First Amendment Equal
Protection doctrines into other areas implicating rights of political
participation, on the ground that such rights, though they may bear a
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resemblance to expression, are not really speech rights. Professor
Tribe, for example, argues that voting "is not so much a matter of
engaging in positive acts of speech . . . but of participating in a collec
tive political enterprise."498 To the extent that this observation suggests
that the act of casting a vote is not exclusively an act of expressing
one's views, he is surely correct. If voting is a sort of speech act, it is
not only one that has a special sort of consequence but also one that
has a special social meaning: it is the quintessential act of political par
ticipation. This, however, does not differentiate it from other sorts of
speech acts for which the Court has adopted special protections
through the First Amendment Equal Protection cases. For many of
those cases, including Shuttlesworth, New York Times, and even
Forsyth County, also implicated participation in a "collective political
enterprise." Moreover, the fact that voting also implicates the value of
political participation - perhaps even more directly than in First
Amendment cases - cannot justify less searching review of discre
tionary election systems that threaten to deny equal protection. If any
thing, it suggests that judicial review of systems denying equality with
respect to the voting process should be subject to more searching
review.
The heightened value attaching to political participation, to be
sure, is not the only factor motivating the heightened attention to offi
cial discretion in the First Amendment and Unconventional Equal
Protection cases. Also of importance are the value that attaches to dis
cretion in a particular context, the capacity of courts effectively to
administer a legal rule that will rein in the harmful effects of discretion
without destroying it, and the degree to which circumstances suggest
that race or viewpoint based discrimination is likely under the circum
stances presented.
The threat to equality of political participation is therefore not the
only consideration motivating a shift away from Conventional Equal
Protection. But it is, and should be, an important determinant in the
development of doctrines designed to restrain official discretion where
it bears upon the functioning of the political process. The problem of
equality and discretion, then, is not one that is susceptible to an easy
formulaic answer. Where it is necessary to balance equality and discre
tion as the Court has done in many contexts, my approach would
require a thumb be placed on equality's side of the scale where rights
of political participation are at stake - especially where race dis
crimination may be at work. Such an approach should cause us to
think about some familiar problems in a different way.
I close with three areas of political equality that might appear
differently if viewed through the lens of First Amendment Equal

498. Tribe, supra note 424, at 243.
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Protection. The suggestions below are necessarily tentative. My objec
tive here is not to present a full-blown argument that particular
practices would be deemed unconstitutional, but rather to suggest how
borrowing from the First Amendment Equal Protection cases'
approach to official discretion might affect the constitutional analysis
of such problems. Such an analysis is particularly salient, given that
suspected but hard-to-prove racial discrimination lies in the back
ground of each of these equal protection problems. In other words, the
examples below present cases in which racial discrimination and view
point discrimination may at least partly overlap, making the sort of
analysis applied in the First Amendment Equal Protection cases espe
cially appropriate.
1.

Election Reform

Disparities in the electoral process might seem the most obvious
candidate for examining inequalities of political participation under
the lens of First Amendment Equal Protection. Among the most
pressing set of democracy-related questions is how the line of equal
protection precedent culminating in Bush v. Gore will affect currently
pending efforts at election reform. As explained below, the most
important implications of First Amendment Equal Protection may lie
not in the area of voting technology, which has heretofore attracted
the most attention, but rather to other areas in which discretion may
threaten equality of political participation.
In the wake of the November 2000 elections, several lawsuits were
filed throughout the country challenging disparities in the systems
used to cast and count votes.499 In the months that followed, a raft of
reports analyzed various problems plaguing our voting systems and
potential solutions.500 While these studies have not reached uniform
499. In the months following the November 2000 election, attorneys in Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, and California brought lawsuits challenging their states' continuing reliance on
punch-card voting systems. Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-3470 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 17,
2001); Black v. McGuffage, No. 01-C-208 (N.D. ll1. filed Jan. 11, 2001); NAACP v. Harris,
No. 01-CIV-120 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 2001); Andrews v. Cox, No. 01-CV-0318 (N.D. Ga.
filed Jan. 5, 2001). For selected pleadings and orders from these and other voting cases filed
in the wake of the November 2000 elections, see Election 2000, at http://election2000.stan
ford.edu/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
500. See, e.g., CALTECH-MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, VOTING - WHAT IS, WHAT
COULD BE (2001) (hereinafter CALTECH-MIT] ; CONSTITUTION PROJECT, BUILDING
CONSENSUS ON ELECTION REFORM (2001) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION PROJECT];
DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS SPECIAL COMM. ON ELECTION REFORM, REVITALIZING OUR
NATION'S ELECTION SYSTEM (2001) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS]; NAT'L TASK
FORCE ON ELECTION REFORM, ELECTION CTR., ELECTION 2000: REVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE NATION'S ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATORS (2001) [hereinafter
NAT'L TASK FORCE]; SURVEY RESEARCH CTR. & INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES,
UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE OF VOTING
TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (2001) (hereinafter SURVEY RESEARCH CTR.]; TASK
FORCE ON THE FED. ELECTION SYSTEM, NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO
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conclusions, almost all suggest problems that go well beyond the
mechanical devices used for voting, resulting in inequalities in whose
votes actually gets counted.501
What these studies reveal is wide variations among counties in
various aspects of the voting process, including machinery used to cast
votes, registration systems, polling-place operations, provisional vot
ing, and the use of sample ballots. The amount of discretion that states
delegate to local election officials in the conduct of elections varies
dramatically from state to state:
State election codes and regulations may be very specific or very general.

Moreover some states have mandated statewide election administration

guidelines and procedures that foster uniformity in the way local j urisdic

tions conduct elections. Other states have guidelines that generally per

mit local election j urisdictions considerable autonomy and discretion in
the way that they run elections.502

A "decentralized" approach to the conduct of elections predominates
in most states, devolving responsibility for the conduct of elections to
more than 10,000 counties, cities, and other local governmental enti
ties. 503
Problems with the methods by which votes are cast have attracted
the most attention and, it appears, have been the subject of the most
litigation thus far.504 Studies of voting systems conducted in the wake
of the November 2000 election have found significant disparities in the
uncounted vote rate - that is, the combined "overvote" and "under
vote" - arising from the use of different types of voting machines.
According to a comprehensive study of data from the 2000 elections
conducted by Professor Henry Brady and his colleagues at the Univer
sity of California, Berkeley, Survey Research Center, punch-card sys
tems result in significantly more uncounted votes than direct record
electronic systems, lever machines, optical-scan systems, or paper
ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (2001) [hereinafter NAT'L
COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS:
PERSPECTIVES ON ACTIVITIES AND CHALLENGES ACROSS THE NATION (2001) [hereinafter
GAO PERSPECTIVES].
501. See, e.g., CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 21 (finding significant disparities in re
sidual vote rate among voting systems); SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., supra note 500, at 2
(finding that punch card systems have significantly higher residual vote rates than other sys
tems); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
FACTORS THAT AFFECTED UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (
2001) [hereinafter GAO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS] (finding that uncounted votes varied in
part based on type of equipment used).
502. GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 7.
503. CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 13 ("Almost all states have given the authority
for administering elections to local governments."); GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at
30 n.7.
504. See cases cited supra note 499; Hasen, supra note 428, at 398-402 (describing the
benefits and costs of requiring equality in the mechanics of elections).
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ballots.sos In some but not all states, people of color are particularly
hard hit by the technology gap.s06
These statistical disparities have resulted in litigation challenging
states' continuing use of systems with differing uncounted-vote rates.
The structure of the argument bears at least a superficial similarity to
that embraced by the Court in Bush v. Gore. In Bush v. Gore, the
problem complained of was the state's failure to set adequate stan
dards for manual recounts, resulting in significant disparities among
counties. In the punch-card litigation, the problem complained of is
the states' failure to set adequate standards for voting systems, result
ing in significant disparities among counties.so7
Such a challenge is one that might conceivably have been raised
even before Bush v. Gore, based on the one person, one vote line of
cases. Indeed, in one sense, it presents a much easier case for applica
tion of settled equal protection principles than Bush v. Gore. For there
was relatively little statistical evidence of intercounty disparities within
Florida arising from the manual recount procedures used. By contrast,
there is already a significant and growing body of evidence proving
that disparities arise from the different systems used to cast votes.sos
This makes the voting-machine cases much more similar to traditional
quantitative vote-dilution cases, in which it is possible to present
empirical proof that the relative voting strength of different counties
has been strengthened or diminished by the challenged practice.so9
The voting-machine litigation thus presents a relatively clear case
of inequalities in the opportunities for political participation arising
505. SURVEY RESEARCH Cm., supra note 500, at 4, 29; see also GAO STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 501, at 9 (finding that counties using punch card had a higher percent
ages of uncounted votes than those using electronic, paper, or optical scan systems).
506. See Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?, at
http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm/inferior.pdf (Jan. 2001 ); see also Michael Tomz & Robert
P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?,
at 18, at http://www.stanford.edu/-tomz/pubs/gap.pdf (June 12, 2002) (finding black-white
disparity in voided ballots to be substantially lower on modern direct-record electronic sys
tems than on punch cards and optical-scan systems).
507. See Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1 107 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
508. See, e.g., SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., supra note 500; Tomz & Van Houweling, supra
note 506.
509. On the other hand, there may be stronger justifications for using different voting
systems than for using different recounting standards within a state. In particular, the in
creased costs of converting to more reliable systems, states have argued, distinguish the two
scenarios. See Hasen, supra note 428, at 399 (stating that "the costs associated with upgrad
ing voting equipment . . . will be considerable"). I do not here dwell on whether this argu
ment might justify using voting systems of varying degrees of reliability within a state. How
ever, to the extent that the one person, one vote cases are deemed applicable to voting
system disparities, those cases require application of strict scrutiny to intercounty inequali
ties. Id. at 389 ("It is hornbook law that laws infringing on fundamental rights, including
voting, must be judged under the standard of strict scrutiny . . . . ) Under this level of scru
tiny, the costs of remedying the claimed inequalities are not generally an adequate justifica
tion for allowing those inequalities to persist. Id. at 395.
"
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from the discretion vested in local officials - in this case, the discre
tion to choose what type of voting machinery to use.
While the use of different kinds of voting machines may be the
most visible electoral equality issue to emerge in the wake of the
November 2000 elections, it is probably not the most significant, either
in terms of its impact on the number of votes counted or its impact on
equal protection doctrine. It is only one of the several areas in which
the discretion delegated to local officials in the conduct of elections
may result in inequalities among voters. One study, for example, esti
mates that approximately 4 to 6 million votes were lost in the Novem
ber 2000 elections. Of those, approximately 1.5 to 2 million votes were
lost due to voting equipment or confusing ballots, while an estimated
1.5 to 3 million were lost due to voter-registration problems and up to
1 million were lost due to problems in polling-place operations.510
While these calculations are admittedly rough, they do suggest other
areas in which the states have delegated discretion to local officials
that may have a substantial impact upon electoral equality.
An approach to these problems that draws upon First Amendment
Equal Protection doctrine would look with particular skepticism on
decentralized election systems conferring significant discretion upon
county officials - even where it is difficult to isolate any particular
factor and empirically prove that any particular group has been dis
advantaged as a result of that factor. Take, for example, the problems
that several studies have found to exist in voter-registration systems.
Most of the studies conducted after the November 2000 elections sug
gest that this is among the most serious existing problems with our
voting system.51 1 Only thirteen of the states have a statewide voter
registration system, resulting in wide variations across jurisdictions
(and even within j urisdictions) in how voter registration is handled.512
For example, voter-registration forms missing certain information
(e.g., the last four digits of one's social security number) may be
treated differently from county to county, or even within one
county.513 Aggravating the problems arising from the lack of statewide
registration systems are the inconsistent practices by which voters'
names are "purged" from the voting rolls.514 Quantifying the number
of votes lost as a result of the defects in registration systems - let
alone determining whether particular groups are disproportionately

510. CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 9.
511. See, e.g., CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 9, 26-31; DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra
note 500, at 37-43; GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 51-98; NAT'L COMM'N ON FED.
ELECTION REFORM, supra note 500, at 26-33.
512. GAO PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 72, 95.
513. Id. at 72.
514. CALTECH-MIT, supra note 500, at 29.
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harmed - is extremely difficult.sis Nevertheless, in at least one case,
voters have claimed that Florida officials disproportionately purged
African American voters from the rolls.s16
Some of the post-2000 election studies recommend that all states
implement statewide voter-registration systems, as a means to pro
mote uniform treatment of voters across j urisdictions.517 Such a system,
if not a panacea, might reduce the degree of discretion exercised by
local officials in determining how registrations should be handled and
who should be purged. The question is whether one might challenge
interjurisdictional disparities in voter registration within a state, with
out evidence of either discriminatory intent or disparate impact as to
any particular racial or ethnic group. Under traditional equal protec
tion analysis, and even under the one person, one vote doctrine, such a
challenge would seem unlikely. Conventional Equal Protection analy
sis would require a showing of discriminatory intent, while the one
person, one vote cases would at the very least require some statistical
proof of quantitative vote dilution.
On the other hand, the analysis applied in Bush v. Gore - and
borrowed from the First Amendment Equal Protection cases - might
allow such disparate practices to be held unconstitutional even without
proof of discriminatory intent or disparate impact. For in these cases,
the delegation of broad discretion to government officials, even with
out proof that a particular group has been disadvantaged, has sufficed
to make out a violation. It is thus in areas like voter registration,
rather than voting machinery, where Bush v. Gore's incorporation of
First Amendment Equal Protection analysis may ultimately prove
most significant. Borrowing from the jury-selection cases, one might
require at least some empirical evidence of disparate impact or treat
ment, in addition to the presence of discretion, to make out a prima
fade case of discrimination. Courts might adopt a similar approach to
analysis of other problems that the election-reform reports have iden
tified, including intrastate disparities in provisional voting,518 distribu
tion of sample ballots in advance of the election,519 and poll-worker
515. Id. at 8-9 (making a rough estimate of number of votes lost due to registration mix
ups).
516. NAACP v. Harris, No. Ol-CIV-120 (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 2001).
517. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 500, at 40; NAT'L COMM'N ON FED.
ELECTION REFORM, supra note 500, at 29.
518. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 500, at 36 (recom
mending that every state adopt a provisional voting system); NAT'L TASK FORCE, supra note
500, at 44 (noting that more than half the states do not have a system for provisional voting).
519. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 500, at 1-2 (advocating distribution of sample
ballots to all voters); DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 500, at 50-51 (noting variations in
state practices for distributing voting guides, including sample ballots); GAO PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 500, at 176 (noting variations in distribution of sample ballots among jurisdic
tions); Peter Brien, Voter Pamphlets: The Next Best Step In Election Reform, 28 J. LEGIS. 87
(2002).
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recruitment, training, and pay.520 Each of these practices may have a
disparate impact upon particular groups, albeit one that is very diffi
cult to prove.
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulties of developing judi
cially manageable standards to disparities in any of these areas. What I
am suggesting is that courts should look more closely than they previ
ously have at decentralized electoral systems that confer broad discre
tion upon local officials, where the nature of that discretion makes it
difficult to determine whether particular groups are disadvantaged.
The problem here is comparable to that identified by the City of
Lakewood Court: the absence of precise, uniform standards
prescribed in advance makes it very easy for officials to discriminate
behind a veil of discretion.521 "Without these guideposts, post hoc
rationalizations by the [official] and the use of shifting or illegitimate
criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in
any particular case whether the [official] is permitting favorable, and
suppressing unfavorable, expression."522 The kernel of equal protec
tion wisdom buried in Bush v. Gore is that this danger should be taken
just as seriously in the voting process as it is in the speech context.
2.

Incumbent Gerrymandering

The voting process is not the only area that might stand to benefit
were it to borrow from the First Amendment Equal Protection cases.
Another area that may warrant more searching up-front analysis is the
redrawing of district boundaries to prevent serious challenges to
incumbents from being mounted. Here too, First Amendment cases
could inform the analysis of a problem that, to this point, has not been
understood to present serious equal protection concerns.
A notorious recent example of this practice of incumbent protec
tion is the redrawing of California's congressional legislative districts
in the wake of the 2000 census. District lines were redrawn in a trans
parent effort to create "safe seats" for virtually all state and federal
legislators - a package to which, unsurprisingly, state legislators of
both parties almost unanimously agreed. As a result of the post-2000
California congressional redistricting, the number of competitive seats
decreased from 14 of 52 in 1990, to only 1 of 53.523 Some commentators

520. DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 500, at 94-99 (noting variations in how jurisdic
tions handle poll-worker issues, and problems that result from inadequacies); GAO
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 500, at 158 (identifying training and recruitment of poll workers
as a "major problem").
521. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
522 Id. at 758.
523. Where the Lines Fall, CAL. J., Jan. 2002, at 36, 36-37.

2516

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2409

have understandably labeled the 2000 California redistricting an
"incumbent protection plan. "524
Under traditional equal protection analysis, this sort of redistrict
ing presents no constitutional problem, but is left to the discretion of
those who draw district lines, whether or not they stand to benefit.
Although the Court once stated that districting plans adopted "to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political ele
ments of the population"525 violate equal protection, it has not held to
this formulation. In Gaffney v. Cummings, for example, the Court held
that districting plans may be drawn to "achieve a rough approximation
of the statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican
parties," rejecting the contention that such a "political gerrymander"
violates equal protection.526 In the Court's view, consideration of the
partisan political consequences of drawing districts were "unavoid
able."527 Since then, the Court has held that it is permissible for district
lines to be drawn for political reasons, so long as they are not drawn
for "predominantly racial" reasons.528 Thus, drawing districts in order
to create a "safe Republican" or "safe Democratic" district is permis
sible, so long as race is not the " 'predominant factor' motivating the
legislature's redistricting decision."529
The current standard thus does not allow any inquiry into whether
Democrats and Republicans have colluded to protect incumbents, as
occurred in the most recent round of California redistricting. All the
Equal Protection Clause has been held to forbid is the use of race as a
"predominant factor." Civil rights plaintiffs challenging the constitu
tionality of such plans must therefore show intentional race discrimi
nation, an argument that the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund
("MALDEF") unsuccessfully attempted to make with respect to the
California plan.530 Such arguments provide the only realistic vehicle for
challenging a redistricting plan on constitutional grounds.
Even if one agrees with the race-discrimination arguments pressed
by MALDEF in that case, those arguments only capture a sliver of the
problem with California's redistricting plan. While racial gerryman
dering may or may not have been one aspect of the line-drawing
process, it is only part of the larger picture - namely, the self-dealing
524. Lisa Plendl, Are Voters Dissed by Redistricting?, CAL. J., Jan. 2002, at 12.
525. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
526. 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973).
527. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
528. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 249 (2001).
529. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999).
530. See Cano v. Davis, 21 l F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd, 537 U.S. 1 100
(2003) . MALDEF also argued that the redistricting had a disparate impact upon Latinos in
violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, an argument that the district court also rejected.
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by legislators of both parties designed to prevent challengers from
being elected. To the extent one embraces any sort of process-based
theory of constitutional rights, such self-dealing is especially perni
cious. It is one of the prime areas in which the political branches
cannot be expected to police themselves. The risk of self-dealing thus
presents a strong argument for entering the "political thicket."531 And
if racial gerrymandering also plays a role in the drawing of district
lines, as was arguably the case in California, it only strengthens the
argument for judicial intervention.
Notwithstanding the appearance of unfairness arising from incum
bent gerrymandering, one might still question the propriety of j udicial
intervention on both theoretical and practical grounds. On a theoreti
cal level, it is not entirely clear whose rights are violated by an incum
bency-protective redistricting. Those of the voters? Those of would-be
challengers? More to the point, it is not immediately apparent what
the equality right being violated might be. For surely there can be no
constitutional right to live in a competitive district. And if there is
some constitutional right, it is unclear who would have standing to
raise it. On a practical level, a fundamental problem is the inherent
difficulty in developing judicially manageable standards by which to
measure incumbent gerrymandering. It may be readily apparent that
California's district lines were drawn with the protection of incum
bents in mind� But going down this road might present a difficult
problem of line drawing, especially given the inherent difficulties of
probing legislative intent. For example, how much of a shift in the
number of safe seats should be required to make out a prima facie
case of incumbent gerrymandering? And is all incumbent gerryman
dering to be forbidden? Or only in cases where protection of incum
bents is the predominant consideration of the line-drawing body?
Here again, borrowing from First Amendment Equal Protection
cases may provide some guidance. Particularly illuminating is Service
Employees International Union v. Fair Political Practices Commis
sion,532 · in which the Ninth Circuit considered a First Amendment
challenge to Proposition 73, a California campaign finance reform
measure enacted through the initiative process. The basis for the
constitutional challenge was that the measure put challengers at a
competitive disadvantage relative to incumbents by limiting the
amount that contributors may give during each fiscal year, as opposed
to each election cycle.533 Plaintiffs argued that this scheme violated the
531. For arguments that courts should intervene with respect to incumbent gerryman
dering, see Sally Dworak-Fisher, Note, Drawing the Line on Incumbency Protection, 2 MICH.
J . RACE & L. 131 (1996); Kristen L. Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Ger
rymander, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 913 (1996).
532. 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992).
533. SEIU, 955 F.2d. at 1314-15.
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First Amendment and produced evidence that incumbents had a much
easier time raising money in off years.534 The restrictions were, how
ever, "viewpoint and content neutral," and did not facially advantage
either incumbents or challengers.535 Moreover, as the dissent pointed
out (and the majority did not dispute), there was no evidence of pur
poseful discrimination against challengers as a class.536 The Ninth
Circuit nevertheless struck down Proposition 73, concluding that the
"discriminatory impact" on challengers was sufficient to violate the
First Amendment.537
The SEIU court's mode of First Amendment analysis has much to
recommend it with respect not only to campaign finance schemes, but
also to redistricting schemes like California's. As is typical of First
Amendment analysis, the SEIU court looked beyond facial neutrality
and evidence of intentional discrimination, implicitly recognizing the
difficulty of coming up with direct evidence of such intent. The
dangers of tilting the political balance in favor of incumbents, the
court's opinion suggests, justifies a more searching brand of equal
protection analysis.
Could such an analysis be applied to a redistricting scheme that
tilts the competitive balance sharply in favor of incumbents, like the
post-2000 California congressional redistricting? The sharp decrease in
the number of competitive districts, from 14 to just 1, would seem to
constitute compelling evidence that the scheme was indeed drawn sys
tematically to favor the interests of incumbents. One could certainly
imagine a legal test (not unlike that constructed in the post-Batson
peremptory-strike cases) in which such evidence were held sufficient
to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in favor of
incumbents. Moreover, if there is any area in which the discretion of
incumbent legislators to act impartially might legitimately be ques
tioned, it is in the drawing of district lines. Accordingly, to the extent
one believes that a strong case for judicial intervention exists where
the political branches cannot be trusted,538 a redistricting plan that sys
tematically advantages incumbents is a prime candidate for searching
front-end review. Indeed, the arguments for judicial intervention for
incumbent gerrymandering are even stronger than in SEIU, given that
Proposition 73 was enacted by the voters whereas California's most
recent redistricting plan is a product of sitting legislators, thus exacer
bating the risk of self-dealing by entrenched interests.
534. Id. at 1315.
535. Id. at 1318, 1320.
536. Id. at 1324 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
537. Id. at 1320.
538. See ELY, supra note 413, at 106 ("Courts must police inhibitions on expression and
other political activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do so: ins have a way of
wanting to make sure the outs stay out.").
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The First Amendment prism through which the SEIV court viewed
Proposition 73 also provides some guidance with respect to the ques
tion of whose rights are violated by a redistricting scheme skewed to
the advantage of incumbents, as well as the concomitant question of
who might have standing to raise such a challenge. Although none of
those who sued to enjoin Proposition 73 were prospective political
challengers, the court held that groups which alleged an interest in
contributing to challengers had standing to sue, viewing the making of
such contributions as an act of political association. Thus, the SEIV
court viewed both challengers and their supporters to have a cogniza
ble interest in challenging a campaign finance scheme tilted to the
advantage of incumbents. Extending this analysis to the area of redis
tricting, either those voters who would seek to support a challenger or
prospective challenger should also have standing to challenge a redis
tricting scheme tilted to the disadvantage of all challengers. As in the
campaign finance context, it ought not be necessary for any particular
voter or challenger to meet the practically insuperable burden of
showing that his or her district would have been competitive but for
the incumbent-skewed redistricting. For it is the collective interests of
all voters throughout the state who would seek to support challengers
- as well as the would-be challengers themselves - whose interests
are violated by a redistricting plan designed to protect all incumbents.
There are of course practical difficulties in piercing the veil of dis
cretion in redistricting cases, a judicial exercise that has proven to be
fraught with peril in the most recent series of racial-gerrymandering
cases.539 There is certainly a strong counterargument that judicial
policing of incumbent gerrymandering is an area in which judicially
manageable standards would be so difficult to fashion that courts
should stay out entirely. The difficulties of determining whether a
scheme benefits incumbents did not, however, stop the SEIU court
from taking a hard look at Proposition 73. It is not immediately clear
that policing redistricting schemes drawn to systematically advantage
incumbents presents practical difficulties on a different order of
magnitude from those faced by the SEIU court. At the very least, an
approach to incumbent gerrymandering that borrows from First
Amendment equality cases like SEIV warrants further consideration.
3.

Peremptory Challenges

A final area in which First Amendment Equal Protection might
inform assessment of inequalities in the realm of political participation
concerns the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude from juries
those with disfavored viewpoints. Courts and scholars have heretofore
assumed that, whatever other forms of discrimination litigants are pre539. See Gerken, supra note 414.
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eluded from acting upon in the exercise of peremptory challenges, it is
perfectly appropriate for such challenges to be exercised against those
who harbor certain viewpoints, political or otherwise. For example,
prosecutors may not exclude all blacks from a jury trial involving a
black defendant, but can certainly choose their peremptories to
exclude the most liberal members of the venire. So too, defense attor
neys may not exercise their peremptories to exclude whites, but are
free to exercise their peremptories against the most conservative
members of the venire. Where such a scenario plays out, the net effect
is to exclude the polar ideological extremes from the jury ultimately
selected.
If we simply view the jury as nothing more than an objective fact
finder, then such exclusion does not appear especially problematic so
long as both sides are allowed an equal number of challenges. Indeed,
excluding people at the extremes from juries is likely to increase the
likelihood of reaching a decision, especially where unanimity is.
required, by decreasing the possibility that there will be one or two
holdouts. If, however, we view jury service as an opportunity for
democratic participation comparable to voting, then such exclusion
raises serious concerns.
Consideration of Vik Amar's analysis of jury service as a form of
political participation brings this problem to light. Tracing the histori
cal pedigree of the jury, Professor Amar persuasively argues that jury
service should be treated as a form of political participation, subject to
the same protections from discrimination as that of the franchise.540
Linking jury service to voting, he suggests, provides a limiting princi
ple upon the antidiscrimination rule that the Court has articulated in
the Batson line of cases. If the exercise of peremptories is subject to
the same antidiscrimination limitations to which the vote is subject
and only to those limitations, Professor Amar argues, then litigants
would be precluded from striking jurors based upon race, sex, eco
nomic class, and age.541 Because such classifications are also prohibited
bases for denying the right to vote, they should also be prohibited
bases for denying the right to participate on juries.
Professor Amar is quite right to align jury service with voting. But
if we follow his line of analysis, it seems doubtful that constitutional
limitations on the exercise of peremptories can ultimately avoid the
"slippery slope" problem - that is, the concern that if race, age, and
gender are impermissible bases for exercising peremptory challenges,
then other forms of group status should also be forbidden bases. As he
notes with respect to the jurisprudence of jury exclusion, "slippery
slope problems have plagued courts because the doctrine at present is
540. Amar, supra note 305, at 217-54.
541. Id. at 251-52.
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not informed by a workable theory to identify protected groups."542 As
stated by one circuit court: " [I]f the age classification is adopted,
surely blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an
endless variety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treat
ment. "543 The slippery-slope problem becomes even more pronounced
if we examine First Amendment limitations upon whom may be
excluded from voting.
This becomes evident by considering a hypothetical scheme
allowing election officials to deny the franchise to those with political
views at the ideological extremes. Suppose, for example, that the gov
ernment had discretion to prevent (or keep from having their votes
counted) "Naderites" with views to the left of the Democratic Party
and "Buchananites" with views to the right of the Republican Party
from voting in the presidential election. Or, to draw a closer analogy,
suppose that Republican and Democratic party leaders in each pre
cinct were allowed to strike from voter rolls one hundred individuals
whose political views they found most objectionable. This is analogous
to what prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civil attorneys do all the .
time when exercising their peremptories to exclude prospective jurors
with political views they believe to be against their client. Such denial
of the vote, however, would surely fail constitutional scrutiny even if
applied in such a way as to exclude equal numbers of Naderites and
Buchananites. Thus, if we apply the same test to exclusions from the
jury box that we apply to exclusions from the voting booth, then the
present system according to which peremptory strikes are exercised is
patently unconstitutional, for viewpoint-based exclusions would
clearly be impermissible in the voting context.
These dangers are magnified in the area of juror exclusion, given
the overlap between racial and viewpoint discrimination. As noted
above, the Court since Batson has counted as a "race-neutral" justifi
cation for striking black jurors the fact that the prosecutor "did not
like the way they looked."544 As it stands, then, litigants may strike
jurors for ostensibly nonracial reasons that shroud hidden racial bias.
Take, for example, a black juror's articulation of skepticism about
whether police officers are generally truthful during voir dire, or, con
versely, a white juror's articulation of the view that police officers are
generally more honest than the average person. It is impermissible to
strike jurors because of their race, but perfectly acceptable to strike
them because of expressed viewpoints. But to the extent that such
views tend to predominate among one racial group or another, view
points may easily serve as a surrogate for race discrimination in the
exercise of peremptories.
542. Id. at 215-16.
543. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985).
544. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995).
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If the same protections from discrimination that apply to voting
also apply to jury service, then viewpoint discrimination must be
added to the list. This would seem to leave us with no choice but (in
Professor Amar's words) to ride the slippery slope to the bottom and
abolish the peremptory challenge altogether.545 For it is virtually
impossible to imagine any system in which a court could possibly hope
to prevent litigants from exercising peremptory challenges based upon
a prospective juror's political or other viewpoints. Accordingly, if
we apply the teachings of First Amendment Equal Protection to the
exercise of peremptory challenges, it would appear to leave no choice
but to eliminate discretion in this area by getting rid of peremptories
entirely.
An obvious criticism of this argument is that it proves too much. It
is, however, at least worth considering how First Amendment Equal
Protection analysis might play out, if we think of jury service as a form
of political participation, as both the First Amendment Equal Protec
tion and Unconventional Equal Protection cases would seem to sug
gest. If jury service is understood as a form of political participation, it
would provide further ammunition to the argument made by Justice
Marshall and others for eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.546
The post-Batson cases have demonstrated just how difficult it is to
police racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
As in the case of incumbent gerrymandering, the overlap between
issues of race discrimination and viewpoint discrimination would seem
to call for particular skepticism of official discretion in this area of
democratic participation.
CONCLUSION

For too long, we have failed to acknowledge the relationship
between the First Amendment and rights of political participation
traditionally examined under the lens of the Equal Protection Clause.
The special First Amendment doctrines regarding precision, standing,
justiciability, facial challenges, and appellate factfinding provide
mechanisms designed to prevent government decisionmakers from
suppressing disfavored viewpoints and disfavored speakers behind a
veil of discretion. It is no accident that some of the most important
First Amendment equality cases arose during the civil rights move
ment, against a backdrop of racial discrimination, for it is where racial

545. See Amar, supra note 305, at 215 n.81 ("One response to the slippery slopes would
be to ride them to the bottom, eliminating key persons and peremptories, leaving only ran
dom selection from recently refilled juror wheels and challenges for cause based upon an
individual juror's demonstrated incompetence or bias.").
546. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Alschuler, supra note 344, at 209.
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bias threatens to distort the proper functioning of the political process
that the dangers of discretion are most pronounced.
The approach taken in the First Amendment Equal Protection
cases stands in stark contrast to that taken in Conventional Equal
Protection cases. By requiring rigorous proof of intentional discrimi
nation, the latter cases make it relatively easy for official discrimina
tion to go undetected. There is no simple answer to the question why
the Supreme Court has adopted a more sensitive approach to the
equality problems posed by official discretion in some contexts than in
others. But at least part of the explanation lies in the special impor
tance attached to preventing inequality in political participation.
The Unconventional Equal Protection cases represent a third
approach to reconciling the values of equality and discretion - one
that is a sort of hybrid between First Amendment Equal Protection
and Conventional Equal Protection - and help explain the differ
ences between the standard doctrines. In its jury exclusion, political
restructuring, and one person, one vote cases, the Court has adopted
analytic frameworks that relax the traditional quantum of proof
required to establish a violation. Like Conventional Equal Protection
cases, the true focus of these cases is on preventing intentional dis
crimination against a disfavored group. But like the First Amendment
Equal Protection cases, these cases exhibit a distrust of official discre
tion - and a willingness to find a violation without smoking-gun
evidence of discriminatory intent. They also adopt special procedural
rules and rules of j usticiability that resemble those embraced in the
First Amendment context.
Though thinly reasoned, the Court's recent decisions in Thomas v.
Chicago Park District and Bush v. Gore suggest the possibility that
these dissimilar approaches to the problem of equality and discretion
might be harmonized. More specifically, they suggest how First
Amendment Equal Protection doctrines might inform our approach to
inequalities in the realm of political participation that have heretofore
escaped notice. Where official discretion threatens to deny equality of
political participation, courts should apply heightened front-end scru
tiny comparable to that which has traditionally been applied in First
Amendment equality cases.
Adoption of the approach I advocate would result in a markedly
different treatment of issues that have not to this point been viewed as
serious equal protection concerns. It should, for example, cause us to
rethink such problems as intrastate inequalities in voting and registra
tion systems; state redistricting schemes that tilt the competitive bal
ance in favor of incumbents; and the exercise of peremptory chal
lenges against those with disfavored viewpoints. Like the line of civil
rights-era speech cases culminating in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
these present problems are prime examples of situations where the
First Amendment imperative against viewpoint discrimination and the
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Equal Protection Clause imperative against race discrimination may
overlap. For in each of these areas, there is a pronounced risk of
covert race discrimination resulting in denial of equality in the realm
of political participation. Even where it is impossible to prove
discriminatory intent, courts should consider adopting legal rules that
will prevent decisionmakers from denying equality in the realm of
participation behind a veil of discretion.
What is still needed, and what I have only begun to suggest in this
Article, is a better account of the relationship between the norms of
equality in the realm of speech, race and participation than existing
constitutional theories provide. To adequately make judgments about
whether to sacrifice discretion in order to promote equality (or vice
versa) in any given context, we must have a more refined conception
of what sorts of interests are most worthy of protection. Only by
developing such a theory can we hope to preserve official discretion
where it is needed, and at the same time promote the constitutional
vision of a more perfect union, one in which all citizens can participate
as equals in the conversations of democracy.

